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Freeman, Richard B., Ph.D., 1998, Forestry
The U.S. Forest Service and the Political Construction of Ecosystem 
Management (272 pp.)
This study is a history of the U.S. Forest Service's adoption and construction
of Ecosystem Management as official policy for managing the national forests.
Secondary sources are used to establish the historical background for this 
story, such as documented histories, policy texts, newspaper articles, and 
widely-distributed magazine articles. Also, secondary sources are used as 
primary evidence when their popularity reflects attitudes and political 
positions influential during their time. To establish events and 
developments during the formative years of ecosystem management (1989- 
1993), I provide, as primary evidence not available in secondary sources, text 
from interviews, memos, letters, and speeches. I conducted interviews with 
seven of the people who were prominent in the Forest Service's adoption of 
Ecosystem Management. Approved transcriptions of these interviews are on 
file at the University of Montana's Mansfield Library.
This history unfolds along the lines of two opposite, yet simultaneous 
movements — the invalidation of Forest Service agency and the official 
political revision and reassertion of that agency. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the Forest Service, as a political entity in an environment of conflict, suffered 
a drastic loss of legitimacy, agency, and identity. During this dilution of the 
Forest Service's persona, a power shift was occurring — largely in reaction to 
court mandates enjoining the Forest Service from timber harvest on various 
western forests. Amidst this power struggle arose a new framework to guide 
decision making regarding millions of acres of forest declared to be habitat of 
the northern spotted owl (and ultimately, of other threatened species). 
During this reconstruction, the political actors used science to aid their cause, 
creating a political position of power for the non-timber-focused applied 
sciences — particularly conservation biology and landscape ecology. These 
scientists, as part of die bureaucratic milieu of the universities and agencies, 
were influenced by the several "crises" that attended the political upheaval. 
And, those who would translate scientific statements into science — 
themselves scientists -- would become influential in Forest Service policy. 
Congress, the courts, the Forest Service, and other executive agencies 
summoned the work of these various scientists in constructing their 
response, which emerged ultimately as ecosystem management. It was one 
particularly acute crisis, however — the embarrassment of the Bush 
administration during the Rio Conference on global warming in Brazil, 1992 
— that precipitated the adoption of ecosystem management as a significant 
policy event.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
On June 4,1992, in a memo to regional foresters and station directors, 
Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson announced what he called "the 
marriage" between the agency and Ecosystem Management.1 He also laid out 
the general principles and instructed his audience to report back within 90 
days regarding their strategies for implementing the policy.
Why is this event significant? What did the memo signify? Was it the 
emergence of a new policy paradigm — a new "ecological approach" to public 
forestry? Was his memo a rewording of the same old emphasis on timber? 
Perhaps it demonstrates some sort of development or evolution in 
environmental policy? Perhaps, more importantly, the memo signifies that, 
at heart, public forestry and forest policy are political in origin. This 
dissertation is a historical inquiry into the processes and events that 
culminated in Robertson's memo of June 4, 1992. The study demonstrates 
that forest policy is, indeed, based upon politics.
The paper narrates the history of the Forest Service's "marriage" with 
Ecosystem Management as a political story, with subjects, agendas, and 
conflict, itself part of a larger political story. This history, as I have written it, 
unfolds along the lines of two opposite, yet simultaneous movements — the 
invalidation of Forest Service agency and the official political revision and
1 Robertson to Regional Foresters, June 4> 1992.
1
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reassertion of that agency.2 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Forest Service as 
a political entity in an environment of conflict endured a drastic loss of 
legitimacy, agency, and identity. During this dilution of the Forest Service's 
persona, a power shift was occurring — largely driven by court mandates 
enjoining the Forest Service from timber harvest on various forests. Amidst 
this power struggle arose a new structure for decision making regarding 
millions of acres of forest declared to be in spotted owl habitat (and 
ultimately, the habitat of other rare species). During this reconstruction, the 
political actors called on science to aid their cause, creating a political position 
of power that the applied sciences (especially wildlife biology, hydrology, and 
ecology) had not previously experienced. Congress, the courts, the Forest 
Service, and other executive agencies, summoned the services of a scientific 
community and its production of science, which featured its own political 
relationships and personalities, as well as its own bureaucracy.
Methodology and Method
The historian sets out to arrange "facts" — documentable events, names, 
dates, messages, and so forth — in a way that makes sense to him or her. 
Crudely speaking, constructing history requires two tasks: the making or 
gathering of facts -  the researching and documenting of useful pieces of 
information — and the making sense of facts — strictly interpretation. 
Interpretation involves assigning signifiers (the facts) into meaningful 
categories (metaphors). If the reader — the judge -- cannot dispute the fact, can
2 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "agency" as such: "1: the capacity, 
condition, or state of acting or of exerting power: OPERATION." The Oxford English 
Dictionary uses similar language: "1. The faculty  of an agent of acting; active working or 
operation; action or activity." (Italidzation of "faculty" is mine.)
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agree with the attribution of category to fact, and can agree that the category is 
worth mentioning, then the statement stands as history.
In constructing this history, I combine three methods for making or 
appropriating facts, each corresponding with its own type of evidence. First, 
to construct historical context, I use previously documented histories or other 
secondary texts (texts written by others about the events I, too, am 
chronicling). For instance, I employ histories and policy textbooks, such as 
David Clary's Timber and the Forest Service, Paul Flirt's Conspiracy of 
Optimism, Michael Kraft's Environmental Policy and Politics, Stephen 
Yaffee's Wisdom of the Spotted Owl, and Samual Dana and Sally Fairfax's 
standard Forest and Range Policy. I also use newspaper and magazine articles 
out of the widely-distributed publications — for instance the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, and Time and Newsweek  magazines. Authorship and 
date of these texts vary.
Second, to establish previously undocumented fact — particularly 
concerning attitudes and political positions of the actors during those times — 
I also use some otherwise secondary texts. For instance, I use histories like 
Michael Frome's The Forest Service — to demonstrate the popular historical 
perspectives. I use newspaper and magazine articles to demonstrate attitudes 
of the press toward policy makers and policy developments. I am assuming 
that a study or history of the Forest Service, widely read and cited during in 
the 1980s, provides evidence regarding prevailing attitudes about policy.
Texts that provides primary evidence in this context would serve as a 
secondary source in another case.
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Third, to establish additional fact, I provide, as primary evidence not 
available in secondary sources, text from memos, letters, speeches, and 
interviews. I conducted interviews w ith seven people who were involved in 
the events leading up to the Forest Service adoption of Ecosystem 
Management. The interviewees are (alphabetized by last name):
— Jerry Franklin was a forestry professor at the University of Washington 
and a Forest Service Researcher in the Pacific Northwest during this historical 
period. He was a key spokesman for the idea of "new forestry," a component 
of ecosystem management, as well as serving on two scientific committees 
that produced the text that would constitute the new policy framework — the 
Scientific Panel on Late-Successional Forests of the Pacific Northwest (1990-91) 
and the Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (1993). He also 
promoted and provided ideas for the Forest Service's New Perspectives 
program — a pilot project for ecosystem management.
— John Gordon was Dean of Yale University's forestry school and also 
served on the Scientific Panel.
— George Leonard was Associate Chief of the Forest Service during the 
owl crisis and when Chief Robertson signed the memo. He retired in spring 
1993.
— John Mumma was Regional Forester for the Forest Service's northern 
region, based in Missoula, Montana. He played a large part in conflict
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between regional officers and the Forest Service directorate in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.
— Dale Robertson, whose memo announced the "marriage" to ecosystem 
management, was Chief of the Forest Service from 1987 to 1993. Robertson 
was a careerist in the agency, working his way from assistant ranger from 1964 
to 1966 to Chief in 1987. Between he held the positions of Ranger, 
Management Analyst (Washington Office), 1968-73, Supervisor (Siuslaw 
National Forest, 1974-76, and Mt. Hood National Forest, 1976-80), Associate 
Deputy Chief, Programs and Legislation, 1981-82, and Associate Chief, from 
1982-87.3 In 1987, Robertson became Chief.
— Hal Salwasser was a Forest Service Washington Office bureaucrat who 
was largely responsible for constructing and marketing the agency's New 
Perspectives Program and developing some of the language later used in 
ecosystem management. During much of his career with the Forest Service — 
from 1978 to the present — Salwasseris role involved translating natural 
resource-related science for planning, management, and marketing 
objectives. From November, 1978, until June, 1982, he served as "Regional 
Wildlife Ecologist" in the Pacific Southwest Region, where he was 
Coordinator of the California Interagency Wildlife Task Group, in addition to 
other responsibilities.4 In June, 1982, Salwasser became "National Wildlife 
Ecologist," and in November, 1985, he moved to "Deputy Director of Wildlife 
and Fisheries."5 In January, 1990, he became the first (and last) director of the
3 Roberston, "Curriculum Vitae."
4 Salwasser, "Curriculum Vitae," 2.
5 Ibid.
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New Perspectives Program, until the program was discontinued in 
September, 1992, after which he served as "Boone and Crockett Professor of 
Wildlife Conservation," at the University of Montana until June, 1985. At 
this time, Salwasser accepted the position of "Regional Forester" for the 
Forest Service's Northern Region, based in Missoula, Montana.6 In addition 
to his agency work, Salwasser served as "Senior Analyst for Natural 
Resources" on the President's Commission on Americans Outdoors," from 
January to October, 1996
— Jack Ward Thomas was on all the scientific teams that helped construct 
much of the language of ecosystem management: the Interagency Science 
Team (1ST), 1989-90; the Scientific Panel, 1990-91; the Scientific Assessment 
Team (SAT), 1992-93, and the FEMAT, in 1903. Of these, he led the 1ST, SAT, 
and FEMAT. In 1993, President Bill Clinton made Thomas Chief of the Forest 
Service, where he served until 1996, when he became Boone and Crocket 
Professor for Wildlife Conservation at the University of Montana. Before he 
became well-known through his work on the various scientific teams, 
Thomas' career charted a fairly conventional path up the Forest Service line 
of authority. After serving as a Research and Management Biologist for the 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, from 1957 to 1966, Thomas entered the 
Forest Service as a Research Wildlife Biologist.7 In 1969, he became a 
Principal Research Wildlife Biologist, and in 1969, the Chief Research 
Wildlife Biologist at the Pacific Northwest Research Station, in La Grande, 
Oregon.8 He occupied this post until becoming Chief in early 1993.
6 Ibid., 1-2.
7 Thomas, "Curriculum Vitae."
8 Ibid.
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In addition to using text from these sources, I borrowed text from 
interviews conducted and published by others -- found in otherwise 
secondary texts, for instance interviews of Forest Service officers found in 
books like Yaffee's Wisdom of the Spotted Owl or in articles of magazines 
such as the Journal of Forestry. I also used transcripts of testimony in 
congressional hearings, memoranda, and newspaper and magazine articles 
written by the historical characters- In this way, I have been able to document 
the history in relation to particular people or agencies.
The Dissertation Organization
I will begin in Chapter 1, "Conflict and Negotiation" by narrating the 
politically tumultuous formative years of the Forest Service. During these 
years, 1897 to 1960, Gifford Pinchot and other politicians maneuvered to gain 
agency and resources for the Service through an often hostile Congress and 
maintain it from aggression by the expansionist Department of the Interior 
and western business interests and politicians. The Forest Service attempted 
to bolster its image and gain popularity, culminating in its golden years 
between the early 1940s and the late 1960s. But, I ask, despite the Forest 
Service's rising budgets and a high public profile, was the agency not as 
unified as some might argue?
In Chapter 2, "Smokey's Identity Crisis," 1964-1992,1 will discuss the major 
legislation and case law that diminished the Forest Service's discretion in 
planning and managing the national forests. National politics — particularly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
an active Congress and courts — exerted immense pressure upon the Forest 
Service that culminated in an organizational identity crisis and the loss of its 
pre-war mythic status of a unified, credible, can-do agency. In March, 1989, 
federal judge William Dwyer enjoined the Forest Service from all timber 
activities w ithin the territory of the northern spotted owl until it could 
assemble a "credible" scientific team to construct an "owl plan" for managing 
the national forests in the Pacific Northwest. In a series of decisions, the 
courts continued to enjoin the agency until spring 1993.
In Chapter 3, "Adding Insult to Injury: More Activism, Dissent, and 
Discord," 1984-1992, I will trace the political activism directed against the 
agency by activists and dissenters within the agency as well as the protest 
directed at the agency by andent-forest activists and journalists outside the 
Forest Service — from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. This public and 
internal unraveling of the Forest Service's image contributed to the 
organizational identity crisis that occurred in the early 1990s. The persistence 
and consequences of these demands seemed to signify that the Forest Service 
needed to do something (anything!) dramatic enough to resurrect its image — 
from the perspectives of its own workers as well as its external critics.
In Chapter 4, " Big Srience," I briefly discuss the political construction of 
these sdentific discourses -- landscape ecology, conservation biology, and new 
forestry — outlining their concepts and rational structure and their bearings 
upon the history of the production (reconstruction or "reinvention," in the 
agency's words) of the agency's new mission, Ecosystem Management.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In Chapter 5, "The Power of Science," 1989-1991,1 discuss the formation 
and work of the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC), 1989-90, and the 
"Scientific Panel to Study Late Successional and Old Growth Forests" 
(Scientific Panel). In 1989, Congress legislated into existence the ISC, adding 
legislative authority to Judge Dwyer's requirement that the Forest Service 
produce a "scientifically credible" plan. In April 1990, the team submitted a 
plan to Congress, but the administration of president George Bush forbade the 
Forest Service to adopt the plan. Political conflict continued, and public 
dissatisfaction remained high. In 1990, Congress convened the Scientific 
Panel to construct a group of alternatives for legislative zoning and 
management of the owl region. In 1991, the panel submitted its report to the 
House of Representatives. Congress failed to pass legislation resulting from 
the Scientific Panel's work, and the controversy and injunction continued. 
Nevertheless, the two reports remained important in the development of 
ecosystem management, because they provided the framework for planning 
that the Forest Service would adopt for its construction of ecosystem 
management.
In the same year, the Forest Service chartered the "New Perspectives" 
program. Much of the science that the ISC, the Scientific Panel, and the New 
Perspectives program appropriated came from the "disciplines" of 
Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology and the closely related "New 
Forestry" (a synthesis of Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology applied 
to forest ecosystems) that were themselves produced in a politically charged 
environment. Conservation biology's political agenda is written into its 
name, and many of its progenitors are explicit about their position in politics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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as advocates. Landscape Ecology is political as well, if not as explicitly, surely 
as thoroughly, its progenitors also emerging and writing in a political 
environm ent.
In Chapter 6, "Poly-Science," 1989-1992,1 discuss the Forest Service's "New 
Perspectives" program, which the agency began building in 1989 to articulate a 
"new" set of management principles based upon new political demands, 
knowledge and science. During the period in which the ISC and the Scientific 
Panel were convening, a group of Forest Service officers and staff were busy 
constructing a policy framework using the language of these scientific and 
political discourses. The production of "New Perspectives" involved political 
maneuvering and negotiation as well as the production of texts that reflected 
this "science." In this manner, science and politics were woven into a 
construction with an appearance of solidity — in the hope of achieving 
political stability.
In Chapter 7, "Forest World," I discuss the events leading up to Dale 
Robertson's authorship of the June 4 "marriage" memo, in  context with the 
relationship between the administration of U.S. president George Bush and 
the Forest Service. The pressures bearing upon Bush, particularly in relation 
to his re-election campaign, as well as his involvement at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, had 
a major influence on the timing and shape of the Ecosystem Management 
policy.
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Last, in the condusion, "Plugging Up the Hole: Filling the Signifier of 
Ecosystem Management," 1992-93, I refocus attention upon the political 
function of Ecosystem Management, to ask, "what was (or is) Ecosystem 
Management?" In the context of events in the year after the June 4 memo, I 
offer an answer: It is a mediating structure — a production — meant to 
reconcile the Forest Service ideas with the manifold desires of the political 
public Ecosystem management defines what resources are recognized to exist 
and in what quantities, it outlines the trade-offs between uses (or resources), 
and manages the processes for making the derisions. Ecosystem Management 
as produced by the Forest Service does not, in and of itself, make political 
decisions, but rather, it draws and maps the rules and boundaries of the larger 
political struggle over resources on the National Forests. Actual decisions are 
made at various levels (internal and external to the agency), and while 
drawing and mapping are themselves political processes, the most general 
and far reaching questions and decisions are negotiated in a political struggle 
involving congressional and executive as well as judicial players.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
Conflict and Negotiation: The Agency's Formative Years
Nowadays you can scarcely be a lookout without a uniform and 
a college degree, but in 1919 not a man in our outfit, least of all 
the ranger himself, had been to college. They still picked rangers 
for the Forest Service by picking the toughest guy in town. Ours,
Bill Bell, was the toughest in the Bitterroot Valley, and we 
thought he was the best ranger in the Forest Service.
As a uniform, our ranger always wore his .45 and most of our 
regular crew also packed revolvers, including me. The two old 
men in the outfit told the rest of us that "USFS" stood for 
"User'er Slow and Fuck'er Fast." Being young and literal, I put 
up an argument at first pointing out that the beginning letters in
the motto didn't exactly fit  USFS — that their last word "Fast"
didn't begin with S as "Seruice" did. As far as they were 
concerned, their motto fitted the United States Forest Service 
exactly, and by the end of the summer I came to share their 
opinion.
— Norman MacLean 
"USFS 1919: The Ranger, the Cook, 
and a Hole in the Sky," in
A River Runs Through It and Other Stories
In the 1940s, Gifford Pinchot nostalgically wrote that the Forest Service, 
which he had been so instrumental in forming, "had a clear understanding of 
where it was going, it was determined to get there, and it was never afraid to 
fight for what was right. Every man and woman in the Service believed in it 
and its work, and took great pride in belonging to it."9 The agency, created by 
the U.S. Congress to be administered by the executive branch of the 
government — but built by Pinchot — was clear about its mission, it was
9 Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, 285.
12
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militant about its mission (to cut trees and regulate harvest and assure a 
steady supply of water) and, apparently, dissent was at a minimum.
But, can we accept Pinchot's claim without skepticism? After all, he wrote 
of a life of politicking — negotiating the creation of the Forest Reserves and 
the Forest Service, serving as Governor of Pennsylvania, running for a seat in 
the Senate, and lobbying and advocating for several controversial political 
agendas. During much of his life as a politician, Pinchot — as Chief and ex- 
Chief — defended the Forest Service from political foes, saving the agency 
from funding crises, land transfers, and control (agency) transfers. He had a 
stake in promoting virtues for his agency, believing that his political activities 
were crucial for American forestry.10
But, these years were rife with conflict and uncertainty, as Pinchot himself 
described in his autobiography.11 Such a political environment could not 
have offered a great deal of certainty for anyone invested in the Forest Service 
during those years. Perhaps, the Forest Service, from the beginning, was not 
as clear about its own agency (discretion) much less its direction as Pinchot 
claimed. Certainly it developed in  a hostile political environment.
In this chapter, I will outline Forest Service history up to the 1960s from 
the perspective of its struggle to survive in a hostile politics, dividing it into 
two eras following the reasoning of historian Paul Hirt. In A Conspiracy of 
Optimism, Hirt divides the history of the Forest Service into two eras. In the 
"Custodial Era," from the agency's creation in 1905 to World War n, the
10 Pinchot, Breaking New Ground.
11 Ibid., 391-476.
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agency was mainly concerned with overseeing use of the national forests, and 
it contributed less than five percent of the nation's wood supply. Following 
the war, during the first two decades of the "Intensive Management" years 
(1945 to the early 1990s), the Forest Service doubled, tripled, and ultimately 
quadrupled timber harvest from the national forests and in the process 
became tightly coupled with the timber industry.12 This chapter traces both 
the custodial years, marked by political conflict and institutional insecurity, 
and the early Intensive Management years, when the Forest Service enjoyed 
relative prosperity and discretion.
Insecurity in the Formative Years — 1905 to World War II
The Forest Service's first decade depended almost entirely upon the 
maneuverings of one charismatic politician, Pinchot, who was soon banished 
from federal service under the Taft administration after a political dispute.
The Forest Service, with or without Pinchot, has always had to defend itself in 
a hostile political environment, especially against powerful sectors in 
Congress. Since its inception, Congress has pushed around the Forest Service 
— not in the sense that Congress has often been unified, but in the sense that 
the agency has usually faced hostility from at least some quarters of Congress 
and has had to be responsive to that hostility. It has often found itself in a 
tenuous position; its gains have usually been qualified and at risk from 
hostile quarters within Congress and an expanding and competitive 
Department of the Interior.13
12 Hirt, Conspircay of Optimism, xxi, 44.
13 Clary, Timber and the Forest Service, Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy; Robbins, 
Lumberjacks and Legislators.
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Even its own original organic act — 'T he Organic Act of 1897" — was not 
really its own. Congress wrote the Act to grant custodial powers over the 
forest reserves to the Department of Interior (giving as much extra power to 
the President as it did the Secretary of the Interior). Not until seven years 
later, with the urging of President Theodore Roosevelt and this confidant, 
Pinchot, did Congress transfer these powers to the Department of Agriculture 
and the newly formed Forest Service.14
On the other hand, as an agency, the Forest Service has had agency — the 
authority and resources to pursue objectives.15 It is an administrative 
bureaucracy w ith a certain amount of discretion — based upon the "organic" 
mandate, as well as a hodge-podge of legislation and case law16 — though it has 
been constantly subject to overview, revision and threat of revision by a 
hostile Congress. In the Creative Act of 1891, Congress gave discretion to the 
President to designate forest reserves. It later gave agency to the Secretary of 
Interior to administer and sell timber off them (Organic Act of 1897) and 
finally transferred this agency to the Forest Service in the Transfer Act 1905.17 
As usual, contention and debate characterized the political negotiations that 
yielded these laws.
14 Transfer Act of 1905.
15 See footnote 2 for a dictionary definition of "agency."
15 I describe the development of this legal structure in the paragraphs below.
17 The "Creative Act" was actually a subsection of General Revision Act of 1891. Listed as
Creative Act in the References Cited. The "Organic Act" was a rider to the 1897 General 
Appropriations Act of June 4,1987; listed as Organic Act. See Dana and Fairfax, Forest and 
Range Policy, 81, and Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 18.
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The lands, to which the Organic Act made reference in 1897, included 47 
m illion acres already designated under the presidential authority written into 
the "Creative Act" -  a designation that caused considerable congressional 
reaction. The 1891 act, which Gifford Pinchot later dubbed "the most 
important legislation in the history of forestry in America," passed through a 
lackadaisical and inattentive Congress as a last minute rider to "A Bill to 
Repeal the Timber Culture Laws," which was widely supported.18 At the 
urging of Secretary of Interior, John Noble, Congress hastily attached the rider 
in Conference Committee, violating its own rules of procedure and writing 
law in language that was vague and sloppy (including an incomplete 
sentence).19 Nevertheless, the bill stood. Within a month, President 
Harrison created the Yellowstone Park Forest Reservation, and over the next 
two years, he added a total of 13 million acres. By 1894, Harrison's successor, 
Grover Cleveland had added another 4.5 million acres. Shortly before his 
departure in February, 1897, Cleveland hastily added 21.3 million acres to the 
reservation system, but "with no mention of how they were to be 
administered, managed, or used."20
Cleveland's actions inspired various congressional proposals to alter or 
eliminate the powers in the Creative Act. Congress attached a rider to its 
appropriations bill allowing any President to "modify or abolish" forest 
reserves, which the lame duck Cleveland killed with a pocket veto in early 
1897, deferring the problem to his successor. (Cleveland was concerned that
1® Williams, Americans, 409-411.
Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 55-58; Williams, Americans, 409-411.
20 Williams, Americans, 414.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
McKinley would use the act to dismantle the newly formed reserves.21) 
McKinley, taking office in February, convened a special session of Congress to 
pass an appropriations bill (so the federal government could operate), and 
again Congress debated the future of the reserves, settling upon the purposes 
of the reserves as the central issue. In this context, on June 4, 1897, Congress 
passed the law that was to later become the Forest Service's "organic law." The 
language of the Organic Act of 1897 states that the purposes of the reserves are 
to assure outputs such as water and timber in the long term, giving the 
President authority to establish forest reserves only to "improve and protect 
the forest within the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable 
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber"22
Much of the Organic Act of 1897 specifies the Secretary of Interior's 
authorization to dispense timber outputs in a lawful manner, including 
timber sales, with an eye towards sustainability of the timber resource: "For 
the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and promoting the 
younger growth on forest reservations, the Secretary of the Interior, under 
such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, may cause to be designated 
and appraised so much of the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found 
upon such forest reservations as may be compatible with the utilization of the 
forests thereon."23 The law further instructed the Secretary regarding the 
designation, appraisal, and marketing of timber sales as well as dispensation of 
revenues from such sales. Thus, he was to appoint some person to the 
purpose of marking or designating timber "before being sold," as well as
21 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 61.
22 Creative Act of 1891.
23 Ibid.
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supervising its cutting and removal. The particular language — "such timber, 
before being sold, shall be marked and designated" -  was to be central to the 
Monongahela case, seventy-five years later. Further, the Secretary had 
administrative obligations to provide "protection against destruction by fire 
and depredations," the exact meaning of "depredations" not being spelled out 
in the Act.24
In 1905, urged by Pinchot and President Roosevelt, Congress transferred 
authority concerning the reserves to a newly created Forest Service in the 
Department of Agriculture. The Transfer Act of 1905 authorized the agency to 
deposit funds from timber sales and grazing permits into an account from 
which it could draw  for Forest Service administrative reasons. (This financial 
discretion was consistent with the idea of self-supporting agencies, popular in 
a budget conservative Congress.) Probably as important to future national 
forest policy as the Act itself was the letter Secretary of Agriculture, James 
Wilson, addressed to Pinchot giving him instruction regarding dispensation 
of the reserves. In this letter, which Pinchot is said to have crafted himself, 
Wilson enunciates the utilitarian vision of the forest service as well as its 
commitment to serve industries depending upon forest resources.25 This was 
an assertion of agency discretion that was destined to become a polity 
statement, and it also reflected the pressures of the western congressmen in 
whose states the reserves were located. By early 1906, reserves covered an area 
of 85.5 million acres, but again, opposition was mounting.
24 Ibid.
25 This letter — particularly text like the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number in 
the long run" — has found coinage in forest policy discourse since Pinchot ghost-wrote it for 
Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson. Wilson, '"Wilson to Pinchot."
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These transfers of agency were largely the product of the assertive Gifford 
Pinchot's political maneuvering, and the survival of the fledgling bureaucracy 
depended especially upon this one individual assisted by his Mend, President 
Theodore Roosevelt. By 1906, Pinchot was already working the margins of 
credibility, making exaggerated claims to Congress regarding the agency's 
ability to pay for itself and buying off western opposition with the promise of 
local dividends and community stability in order to get funding.26 Almost 
immediately, Congress was to reduce and constrain these fiscal powers, 
depriving the agency of much of its independence to make and spend 
money.27
In March, 1907, through the Agricultural Appropriations Act, Congress 
reduced the agency's fiscal discretion by assigning ten percent of receipts to 
local and state governments for schools and roads.28 While this affirmed 
Pinchot's argument to westerners that national forestry was good for 
community stability, it was a step away from fiscal impunity.29 In the same 
act, Congress abolished the forestry fund and explicitly required the agency to 
report receipts and expenditures (tightly curtailing spending discretion).30 
Also in the same act, Congress revoked presidential authority to establish new 
reserves, restraining the president from transferring authority of public 
domain lands from the Department of Interior to the Department of 
Agriculture.31 The national forest system would grow more slowly and by
26 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Polio/, 25-26.
27 See Wolf, "National Forest Timber Sales."
Appropriations Act of 1907.
29 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26.
30 Appropriations Act of 1907.
31 Ibid.
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different means. Also in the appropriations act, Congress renamed the Forest 
Reserves the National Forests.32 In 1908 Congress raised to twenty-five 
percent the share of receipts from timber stumpage that the Forest Service had 
to pay to local governments for schools and roads.33 Payments to counties 
were destined to play a major role in the development of future agency 
policy.34 In the Appropriations Act of 1913, Congress again used an 
appropriations act to make forest polity by requiring the Forest Service to use 
ten percent of receipts for road-building, effectively tying the agency*s funding 
to the timber program.35
Shortly before he signed the 1907 Appropriations Act, President Roosevelt, 
with advice and assistance from Pinchot, hastily added nearly 65 million acres 
to the system, again provoking the westerners, especially ranchers, who 
wanted unrestricted access to the forest lands.36 In 1911, after much debate that 
was characterized by the use of advocacy science concerning the relationship 
between forests and watersheds, Congress passed the Weeks Act, which 
authorized and funded the Forest Service to acquire eastern lands.37 This act, 
in a sense, marked the close of the Forest Service's formative years; the lines 
had been drawn and redrawn in an environment of political struggle and 
hostility that would continue "to haunt the Forest Service for decades."38
32 Ibid.
33 Appropriations Act of 1908.
34 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26; Hirt, Conspiracy of Optimism, xxxiv- 
xxxv.
35 Appropriations Act of 1913.
36 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26
37 The Weeks Act of 1911.
38 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 90-92.
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Also in 1911, the Supreme Court "firmly established the Forest Service's 
broad regulatory authority" in a "landmark" ruling in the case of United 
States v. Grimaud, particularly the authority to charge fees and require permits 
for National Forest use.39 According to Charles Wilkinson, "lower court 
decisions since Grimaud have consistently upheld assertions of Forest Service 
regulatory power. The agency has withstood challenges to its permitting 
procedures, a basic element of the agency's authority by which it regulates 
various uses of the national forests," all under the "auspices of the Organic 
Act."
The Service's administrative powers benefited in other ways, too. In the 
years between 1911 and World War II, Congress passed laws that further tied 
the Forest Service to local and industrial concerns — a direction previously 
established by Pinchot's rhetoric and the machinations of the congressional 
appropriations process. The Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 created the authority 
for fire control and cooperation with state governments in fire control, 
reforestation, and conservation programs, as well as expanding the eastern 
forests acquisition programs, while the McSweeney-McNary Act of 1928 
established the Forest Service research program.40 The Knutson-Vanderberg 
Act (1930) further tied the agency to its timber program by authorizing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to require timber buyers to pay for reforestation and 
silvicultural activities.41
39 United States v. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource 
Planning, 55-57.
40 Clarke-McNary Act of 1924; McSweeney-McNary Act of 1928. Clary, Timber and the 
Forest Service, 83.
41 Knutson-Vanderberg Act of 1930.
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Yet, these years were not calm: congressional hostility remained, and the 
agency faced aggression from other quarters, particularly an expanding 
Department of the Interior (DOI). In 1908, following conflict between Gifford 
Pinchot and the newly assigned DOI Secretary, Richard Ballinger, Pinchot was 
fired, marking the beginning of three decades of tension between the Forest 
Service and the DOI. In the mid-1920s, Harold Ickes, Secretary of the DOI 
under Franklin Roosevelt, opposed Forest Service attempts to obtain 
congressional appropriations for recreation and suggested that the DOI take 
control of the Forest Service. In the early 1930s, Ickes resurrected this idea of 
subsuming the Forest Service and Interior bureaucracies into a Department of 
Conservation. The proposal was not adopted, but continued to reside in the 
discourse as an uncomfortable issue for the Forest Service. In 1933, Congress 
placed under DOI jurisdiction sixteen monuments within national forest 
boundaries. Conflict between the DOI and Forest Service persisted 
throughout the 1930s as Ickes, working with Congress, attempted to acquire 
more national forest lands for the National Park Service or extend Park 
Service control of recreation planning over them.42
Forest Service struggle with the Park Service significantly influenced its 
recreation policy. From its early years, the Forest Service attempted to 
establish itself as a provider of recreation in order to establish its legitimacy as 
manager of all above ground resources on the national forests. While the 
automobile and related recreation remained central to Forest Service 
recreation policy in the 1920s and 1930s, the agency also committed resources 
to wilderness policy, particularly to the "U-Regulations" of 1939. The U-
42 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 151-152,193-194.
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Regulations were a three-tier roadless area classification that were the subject 
of internal Forest Service conflict, as was its predecessor policy, the "L- 
Regulations" of 1929. Advocates argued that a vigorous wilderness program 
would build public support and institutional protection against an aggressive 
Department of the Interior, while opponents argued that focusing upon 
wilderness and recreation as a forest use affirmed the DOI position that 
recreation was a legitimate primary use of public lands. This rift represented 
the beginning of internal conflict that was to arise, mutate, and grow to much 
more serious proportions by the 1970s and into the 1980s.43
The FS suffered hostility from the timber industry also, insofar as it 
pressed for government regulation over industry logging on private lands. 
From as early as 1919, Pinchot had enlisted members of the Forest Service 
directorate in ca llin g  for federal regulations over land use on privately owned 
lands, particularly those belonging to the large corporations.44 Agency 
personnel, however, were not united in support of such regulation, and in the 
1920s, the Forest Service did not adopt an official position in support of such 
regulation, advocating state rather than federal control.
Nevertheless, Pinchot and his supporters pressed for legislation, and 
though no laws were passed, they did bring influence to a congressional study 
of timber harvesting culminating in the Timber depletion, lumber exports, 
and concentration of timber ownership report in 1920.45 Later, the 
"Depression Chiefs of the Forest Service ... were increasingly vociferous and
43 Ibid., 155.
44 Ibid., 125.
43 Ibid., and Williams, Americans 325.
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adamant in their espousal of federal forest regulation."46 In 1933, the agency 
produced the "Copeland Report," predicting timber famine and advocating 
increased federal land acquisitions and control over industry timber 
production. Some of these ideas briefly came to realization in the "Lumber 
Code" provisions of the National Industrial Relations Act, though, within a 
year, the Supreme Court "unanimously invalidated the whole NIRA 
program."47 Roosevelt, with encouragement of Chief Earl Clappe, assembled a 
'Joint Congressional Committee on Forestry," which, in 1938, issued a report 
calling for state control rather than federal planning — a disappointment to 
advocates of Forest Service control over private timber regulation.48 Next, 
the agency enlisted forest rangers in a failed attempt to persuade the public 
and the industry to adopt regulations on industrial lands.49 By 1940, the 
agency found its morale at an all time low, with FS Chief Earl Clappe reporting 
that "[o]ne group of problems included the existing morale in the Forest 
Service, and baffled feeling of many men because they do not know what 
Forest Service objectives are, the feeling of uneasiness or even hopelessness 
because of inadequate legislation and funds for badly needed work, the belief 
that the Service is continually on the defensive, the damper on enthusiasm 
and creative effort caused by the threat of reorganization."50
On the other hand, in the 1930s, the agency had gained the support of 
recreation users and New Deal work project advocates with Forest Service 
projects. For example, the Forest Service was able to muster the labor of the
45 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 168.
47 Ibid., 170.
48 Ibid., 170-171.
49 Clary, Timber, 108-09.
50 Earl Clappe in Clary, Timber, 109.
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Civilian Conservation Corps for tree planting and fire suppression and 
development of trails and recreational facilities. The New Deal work was a 
source of legitimacy and political momentum for the Forest Service, though of 
limited potency.
Its next challenge, however — a drastically scaled-up production for World 
War II — propelled it to the front lines of industrial production. According to 
Hurt, "timber sales on the national forest rose from 1.3 bbf to 3.1 bbf between 
1939 and 1945, an increase of 238 percent. More significantly, the proportion of 
national forest contributions to the total national timber production economy 
in that same period doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent.51 World War II, 
with its increased demands, sharply contrasted with the preceding fifteen years 
and provided the impetus for the Forest Service to undergo its 
metamorphosis into a large-scale timber provider. Hirt claimed.
World War Two thus represents a major transition period in the 
history of the Forest Service. The move to intensive 
management and rapidly expanded production that began with 
the war and peaked in the 1960s is crucial to understanding the 
foundation of current national forest management 
controversies.52
Clary also stated that the agency was, "at the close of the war, thoroughly 
oriented toward production forestry in a way that it had never been 
previously."53
Intensive Management (the construction of Smoky Bear)
51 Hirt, Conspiracy, 45.
52 Ibid., xxi.
53 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 175.
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Intensive Management (the construction of Smoky Bear)
During the late 1940s and the 1950s, government and industry 
undertook major investments in transportation, education, mass 
communications, manufacturing and agriculture. These investments had 
numerous impacts, including demographic changes, introduction of new 
manufacturing and agricultural technologies, and the wide spread, everyday 
use of mass communication technologies — the telephone, television, and 
radio. According to Hirt, "pent-up demand for housing exploded after 1945, 
exacerbated by a postwar 'baby boom/"54 During this time, the Forest Service 
grew tremendously in terms of its labor force, its budget, its productivity, and 
its effects upon the landscape, as it became linked to the timber industry and 
its political constituency. Meanwhile, public contact increased as numbers of 
visitors to the national forests increased, and people increasingly voiced 
political demands for non-timber uses. Eventually, the demands became 
more acute, culminating in congressional acts constituting the bulk of 
environmental legislation relevant to the politics concerning national forests 
in the 1980s and 90s.
Accompanying these production increases, an important development in 
the early intensive management days was the coupling of the Forest Service 
with the timber industry. For instance, in 1951, the National Lumber 
Manufacturing Association (NLMA), "who had opposed the sale of national 
forest timber up until the early 1940s (trying to keep competition down and 
prices up), now spoke critically about the national forests not contributing
54 Hirt, Conspiracy, 50.
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their 'fair share' to the lumber supply burden, disingenuously blaming the 
Forest Service for the overcutting that had earlier occurred on private 
lands."55 The industry began a full-time lobbying effort, which used the 
Korean War to link national security to its timber supply from national 
forests, conjuring up images of a national emergency and timber famine crisis 
to promote "immediate development of plans for the maximum utilization of 
publicly owned stumpage. These plans should include consideration of 
overmature stands now degenerating in areas now locked up for lack of ready 
access in Alaska."56
Congress, particularly through the appropriation committees, responded by 
raising timber budgets, particularly for "the agency's proposed accelerated road 
construction program," while neglecting reforestation, wildlife, and recreation 
budgets.57 In FY 1950, Congress made available to the Forest Service $13.3 
million for forest roads; in FY 1951, $16.9 million; in FY 1952, $18.9 million; 
and for FY 1953 the figure jumped to $24.3 million.58 In comparison, the 
entire budget for national forest protection and management of all resources — 
in FY 1953 amounted to $39.8 million (not including roads). These road funds 
and additional timber purchaser credits built nearly 6,000 new miles of roads 
between FY 1951 and FY 1953.59 In 1959, the Forest Service requested $24 
million for road construction, which Congress increased to $28 million, "a 17 
percent increase aver the agency's request, equivalent to a fifth of the total 
budget allocation approved by Congress, hi contrast, in the final appropriation
55 Ibid., 90. Hirt acknowledges Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legislators.
56 Hirt, Conspiracyr 90.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 93.
59 Ibid.
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the Forest Service got substantially less than it requested for reforestation, soil 
and water management, wildlife, and recreation."60
Thus encouraged by Congress, the agency adopted an "intensive 
management" operating philosophy. To implement the program, the Forest 
Service began using large clearcuts coupled with intensive tree growing 
practices — terracing, tree planting, chemical weeding and protection against 
insects and disease, fire suppression, among others and dramatically increased 
its cut. According to Flirt:
The key development in national forest management in the 
1950s was the full maturing of intensive timber extraction and 
the contingent evolution of technical and ideological rationales 
for raising allowable cut levels, including the widespread 
adoption of clearcutting as an alternative to selective cutting.
During the 1950s, timber production from the national forests 
shot up from 3.5 billion board feet to 9.3 billion board feet. At 
the same time, the percentage of national forest contributions to 
total U.S. timber harvests climbed from 10 percent to 15 percent.
In the Pacific Northwest, national forest contributions to 
regional timber production in this decade jumped from 21 
percent to 35 percent.61
The Forest Service's "rationales" for raising the allowable cut inevitably 
reflected the demands of the timber industry, which reinterpreted the 
maximum allowable cut to be the amount of timber to which the industry 
should  have access.62 What's more, rationales were ambiguous enough to 
allow for flexibility and interpretation, marking their construction as projects 
of political negotiation. The construction of politically acceptable allowable cut
60 Ibid., 210. (Emphasis in original.)
61 Ibid., 131. "The volume of timber cut oof the national forests as a whole rose horn 3.7 billion 
board feet in FY 1949 to 4.6 bbf in 1951, and to 5.1 bbf in 1953." Ibid., 90.
62 Ibid., 132.
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limits — that is, acceptable to industry — required the forestry community to 
construct "theories of technological control," to justify "promises that 
politicians and constituents then expected them to deliver."63 In addition, the 
agency's "definition of multiple use and sustained yield, which had previously 
been consistent with the industry view, grew more ambiguous in the late 
1950s; that way agency leaders could retain the maximum amount of 
flexibility in applying them."64 In turn, the Forest Service enjoyed ever 
expanding budgets, which it then spent upon more "intensive management," 
using the increased production of commodities to justify future budgets:
Since the agency's budget and employee base had significantly 
expanded in response to promises to produce more goods and 
services, admitting an inability to achieve production targets 
would weaken Forest Service clout in budget negotiations and 
threaten job security for hundreds, maybe thousands, of 
employees. And since intensive management was a means for 
increasing forest productivity to meet escalating demands, 
abandoning the faith would have meant establishing limits to 
production, saying no instead of yes to constituents and 
congressmen, and rationing rather than simply stepping up 
outputs.65
In the same twenty years, 1945-1965, the Forest Service gained a new degree 
of authority in its successful promotion of recreation as a use that was worth 
managing, insofar as it increased the agency's management options. In United 
States v. Perko, a Federal Court affirmed the agency's authority to manage a 
particular roadless area for recreation.66 In 1960, a friendly Congress 
broadened this power to all national forests with the Forest Service authored
63 Ibid., xxxiii. For a brief history of this shift in the meaning of sustained yield, see Parry, 
etal., "Changing Conceptions of Sustained Yield."
64 Ibid., 171.
®  Ibid., xxxiii
66 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 59.
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Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act o f 1960 (MUSY) -  a law that in its ambiguity 
promises "more of everything for everyone."67 Hirt, who studied the Forest 
Service's intensive management program, argued that, by "promoting 
multiple use, politicians could befriend all the pressing constituencies, and 
with intensive management there was to be more of everything for 
everyone."68 The law specified a range of uses — recreation, range, timber, 
watershed, wildlife, and fish — that the national forests are to make available 
"in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people."69 
In Wilkinson's words, the Act "has fortified the agency's defense against legal 
challenges to its regulatory authority.70 The Act also directs the Forest Service 
to maintain enough flexibility in its management to allow for changes in 
demands for outputs. According to Hirt,
MUSY can be considered the last major victory for the Forest 
Service in its struggle to retain full discretionary control over 
national forest management (discretion within budget 
constraints, of course). After 1960, legislation became 
increasingly prescriptive. The act further symbolized the 
continued hegemony of the expanding pie ideology among 
politicians and agency leaders.71
The Forest Service maintained its intensive management posture into the 
1960s, increasing its logging levels to pay for other programs, such as 
recreation and wildlife. Finally, the agency enjoyed political prestige and a 
modicum of security — only 20 years after Chief Earl Clappe lamented the poor 
morale of the agency. It was selling more stumpage than ever before, and a
67 Hirt, Conspiracy, 84. Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
68 Hirt, Conspiracy, 84.
69 Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
70 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 62.
71 Hirt, Conspiracy, 190.
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friendly Congress, influenced by the timber industry, was increasing the 
timber program budget. The Forest Service was also promoting itself to the 
public, spending millions on public spectacles intended to influence the 
populace. For instance, the agency worked with the Ad Council, the American 
Broadcasting Agency and other television networks, the organizers of Macy's 
parade, the Boy Scouts, magazines such as Playboy Magazine, the Disney 
Corporation, and thousands of schools, civic organizations, and businesses to 
promote its fire suppression program and bought advertisements in J 2 The 
agency also propagandized communities about the link between national 
forestry and community economic health (as well as national prosperity), and 
promoted itself as the nation's premier recreation provider. During this 
period, sociologist, Herbert Kaufman authored a book destined for wide 
readership, The Forest Ranger, describing a confident, integrated agency that, 
after thirty-five years, had established a solid institutional footing, a strong 
identity, and a favorable popular image.
The Forest Service and Identity Management
Almost any study on the Forest Service dtes Herbert Kaufman's book, The 
Forest Ranger, wherein he explores the assertion that, although the agency's 
decentralized administrative structure would encourage fragmentation and 
inconsistency, "this fragmentation does not occur" — "rarely does one hear it 
said that Rangers behave in  a fashion inconsistent with Service policy." An 
important question is, Why do they "not succumb to the centrifugal forces 
inherent in the administrative situation"?73
72 USDA1973, 6-10.
73 Kaufmann, Forest Ranger, 4-5.
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Kaufman addressed this question and described his research methodology 
thus:
Five Ranger districts in different parts of the country were 
selected for intensive analysis. They were not chosen as being 
"typical," although districts with conspicuously unusual 
characteristics were avoided; rather they were picked as samples 
because together they show almost the whole range of Forest 
Service activities and a wide variety of the conditions under 
which its work is carried on. Ideally, the number of "specimens" 
would have been larger — at least one district of a national forest 
in each of the ten regions ... but there was neither sufficient 
money nor manpower for more inclusive coverage.74
Kaufman concluded that the Forest Service uses several "techniques of 
integration," using such techniques as "authorization, direction, and 
prohibition," "official diaries," "sanctions," "selecting men who fit," and 
"building identification with the Forest Service," to name only a few 
"procedural devices for preforming decisions," "detecting and discouraging 
deviation," and "developing the will and capacity."75
Most policy books concerning Forest Service in the recent decades reference 
Kaufman's work, and many expound upon it. Michael Frome wrote of the 
"[c]ohesiveness and loyalty" that had prevailed within the Forest Service, 
claiming that "esprit and devotion to the agency rose as a binding force 
between individuals and institution."76 Clary noted that "criticism from 
within was unlikely, because the shared culture of the agency was 
pervasive."77 Depending upon Kaufman's account, Paul Hirt describes a time
74 Ibid., 18.
75 Ibid., 92-124.
76 Frome, Forest Service, 36.
77 Clary, Timber, 196.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
when "the Forest Service enjoyed a high degree of public accolade and 
organizational cohesion. Then, scholars d ted the agency as a model of public- 
spirited bureaucratic efficiency."78 Policy professor Steven Yaffee took the 
study at face value when he concluded that Kaufman's "classic study":
[Identified information, budget and personnel systems that tended 
to enhance the compliance of the Forest Service workforce with the 
overall direction of the organization. By the 1960s, the Forest 
Service was a fairly militaristic, "Can Do" agency that promoted and 
rewarded individuals that mirrored the values and objectives of the 
agency's leadership, and tended to select against individuals who 
disagreed. While the Forest Service's district rangers and forest 
supervisors had remarkable amounts of discretion at the forest 
level, they exercised it primarily within the overall themes defined 
by the organization.
The idea that the Forest Service maintained a strong identity has carried 
over to claims regarding the agency's public image — its public identity. As 
late as 1984, Frome could still claim that the Forest Service "is a well respected 
institution," citing a 1981 study ranking the agency "among the ten most 
successful organizations in the country," partially because it "produced a well- 
respected product, whatever the nature of the product," as well as appearing "a 
good place to work," and staying "sound and healthy" over a "sustained 
period of time."79 Frome described President Eisenhower's 1954 visit to 
Missoula, Montana, to dedicate a smoke jumper facility. There the president 
claimed: "I am not surprised that it is such a good outfit," extolling the good 
relations between agency workers and management80 Others agree w ith 
Eisenhower's assessment For instance, Yaffee writes of high times for the 
Forest Service during this era:
78 Hirt, Conspiracy, xvi.
79 Frome, Forest Service, 33.
80 Eisenhower in Frome, Forest Service, 33.
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By the 1960s, the combination of organizational styles and behaviors 
described above had succeeded remarkably well for the FS. It had an 
expanding budget, a set of supporters in the federal budget process, 
and an esprit de corps that was the envy of Washington. ... Overall, 
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were a great time to be in the Forest 
Service. The agency's mission was growing, clear, and valued by 
society, and its methods of land management and organizational 
control were well tested. While the agency had been challenged 
occasionally over site-specific controversies, by and large it had won 
those challenges and was in control of its destiny.81
But, is it legitimate to assert with confidence that the Forest Service was 
strongly integrated based upon one study involving five subjects? Probably 
not; though Kaufman's argument may (or may not) have described the 
situation as it really was, evidence lacks for such a positive statement. Yaffee, 
in an interview, later said that:
In some respects, Kaufman's basic image is consistent with other 
things about the agency in the times. But the fact that he only 
looked at five districts — it was a small number. I think we 
pattern these things pretty much to fit our prior notion unless 
we're very careful. I think his image held together really nicely 
— all this emphasis on control. I suspect that three quarters of it 
or two thirds of it was right on the mark. But I think what we 
probably lost was a sense of the diversity that was present at the 
time in the organization. I doubt that was ever that tightly as 
controlled as he would suggest.82
Whether or not Kaufman's study was statistically acceptable, it reflects an 
image that was believed at that time, in which the Forest Service was a 
flagship agency that could do the job.
8! Yaffee, Wisdom, 8.
82 ibid., 15.
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Concluding Remarks
Given the tumultuous years preceding the time period of Kaufman's 
writings, and given that the 1950s and early 60s marked periods of significant 
social change for the U.S. society, a claim to such integrity and identity is 
suspicious. The historian would want more evidence -- should want more 
evidence. Perhaps, despite Pinchot's rhetoric, the agency spent its infancy 
with a challenged identity, which remained challenged. Being responsive to 
the politics of the day, the agency could never have been expected to have a 
"clear understanding" of where it was going, unless its mission was in fact "to 
be responsive to the politics of the day."
Nevertheless, by the time of the Multiple-Use/Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 
the Forest Service seemed to be politically positioned well, with expanding 
budgets and the prestige signified by Smoky Bear. The agency had linked itself 
to both the timber industry and recreationists — almost the entire spectrum of 
political claims upon the national forests. For the time, though, the Forest 
Service had support in political quarters and a strong sense of direction and 
identity. But, this support and organizational confidence was soon to be tested 
by a changing and increasingly adverse political struggle over control of the 
public wildlands. Ultimately it would give way to turmoil, as the range of 
public demands expanded while the available resource rapidly diminished.
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Chapter 3
Smokey's Identity Crisis
The "purpose of law /' however, is absolutely the last thing to 
employ in the history o f the origin o f law: on the contrary, there is 
for historiography o f any kind no more important proposition than 
the one it took such effort to establish but which really ought to be 
established now: the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual 
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie 
worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is 
again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, 
and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the 
organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing 
and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation 
through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are 
necessarily obscured or even obliterated.
— Friedrich Nietzsche 
Geneaology o f Morals
Whether or not the Forest Service's fifteen years of prosperity, 1945-1960, 
constituted the basis for a strong identity — the commonly accepted mythology 
— it surely was not able to protect one during the following three decades. 
From the early 1960s, the agency suffered a steady erosion of political 
acceptance (internal as well as external), culminating in fierce opposition and 
challenge to its policies. Congress repeatedly intervened in national forest 
policy, passing and threatening to pass legislation the Forest Service 
considered hostile and constraining to the agency. The Endangered Species 
Act, for instance, gave the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service — a Department of 
the Interior agency — jurisdiction over management of endangered or 
threatened species on all national lands, including national forests.83 
Administrative appeals and lawsuits delayed and impeded logging,
Endangered Species Act of 1973.
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
culminating in the Pacific Northwest logging moratoria on behalf of the 
northern spotted owl. Citizens groups opposed agency activities on site, step 
by step, all over the country. By the early 1990s, the bureaucracy was struggling 
with a crisis of agency -- losing control over management of the national 
forests, as well as an internal crisis of identity. Its entire modus operandi had 
become delegitimated, the agency had little if any sense of direction, and its 
fate was ambiguous.84 Its image of integrity and ability, long cultivated within 
ranks as well as sold to the public, had deteriorated, and, to the public as well 
as industry, the fundamentally political nature of Forest Service policy had 
become clear.85 In this chapter, I will outline this deterioration of Forest 
Service authority. I will begin with the years 1964 to 1976, when Congress 
passed major environmental legislation, discuss the political negotiation of 
roadless areas, old-growth, and wilderness, during 1975-1984, and finally, 
outline the political struggle that focused around the northern spotted owl
When it all began to unravel: Law in the Post-War Reformative Years. 1964- 
19 76
An early sign of the coming unrest for the Forest Service was opposition to 
the multiple use plans in the Pacific Northwest by conservation groups, 
seeking permanent wildlands designation of some of the areas in some of the 
plans.86 Some of the groups, for instance, "the Sierra Club, the Federation of 
Western Outdoor Clubs (a newly formed coalition of organizations), and the 
Mazamas (a hiking club turned politically active)" had gained support in
8^ Webster's defines an "identity crisis" as "a state of confusion in an institution or 
organization regarding its nature or direction." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 597.
88 Hirt, Conspiracy', Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian.
88 Hirt, Conspiracy, 225.
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Congress, as well as "the influential support of United States Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas -  also from Washington."87 Responding to this 
formidable opposition, the Secretary of Agriculture, in 1961, requested that the 
Chief "put the plans on hold temporarily while it developed a new 
comprehensive policy statement for forest management in the region."88 The 
agency, in a report called "Long-range management policy and objectives for 
the high mountain areas of the region," vowed to be more careful in regards 
to esthetics, but continued to log the areas in question.
The first major legislative action hostile to the Forest Service was passage 
of the 1964 Wilderness Act, which Clary noted, "reflected an absence of faith in 
multiple use or in the intentions of the Forest Service, whose feelings 
accordingly were bruised."89 The act constituted a "zoning type law," which 
provided the machinery for stipulating specific land uses over large areas. A 
compromise patched from a stronger bill that the Forest Service opposed, the 
Act instituted some previously designated lands in the U-Regulation system 
as National Wilderness areas, limiting the agency's discretion regarding those 
lands as well as hinting at future removals (Congress retained the right to 
designate Wilderness). According to Frank Gregg, a "public administration 
scholar" and BLM director under President Carter, "the era of Forest Service 
discretion over major land use allocations ended with the Wilderness Act of 
1964, which established the Congress as a direct decision maker on the uses to 
be permitted on millions of acres of national forests."90 In one sense,
87 Ibid., 225.
88 Ibid., 226.
89 Clary, Timber, 172.
90 Gregg in. Hirt, Conspiracy, 232.
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however, the Act represented a small victory for the agency, because the extent 
of the designated lands was small and of marginal timber value.
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, which 
mandated the Forest Service (and other agencies whose actions affect the 
environment) to draft environmental impact statements of proposed actions, 
with alternatives considering a range of environmental consequences. The 
law also required federal agencies to open the planning process to public 
scrutiny and participation, particularly through a public hearings process. The 
Forest Service mistakenly considered this act to be insignificant in the sense 
that the agency believed itself already to be in compliance, making agency 
changes unnecessary.91 However, the act turned out to be very effective in 
altering Forest Service policy, particularly in terms of timber policy. As case 
law developed in relation to NEPA, it became apparent that the law required 
documentation of agency activities beyond what the Forest Service was able to 
produce. In addition, the law instituted demographic change within the 
agency. Its requirements for interdisciplinary, scientific planning, forced the 
Forest Service, whose workforce had been made up of foresters, to hire 
workers with diverse educations and backgrounds.92 These new specialists, 
particularly biologists, began to work themselves into positions of authority, 
eventually bringing internal opposition to the Forest Service timber program.
In 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act, destined to rock the 
public lands politics of the 1980s (U.S. Congress 1973). If a species with habitat 
on national forests were to become listed as threatened or endangered — or, as
91 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 242.
92 Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian, 145-146
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it turns out, proposed to be listed — the agency would be forced to respond, 
particularly in the face of litigation. This act threatened and ultimately 
proved to constrain Forest Service discretion and made necessary further 
specialization of labor within the agency to address the effects of logging on 
plant and animal wildlife.
The absolute nature of the language in the ESA — its mandate that the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) listing of any species could deter any 
program or project, government or private, that endangered the species or its 
habitat — drew intense resistance, for instance, from natural resource 
managers. According to Dana and Fairfax, "From the point of view of forest 
and range managers, the Endangered Species Act seemed to constitute an 
uncompromising piece of legislation which threatens management activities, 
invites court action, and fails to allow for a balancing of other considerations 
which warrant weighing against the necessity of protecting a species."93 
Eventually, owing to the Tellico decision barring the further development of a 
Tennessee Valley Authority dam, industry and several agencies pressured 
Congress into passing legislation that qualified the ESA.94 The ESA update in 
1978 created the possibility of convening a cabinet level committee (soon 
dubbed the "God Squad") to weigh the political and economic advantages of a 
project against the risks posed to the species in question.
Meanwhile, conflict between the Forest Service and tbe recreationists and 
environmentalists arose concerning the Forest Service's widespread use of 
clearcutting as a management tool. The Forest Service, it seems, had taken the
93 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 261.
94 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill et. al.
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Organic Act's language pertaining to marking every tree to mean marking 
only those trees on boundaries of what would become large dearcuts. 
Clearcutting became the technology of the day, espetially in large tracts, and its 
widespread effects became increasingly apparent. By the 1970s — only a decade 
after the Kaufman report — conflict had become apparent, within and without 
the agency. In 1970, Neil Rahm Regional Forester of the Northern Region 
wrote a memo to the Forest Service Chief, despairing the regional Forest 
Service workforce's low morale:
Some of our own people are feeling and expressing doubts. The 
doubts are whether we can perform as well as we tell people we can.
Do we have the expertise on the ground to perform an acceptable 
job? I think the answer is no.95
Chief Cliff responded in a memo of his own, alluding to the agency's 
uncertainty regarding its mission in a time of changing politics:
Many employees have recently expressed concern on the direction in 
which the Forest Service seems to be heading. I share this concern.
Our programs are out of balance to meet public needs for the 
environmental 1970s and we are receiving mounting criticism from 
all sides.96
In response, Congress, at the request of Senator Lee Metcalf (D — Montana), 
commissioned a panel of professors from the University of Montana to study 
the effects of FS management on national forests in Montana. Named for its 
leader, Forestry Dean Arnold Bolle, the Bolle report harshly criticized the 
agency for its clearcutting and for terracing to promote regeneration in  the 
Bitterroot Valley (Bitterroot NF), writing, "Such cutting practices abuse the 
multiple use principle. And they make a mockery of the sustained yield
95 Neil Rahm, "Memo to the Chief." Frome, Forest Service, 5.
96 Frome, Forest Service, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
concept which decrees that all resources — but particularly the key ones, soil 
and water — must be sustained. Above that, many consider it foolish 
economics. The short-term gains are offset by longterm losses in both 
economics and environmental quality."97
Three years later, a group of turkey hunters, soon joined by the Izaak 
Walton League, filed suit against the FS over its clearcutting practices in the 
Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia. The lawsuit successfully 
argued that, in its indiscriminate cutting of trees of all ages, the Forest Service 
had exceeded its authority."98 In summary, the "plaintiffs contended that in 
embarking upon a clearcut, the Service violated the letter and the clear intent 
of the Organic Act of 1897."99 Further, they argued that the entire timber 
program relied upon this one law, writing, "the act was the only real charter 
the timber program had."100 Arguing that a bureaucracy had no authority to 
alter the content of congressional law, the judge enjoined all clearcutting 
operations on the entire Monongahela National Forest, and the 1975 decision 
in the Fourth Circuit Appeals Court proscribed clearcutting across all national 
forests within its domain.101 "The court's reasoning in the Monongahela case 
was promptly adopted in Zieske v. Butz,"102 and it was clear that similar 
findings would be forthcoming in other judicial districts. The Forest Service 
timber program was stymied.
97 Bolle Report, in Frome, Forest Service, 5.
9® Clary, Timber, 191; West Virginia Div.of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz.
99 Clary, Timber, 191.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 42, fin.197; Zieske v. Butz.
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As a way out of this impasse, and after Nixon's administration, the Senate, 
the Forest Service, and even Ralph Nader's public interest group had all 
studied the situation and published reports, Congress passed the National 
Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), amending the 1974 Renewable 
Resources Planning Act (RPA).103 The NFMA is an updated "Organic Act" in 
the sense that it establishes the Forest Service's basic authority and mandate to 
manage the National Forest, although it is different than the original Organic 
Act in several respects, reflecting changes in public opinion since the turn of 
the century. In some ways the act affirms the Forest Service's instituted 
operating procedures, insofar as it does establish the agency's discretion to use 
clearcut logging, and it does structure resource planning in the context of 
multiple-use and sustained yield as mandated in the MUSY of 1960. Further, 
to translate NFMA into administrative rules, Congress provided for a 
"Committee of Scientists" to be appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Through consultation, the Forest Service would be able to exert influence 
upon the political production of the NFMA regulations.104
On the other hand, NFMA and RPA were more prescriptive than earlier 
land management laws, defining management objectives ("considerations" in 
the NFMA language) in relatively specific language, including time-tables for 
regeneration and explicit limitations on clearcut logging.105 According to 
Charles Wilkinson and H. Michael Anderson, the NFMA "is the most 
adventurous congressional incursion into the on-the-ground activities of the
National Forest Management Act of 1976; Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.
104 National Forest Management Act of 1976, sec. 6 (g),(h).
105 Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Three Decades," 9; Hirt, Conspiracy, 245.
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Forest Service."106 The law references some of the specific political demands 
of the time, such as requiring consideration of "biological diversity," aesthetic 
impacts, and so on, as well as mandating a planning process that includes 
provisions for "public participation."107 In addition, the law — particularly 
the original RPA language — links congressional funding to the agency's 
production of national assessments of forest resources as well as national 
program plans and budgets regarding their use. During the House floor 
debate on RPA, Congressman Don H. Clausen of California summarized, "the 
intent of the legislation is to establish more congressional control over the 
management activities and appropriation process of the national forest system 
lands," which it did.108
The NFMA was the last piece of legislation forming the institutional 
milieu in which the Forest Service was operating when the politics of 
Ecosystem Management emerged in the late 1980s. Though the Forest 
Service's direction and modus operandi were affirmed, as was its longstanding 
practice of using planning to assert agency, the agency was now saddled with 
forest level planning and reporting responsibilities that would increase its 
workload by a large magnitude and force further diversification of its ranks 
while also increasing Congressional oversight. The NFMA signified change 
for the agency in the sense that its practices would now be even more in the 
public eye, it would have to account for increased public pressure and diverse 
demands, and, as it turned out, intense criticism and conflict. Together with 
NEPA, the congressional action forced the agency (and other agencies) into
106 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 7.
107 The National Forest Management Act of 1976.
108 Hirt, Conspiracy, 245.
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timely planning processes open to oversight and litigation, as well as making 
substantive forest management demands. The Forest Service was now to 
operate in an environment open to onlookers, criticism (or applause), and 
ultimately, litigation, while also diversifying its workforce in terms of 
specialization.
The environmental legislation of these years, particularly the Wilderness 
Act, the ESA, the NEPA, the RPA and ultimately the NFMA, "clinched a trend 
toward greater congressional intervention in federal land management and 
decreasing agency autonomy and discretion."109 What is more, the Forest 
Service, which once considered itself insulated from public conflict by virtue 
of its position as a technocracy,110 now found itself chronically embroiled in 
the political theater, attacked in the media, in Congress, in the courts, on the 
streets and in the forests.
Roadless Lands, Wilderness, and Old-growth (Oh My) 1975-1984
The conflict that has assailed the Forest Service from the mid-1970s to the 
present mostly concerned unroaded or otherwise primitive lands — 
characterized by old-growth forest These lands were rich in timber, yet also 
valued for recreation, ecological preservation, watershed roles, aesthetic and 
spiritual reasons, and as habitat for rare and endangered species — all concerns 
that translated into a wide array of different political demands. Most of the 
remaining roadless areas were in the national forests of Pacific Northwest and 
Northern Region and corresponding BLM and NPS lands. Of these
109 Hirt,Conspiracy, 232.
HO A consistent theme in Clary, Timber.
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forestlands, the most profitable for timber were in western Washington, 
Oregon, and California. As a consequence, these regions became the primary 
focus of Forest Service policy, and national issues were framed in terms of 
these regional environmental issues.
Much of the actual political negotiation and debate focused on lands — 
predominantly in the western states — that the agency had classified in its 
highly politicized Roadless Area and Review and Evaluation (RARE) studies 
during 1971-1972. The Forest Service conducted this classification in an 
attempt to regain control over management of undeveloped forestlands. 
During 1971, the Forest Service contended that it was unable to conduct 
multiple use planning as required by administrative law, due to uncertainty 
over the status of its unroaded lands arising from court cases and proposed 
wilderness designation. Reflecting upon these times, Forest Chief Edward 
Cliff lamented:
Every time we made a move into a roadless area we ran into 
opposition which generally materialized in the form of a lawsuit or 
a wilderness proposal by a congressman. The principle of sovereign 
immunity had been breached in the court cases in the 1960s. As a 
result, environmentalists started filing lawsuits and conservation 
law became a fast growing branch of the law. If a bill was pending, 
that effectively stopped any activity because we d idn 't want to 
aggravate Congress. We had no idea where we could plan or where 
we could be stymied. We needed to draw  some parameters around 
areas which we could develop and which we could preserve.111
Arguing that RARE studies would clarify the status of these lands as well as 
constituting a national environmental impact statement for logging on them, 
the agency gained support for the project from officials in the Department of
H 1 Interview with Edward Cliff, in Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 36.
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Agriculture.112 By 1972, the Forest Service had designated 1,449 roadless areas 
over 55.9 million acres and selected 274 areas over 12.3 million acres to be 
protected while it further studied them for wilderness designation.113 Soon 
afterwards the Sierra Club sued, and settling out of court, the agency agreed to 
prepare an environmental impact statement and land use plan before 
developing any potential wilderness area.114 The agency7s attempts to gain 
impunity over development of roadless areas had only yielded the additional 
responsibilities linked to producing environmental impact statements for 
offering stumpage in these areas.
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed an act (with no title) designating 
fourteen national forest wildernesses and 17 wilderness study areas, and in 
1978, Congress passed the Endangered American Wilderness Act.115 But, 
many popular areas had been excluded from both pieces of legislation, and 
political dissatisfaction persisted. In 1978, Rupert Cutler, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture for Conservation (and earlier in  his career, assistant executive 
director of The Wilderness Society), responded to dissatisfaction with the 
incompleteness of the RARE I process and with the Endangered Wilderness 
Act by initiating the RARE II process. At first. Cutler preferred an approach 
that would "release" all lands not recommended for wilderness, but he soon 
announced a third category named "further planning."116 In 1979, Cutler 
announced the RARE II allocations: 15 million for wilderness consideration 
(one-third of this on the Alaskan Tongass National Forest), 36 million for
112 Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 37; Dana and Fairfax p. 300.
113 Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 37.
114 Ibid., 37; Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 300.
113 Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 46,51. Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1975.
116 Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 57.
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nonwildemess, and 11 millions for further planning.117 Definition of the 
release language posed the next political question. Timber industry officials 
favored a national wilderness bill including a "hard" or "long-term" 
interpretation of release -- an interpretation that appeared in the "Hayakawa" 
bill. In 1981 and 1982, environmentalists defeated this bill as well as a 
Wyoming wilderness bill that would have instituted hard release, signaling 
the defeat of the hard-release interpretation of RARE II non-wilderness 
lands.118 In the years 1980 to 1983, Congress passed several wilderness bills, 
mostly for eastern states.119
During 1984, Congress passed wilderness bills for six western states (as well 
as twelve eastern states), including 950,000 acres of wilderness in Oregon and 
1.8 million acres in California.120 Passage of these bills marked the end of 
wilderness designation as the primary focus of the conflict over developing 
roadless areas, aside from Montana and Idaho roadless lands, for which acts 
were never passed.121 Nevertheless, the remaining, undesignated but defacto 
wilderness areas in these states were to persist as an object of political struggle.
117 Ibid.
118 ibjd Hendkee, Stankey, and Lucas, Wilderness Management, 141.
119 Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980; Colorado Wilderness Act of 1980; Charles Deam 
Wilderness Act of 1982 (Indiana); Cheah Wilderness Act of 1983; Florida Wilderness Act of 
1983; Lee Metcalf Wilderness and Manageament Act of 1983 (Montana — not a comprehenisve 
act); Paddy Creek Wilderness Act of 1983 (Missouri); West Virginia Wilderness Act of 1983; 
Roth, Wilderness 1980-1984, Chapter One.
120 ArizonaWildemess Act of 1984; Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984; California Wilderness 
Act of 1984; Georgia Wilderness Act of 1984; Mississippi National Forest Wilderness Act of 
1984; New Flampshire Wilderness Act of 1984; North Carolina Wilderness Act of 1984; 
Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984; Pennsylvania Wilderness Act of 1984; San Juan Basin 
Wilderness Act of 1984; Texas Wilderness Act of 1984; Utah Wilderness Act of 1984; Vermont 
Wilderness Act of 1984; Virginia Wilderness Act of 1984; Washington Wilderness Act of 1984; 
Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984.
121 Actually, Nebraska did not pass a wilderness act until 1985, (Nebraska Wilderness Act of 
1985) and Tennessee did not pass one until 1986 (Tennessee Wilderness Act of 1986).
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Owl I: Yet Another Annoyance
After 1984, the focus of the roadless area conflict became a struggle between 
"old-growth" forest advocates and the timber industry. At the core of the 
battle were old-growth dependent wildlife, particularly those species fit to be 
listed under the ESA, of which the northern spotted owl was most 
consequential. During the preceding decade, researchers and activists 
increasingly had been focusing attention upon the spotted owl, which seemed 
to be diminishing in numbers and losing habitat as private, state, and federal 
forestry interests logged remaining old-growth forests — forests that were 
always slated for demise under the traditional precepts of intensive 
management and high level sustained yields of timber. After passage of the 
wilderness bills, several national and local organizations began to pressure 
federal agencies, particularly the Forest Service and the BLM, into managing 
remaining lands for the preservation of the owl. Among the national groups 
entering the political fracas were the Sierra Club Legal Defense Foundation, 
the National Wildlife Federation, and the Audubon Society. These groups 
were often in disagreement with the local or regionally based groups, the most 
powerful being the Oregon Natural Resources Council, headed by Oregon 
native, Andy Kerr. Ultimately, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service would list 
the northern spotted owl as threatened under the Endangered Species Act. 
What began as an annoyance grew into the major issue that was to give rise to 
the adoption of Ecosystem Management as Forest Service Policy in June 1992.
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After Congress had passed the Endangered Species Act in 1973, federal and 
state agencies had formed an interagency group called the Oregon Endangered 
Species Task Force (OESTF) to "begin inventory, research, and management 
work on endangered Oregon wildlife."122 The task force — which included 
representatives from the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as the Oregon State Game Commission and 
the Oregon State University (OSU) — was already aware that the northern 
spotted owl could pose legal problems. Publicity around the research work of 
Eric Foreman, an OSU master's student in wildlife biology, had raised the issue 
of declining owl habitat. Foreman recalls that he and professor Charles 
Meslow, of OSU, w ith whom he was working, were active in bringing public 
attention to his research results, ultimately culminating in creation of the 
conflict around the spotted owl.123 In the same year, responding to an 
accumulation of research around the northern spotted owl, the U.S. FWS had 
included the species among a list of "candidate species," for listing under the 
newly passed ESA.124 By 1976, the OESTF had devised an interim plan for the 
spotted owl, which included a network of land set-asides for owl habitat (a 
zoning strategy that would designate zones to a particular use) which the team 
intended to be worked into regional guides and forest plans. Three years later, 
the NFMA Committee of Scientists published its 1979 administrative 
regulations naming the spotted owl as an indicator species of old growth 
ecosystems.125 Nevertheless, the Forest Service continued to sell stumpage in
122 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 20.
123 Forsman in Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 20. Accordin to Yaffee, Jack Ward Thomas, then a 
research scientist for the Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station, was project funder 
and director for Foreman's owl research. Ibid., 19-23.
124 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 47.
125 (36 CFR 219.19). Also, see Watson and Muraoka, "The Northern Spotted Owl," 88; Yaffee, 
Widsom, 384, fn.8.
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owl territory and neglected to adopt a strategy for dealing with declining 
habitat. Not until 1984 did the Forest Service address the issue of owl 
management in context of an official planning document.
In June, 1984, the FS published its "Regional Guide" for Region 6 
(including Oregon and Washington) — a document outlining the general 
direction and objectives of the Forest Service, but deferring specific resource 
decisions (and liability) to individual forest plans. Environmental groups 
promptly appealed the Guide, asserting that its lack of cumulative effects 
analysis concerning the relationship between logging and owl habitat violated 
NEPA and that its lack of viability analysis regarding effects on owl 
populations violated the biological diversity requirements of NFMA.126 In 
1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Douglas MacCleery 
(previously a lobbyist for the forest products industry) succumbed to political 
pressures and ordered the Forest Service, particularly Region 6 (whose 
Forester was Jeff Sirmon), to write a supplemental environmental impact 
statement to the regional guide regarding management for the spotted owl. 
Meanwhile, MacCleery authorized logging on the controversial lands. The 
SEIS appeared in April 1988, and in December, the Chief of the Forest Service, 
Dale Robertson, signed a Record of Decision. Several groups — including old- 
growth advocates and timber industry groups — then filed administrative 
appeals which the FS promptly rejected. Subsequently, in February, 1989, the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF), acting on behalf of twenty-nine 
groups, filed federal suits in Seattle and Portland. Seattle District Court Judge 
William Dwyer, basing his decision on the ESA, in March, 1989, granted a
126 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 75-81.
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preliminary injunction on 140 planned FS timber sales and set a court date for 
June, when he extended the injunction indefinitely.127
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Land Management was facing similar legal and 
political problems in relation to its timber program and the northern spotted 
owl. In 1987, the SCLDF filed suit in U.S. District Court (in Portland, Oregon) 
against the BLM "over the inadequacy of their owl protection plan."128 "In 
1988, U.S. District Judge Helen Frye... granted a preliminary injunction 
blocking BLM timber sales in stands of trees more than 200 years old."129 In 
response, spurred by industry and troubled by rapidly changing scientific 
pronouncements on owl ecology, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon) and 
Representative Les AuCoin (D-Oregon) "attached language to a spending bill 
for the BLM that said its management plans could not be challenged solely on 
the basis of new scientific information," whereupon Judge Frye lifted the 
in junction.130 The legitimacy of the BLM had been strongly challenged and 
nearly usurped by a federal court, exposing its vulnerability to legal challenge. 
But through overt political maneuvering in Congress by its allies, AuCoin and 
Hatfield, the agency had, at least temporarily, been directed to perpetuate its 
current timber program.
During the same time frame, in January 1987, a small group out of 
Massachusetts named Green World petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as an endangered species.
127 Seattle Audubon Society o. Robertson. Also, see Sher, 'Travels with Strix."
128 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 91.
129 Ibid., 91.
130 Ibid., 91.
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According to Andy Stahl, who had recently become director of the Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund, the larger environmental organizations had wanted to 
delay filing a petition until they had better "developed" public opinion.131 
But, the petition by the "out-of-the-blue" group, GreenWorld, forced their 
hands, and in March, thirty-five other groups filed a separate petition.132 In 
December, the FWS' regional director for the northwest, Rolf Wallenstrom, 
acting under orders of the FWS national director, Frank Dunkle, rejected the 
petitions. The following May, 1988, SCLDF sued the FWS, and in November, 
U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly found the FWS decision to have been 
"arbitrary and capricious," and ordered the Service to review its decision using 
available scientific evidence that the agency had ignored.133 In April, 1989, the 
FWS proposed listing the owl as threatened under the ESA and published the 
listing in the Federal Register in June. Final listing was published in the 
Register a year later, but the FWS had failed to designate critical habitat. The 
Sierra Legal Defense Fund, the Portland Audubon Society, and the Northwest 
Resources Defense Council sued, and in February, 1991, Judge Zilly 
determined that the FWS failure to designate owl habitat violated the ESA 
and ordered the Service to submit a plan for reviewing critical habitat.134 The 
court had effectively required the Fish and Wildlife Service — within the 
Department of Interior, which had often attempted to gain control over Forest 
Service Lands — to zone the Pacific Northwest for the objective of managing 
the owl. Since most owl lands were on national forests, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service would exert great control over Forest Service decision-making.
1 1̂ Stahl in Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 108.
132 Ibid.
133 Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F.Supp. 479 (W.D.Wash. 1988); Yaffee Spotted Owl, 
111; Durbin, Tree Huggers, 92.
134 Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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While the Forest Service was being assailed by environmental groups, the 
court, and factions within Congress (see discussion below, in this chapter), the 
Congressional appropriations committees were busy ordering the Forest 
Service to raise cuts in the Pacific Northwest. For instance, in 1987, during the 
agency's NFMA planning process, Congress directed the agency to harvest 
timber from owl national forests in Oregon an Washington at quantities 
eighteen percent higher than written into its draft plans.135 October, 1989, the 
Senate passed an appropriations bill dubbed the Hatfield/ Adams bill with a 
rider — dubbed "Section 318" — that guaranteed a total timber cut of 9.6 billion 
board feet from federal lands in the Pacific Northwest (7.7 bbf from the FS; 1.9 
from the BLM) during the 1989 and 1990 fiscal years.136 The bill gave 
environmental groups the discretion to choose which 1.1 billion board feet 
would be harvested (the total volume held in litigation), protecting the 
remaining lands from logging until the end of fiscal year, 1990, and prohibited 
all logging on lands with known habitat. Section 318 reduced the debate 
between preservationists and the timber industry to a conflict over mutually 
exclusive landuses — a conflict over zoning. While it conceded a great amount 
of timber to industry, the bill clearly signified restraints upon the Forest 
Service's decision-making power, as well as acknowledging "fragmentation" 
as an unwanted effect of logging practices. In its accompanying conference 
report, Committee members chastised the agency directors regarding the 
"adequacy of their planned actions" concerning the spotted owl and habitat. 
But, the Forest Service gained on other fronts: the bill also proclaimed the 
final SEIS to be immune from further judicial review, "prohibited the courts
I*® Caufield, "A Reporter at Large," 56.
136 Section 318 of 1990 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.
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from issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction on fiscal 
year 1990 timber sales/' prescribed deadlines for judicial review, and 
streamlined the litigation process. 137 The agency was clearly caught between 
the courts and congress, although it was a far from passive participant.
Administrative Appeals and Litigation: Smokev's Star Chamber
In crafting the Hatfield/Adams bill, Congress was at least temporarily 
responding to the Forest Service directorate's complaints regarding increasing 
demands upon planners and disruption of management activities resulting 
from litigation and administrative appeals. These complaints were part of a 
campaign to limit public control of the agency (a campaign that the Forest 
Service kept active at least until the mid-1990s). In the mid-1980s, the Forest 
Service contended with an increasing number of administrative appeals to 
timber sales as well as lawsuits, largely based upon allegedly inadequate 
environmental impact statements. The agency was not prepared for the 
increasing number of appeals, and a backlog developed, increasing the 
processing period for each appeal. In addition, by 1985, as national forests 
completed their NFMA mandated forest plans, environmental groups began 
appealing the plans, further increasing the agency's burden. According to the 
General Accounting Office report:
Nationwide, the number of Forest Service appeals filed annually 
more than doubled between fiscal years 1983 and 1988, from 584 
to 1,298. Average processing time for appeals increased from 201 
days in fiscal year 1986 to 363 days by March 31,1988, which is 
more than 2-1/2 times as long as generally provided for appeals 
processing. The nationwide backlog of unresolved appeals grew
137 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 121.
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from 64 at the end of fiscal year 1983 to 830 by the end of fiscal 
year 1988.138
Appeals and litigation were largely stop-gap measures, but the issue of old- 
growth and old-growth dependent species was beginning to emerge 
nationally, providing the main focus for the political conflict that would 
culminate in the Forest Service's adoption of "Ecosystem Management."
One of the Forest Service's responses was to work behind the scenes to limit 
access to public involvement in management through administrative appeal 
and litigation.
In March 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on Conservation and Forestry 
convened a "Hearing on Appeals Process Used by the Forest Service" to 
review the consequences of the new appeals process crafted by the Forest 
Service the previous month.139 Montana Senator Baucus played a large part 
in organizing the hearings, and during the proceedings, he aggressively 
questioned Forest Service officials. Though the hearings ostensibly concerned 
appeals, Leonard began his oral testimony by referring to timber supply 
problems, which he linked to timber sales that were not taking place due to 
the appeals process. In his written testimony, he stated the case more softly:
During the past year, the Forest Service appeals process has been 
cited as one of the causes of timber shortages in several areas of 
Montana and other parts of the country. Over the last 2 years, a 
total of 48 timber sales were appealed in the Northern Region.
Of those 48, 19 were affirmed. The remainder were either 
remanded, settled through negotiation, or withdrawn. In 1988,
138 u_s. General Accounting Office, Forest Service, 1-2.
139 U 5. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Subcommittee on 
Conservation and Forestry, Hearing on Appeals Process.
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over 52 million board feet were tied up due to appeals. That 
represented about 65 percent of the Region's timber sale 
program.140
Associate Forest Service Chief Leonard persistently attempted to link appeals 
and litigation to reductions in the timber supply. He particularly emphasized 
Region One — comprising mostly Montana and northern Idaho — where 
Baucus' constituency was situated. In November of the same year, speaking 
before a House of Representatives hearing, Leonard also testified that forest 
plans were facing the obstacle of appeal: "Of the 97 plans which have been 
issued in final form, we have had 825 appeals. Of that 825, 515 of those 
appeals have been resolved, either through local discussions or decisions We 
also have 10 major lawsuits." At the time, Leonard testified, 48 plans were 
still tied up, though Leonard looked at the positive side: "But we now have 
49 plans free and clear of appeals and lawsuits" (which was one plan over the 
half way mark).
Leonard's reference to litigation was revealing. It reflected an ongoing 
controversy within the agency and in the political dialogue in general. In the 
March, senatorial hearings, Montana Senator Max Baucus, who played a 
large part in the proceedings (and commissioned the GAO study mentioned 
above), addressed Leonard about the agency's legal record in the Northern 
Region (Region One, Missoula, Montana): "As you know, in the last 15 cases 
that have gone before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Forest Service 
has lost So the Forest Service is now batting 0 for 15."141 Leonard defended 
the record somewhat obtusely, telling Baucus, " We have a better batting
140 Ibid., 60.
141 Baucus, "Senator from Montana," 26.
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average in some of the other circuits." Linking the problems to the NEPA 
process, which Congress itself had instituted, Leonard added:
We have tried to utilize environmental assessments tiered back 
to forest plan environmental impact statements, and we simply 
have not been successful in convincing the ninth circuit that 
provides adequate consideration of the environmental impacts 
and that in fact in order to comply with the NEPA those kinds of 
decisions must be documented in a full-blown environmental 
impact statement. Some of it we can say has been the result of 
evolving standards. Some of those decisions that we have lost 
in recent years, if we had presented the same decisions to the 
court 5 years ago might very well been accepted. The NEPA law 
has been evolving.142
Leonard continued to construct the link between timber shortages and 
environmental appeals and litigation, while also continuing to develop the 
link been these procedural obstacles and federal law, particularly NEPA. In 
this context, Leonard told Congress that "appeals and litigation have resulted 
in delays and withdrawals of timber sales, and they have also identified the 
need for us to go back and rework previously prepared sales to bring the 
NEPA documentation to standard."143 Furthermore, Leonard argued, "NEPA 
rework has substantially slowed the completion of timber sale preparation. It 
has also meant that decisions to make sales are delayed to the point that an 
appeal cannot be resolved without delaying the planned sale date."144 From 
the agency's perspective, the main problems it faced resulted from 
inadequacies in procedural law, not misconduct on the part of the agency. On 
issues of substance — the technical content of plans and sales — the Forest 
Service retained its hegemony. Leonard added:
142 Ibid.
143 Leonard, 'Testimony," 23-24.
144 Ibid., 25.
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I would like to point out that while appeals and lawsuits have 
revealed procedural deficiencies in complying with the National 
Environmental Policy Act, there have been no decisions in 
either appeals or litigation identifying substantive violations of 
other environmental laws or of the standards and guidelines in 
forest plans.145
In making the link to NEPA and other procedural considerations, Leonard 
tried to soften his critique upon citizen involvement through appeals and 
litigation, stating (enigmatically) that appeals were actually a symptom of 
timber shortages and that — presumably under further refined conditions — 
they were a practical aid to forest management. He added:
Although administrative appeals have delayed and in some 
cases stopped timber sales, we believe appeals are more a 
symptom than the cause of the timber shortage problems. The 
appeal process costs the Forest Service time and money.
However, the appeal process is a beneficial tool the public and 
our land managers can use in making responsible natural 
resource decisions and detecting emerging issues.146
Leonard went even further, touching upon the democratic and practical 
functions of administrative appeals, which he more fully acknowledged 
elsewhere while lamenting its role in political conflict. He noted:
Appeals play an important role in the management of the 
national forests. The Forest Service makes every effort to 
delegate decisionmaking to the lowest possible level. We want 
the decision to be made by people who are most familiar with 
the conditions on the ground.
But, in making these delegations, we create opportunities for 
different interpretations of regulations and procedures. The 
appeals process gives people who may be adversely affected by a 
decision an opportunity to have it reviewed by a higher level.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 60.
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And it is an important part of ensuring that we remain 
responsive to the public.147
Thus framed, Congress and the Forest Service had presented the issue of 
appeals as being a tension between two conflicting ideas: the democratic 
process and its consequent slowdowns versus the efficiency and timeliness of 
goods and services delivered (notably, timber) by an unconstrained 
management agency. In the words of Wyche Fowler, a Georgia Senator and 
member of the subcommittee: "While we want to avoid unnecessary 
impediments to Forest Service management activities, the solution to such 
problems cannot come at the expense of public participation and interest in 
good forest planning and management."148
With this tension so expressed, Leonard informed Congress, in February, 
1989, the directorate "made changes in our appeal regulations to standardize 
or to streamline the process and to try to encourage resolution of disputes 
outside the appeals process."149 In written testimony, in the last sentence of 
the paragraph attesting to the rightness of having an appeals process, Leonard 
wrote that "We believe our new appeal regulations will go a long way toward 
reducing the cost and delays we experienced in the past."150 Leonard claimed 
that the new appeals process would result in cooperation between the Forest 
Service and local activists — presumably environmentalists — and an increase 
of informal agreements that would allow controversial stumpage sales to 
continue. Leonard stated:
147 Ibid., 25.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., 60.
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There is no doubt that the new appeal procedures are changing 
the way we approach planning and decisionmaking. Although 
it is still early for any definite conclusions, we are greatly 
encouraged by what we see as a change for the better under the 
new rules. We already have examples of controversial timber 
sales and other decisions going forward because of an 
understanding being reached between the public and the Forest 
Service at a local level. This was one of the goals we hoped to 
achieve under the new rules. One underlying objective in 
developing the new rule was to get people to work out their 
differences in an informal setting during project development 
rather than waiting until after the environmental documents 
were complete. By informally working out differences early in 
the process, we expect to implement projects more quickly.151
Presumably, environmentalists would have to bargain informally with 
the Forest Service as a result of decreased access to the alternatives of appeals. 
If the agency's reasoning were correct, then the appeals process would speed 
up, and the backlog of delayed timber sales would diminish. The agency 
would opt for efficiency over public participation.
Bob Wolf — retired congressional staffer (who, as a chief staffer for Senator 
Hubert Humphrey, had drafted the RPA and NFMA) and past Forest Service 
forester and economist — opposed this trade-off and testified that the changes 
were anti-democratic. Wolf further testified that the timber industry, which 
would directly benefit from the dispatch of the appealed timber sales, unduly 
influenced the decision to institute further restrictions on appeals. Wolf 
wrote:
Now the Forest Products Industry and the Forest Service want to 
make it more difficult for conservation groups to secure an 
administrative review of their concerns. They would tilt the 
jury box.
151 Ibid.
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Wolf believed that the high number of appeals resulted from pubic 
dissatisfaction with the Forest Service's plans, not because the process was too 
easy to use, and that the correct solution would be to manage in line with 
public opinion. Wolf stated:
I view the volume of appeals as an indicator of general 
dissatisfaction with the proposed National Forest Plans. I think 
that commodity or noncommodity groups file appeals for 
reasons they believe are just. The solution will not be found in 
changing the appeals process. It will come when the Forest 
Service addresses the reasons for the several publics registering 
their votes of low confidence.152
Leonard did not acknowledge a public "vote of low confidence," however, 
and continued to focus upon the need for an uninterrupted supply of timber. 
From Leonard's perspective, the timber program would remain the highest 
priority, despite earlier rhetoric pertaining to the virtues of public 
participation. Leonard summarized his testimony with the claim: "We hope 
the combination of these actions and the emphasis we have placed on 
prededsional public involvement in our new appeal regulations will create a 
situation conducive to refilling the 'timber pipeline.'"153
Pipeline or not, the agency remained entangled in court. In October, Chief 
Robertson appeared before a senatorial joint hearing, in which Senator Mark 
Hatfield from Oregon readdressed the question of the Forest Service's recent 
legal history: "Over the last 5 years, how many lawsuits and appeals have 
been filed in Region 6 [Pacific Northwest] on the activities of the Forest 
Service?" Robertson replied that "there have been 21 appeals and 1 lawsuit 
challenging an old timber management plan to date. There have been
152 Wolf, "Prepared Statement," 365.
153 Leonard,'Testimony," 61.
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hundreds of appeals and lawsuits for project-level activities." Presently, 
Robertson added, "I can tell you right now the Forest Service has about 3,300 
lawsuits pending nationwide, 3,300," of which "between 10 to 20 percent" 
concerned activities in the Region 6.154
Owl II: Listing and Post-Listing (1990-1992)
Meanwhile, politics largely out of control of the Forest Service were 
producing results with great bearing upon the agency's discretion over the 
national forests. In June, 1990, when the FWS had listed as threatened the 
spotted owl, it had failed to designate critical habitat, though the ESA 
mandates that the agency must simultaneously list a species and designate 
habitat. Subsequently, in a federal district court ruling in February 1991, judge 
Thomas Zilly had ordered the FWS to propose critical habitat by April 30.155
By March, Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan, announced that he had 
assembled an endangered species recovery team — consisting largely of 
political appointees with nominal representation by biologists — which 
published its proposed critical habitat on May 6. The designation included 11.6 
million acres, 6.5 million of them on national forests. In response, BLM 
Director, Cy Jamison requested that Secretary Lujan convene an Endangered 
Species Committee to evaluate the exception of forty-four timber sales on BLM 
lands within the proposed critical habitat, which Lujan accepted in late 
September. Political pressure came to bear upon the FWS, which dropped its
154 Robertson, 'Testimony," June 22.1989,31.
155 Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
habitat designation to a total of 6.9 million acres, issuing its final 
recommendations in early January, 1992.156
The subsequent February, "a federal judge issued a preliminary 
injunction... blocking all logging in old-growth forests on U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management property because of danger to the northern spotted owl's 
habitat."157 On May 14,1992, the ESC — known as the "God Squad" — after 
hearings surrounded by public fanfare and spectacle, voted to exempt fourteen 
of the forty-four sales — an ambiguous result. The Sierra Club Legal Defense 
Fund promptly filed suit to stop the sales. Meanwhile, during the same 
month, the FWS published its draft owl recovery plan in Portland, while BLM 
director, Jamison, continued to work on his own plan, featuring more timber 
than the FWS draft plan offered.158
The Bush administration opposed implementation of the draft recovery 
plan, which was a modification of the ISC strategy, arguing that it would result 
in the loss of 32,000 jobs.159 In early 1991, the Forest Service succumbed to 
pressure from the Bush administration and rejected the ISC owl conservation 
strategy, and several groups responded by filing suits against the agency for 
scheduling timber sales under no explicit plan.160 In early 1991, the court 
again enjoined the agency from timber sales in lands suitable to owl habitat 
and ordered the FS to deliver a timetable for completing an owl management
156 "Logging Limits Sought Over 7 Million Acres," New York Times, January 10,1992, A12.
157 "Judge blocks logging in owl habitat," Washington Post, February 20,1992 A10. Injunctive 
Relief was granted in Portland Audobon Soc. v. Luhan.
158 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 136-40.
159 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 137-38.
160 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 136-40.
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plan by June 15 and a plan by March, 1992. In late May, 1991, two weeks after 
the FWS published its proposed habitat designations, Judge Dwyer, in Seattle 
Audobon v. Evans (771 F. Supp. 1081), permanently enjoined FS timber sales 
in designated owl habitat "until the FS completed a new spotted owl 
management plan and environmental analysis."161 Ruling that the agency 
"had violated the EIS requirements of NEPA,"162 he wrote in strong language: 
"The problem here has not been any shortcomings in the laws, but simply a 
refusal of administrative agencies to comply with them. This involves a 
public interest of the highest order: the interest in having government 
officials act in accordance with the law."163
Meanwhile, the issues concerning roadless areas and old-growth forest 
began to expand — conceptually and geographically — threatening further 
action and curtailment of Forest Service discretion. The list of politically 
important (ESA listed or proposed) old-growth dependent species was 
growing, and various congressional members were crafting their own 
solutions to the old-growth controversy. In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy 
(Vermont, D) criticized foresters for not accounting for changing political 
demands and indirectly warned the Forest Service and other agencies that 
Congress was preparing legislation to remedy this neglect. Leahy suggested:
Despite the dramatic change in public view, it seems that the 
forestry profession has been slow to respond. For that reason,
Congress has become increasingly active in environmental and 
forestry issues. ... This increased congressional activism has been 
renewed in the last two years and will continue on several 
fronts. Key areas include: old growth forests; global warming;
161 Ibid., 133.
162 Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Making Ecosystem Policy," 10.
163 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 124
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add rain; wilderness preservation; and forest planning. Last 
week the Senate passed my Forest Stewardship Act as a separate 
title in the 1990 Farm bill. This is the first time a forestry title 
has ever been incorporated into a farm bill and bears witness to 
the importance Congress now places on forestry.164
On April 19,1990, the same day that the ISC was presenting its findings to a 
Congressional hearing, Congressman Jim Jontz (D, Indiana) introduced a bill 
with 24 co-sponsors to establish an andent forest reserve system on Forest 
Service and BLM lands. The proposed Andent Forests Protection Act did not 
pass, but the idea persisted through 1992, representing the sentiment within 
some sedors of Congress that the FS discretion regarding forest management 
should be further censured. In April, 1991, the House Agriculture Committee 
and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee convened a 
"Sdentific Panel on Late-Successional Forest Ecosystems" (dubbed Gang of 
Four by the timber industry and hereafter Sdentific Panel165) in an attem pt "to 
get things going by providing members of Congress with a menu of options 
from which they could build forest protection legislation."166 John Gordon, a 
panel member and Dean of the Yale forestry school, recalls that the formation 
of the team "was symptomatic of the Forest Service losing control," and the 
Forest Service Chief was unhappy about i t 167 According to Gordon:
The fad  that the Forest Service was not very happy about what 
we were doing must have been that they felt they lost something 
that way—control, I suppose. We were called in by Dale 
Robertson, and sort of bawled out for running off and getting 
Forest Service sdentists involved.168
I64 Leahy, "Forestry and Foresters," 31-3Z
1®* Timber industry presumably chose this name to cast the panel in the light of the Chinese 
communist leadership, a bizarre instance of red-baiting.
166 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 168.
16? Gordon, "Interview," 9.
168 Ibid., 10.
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Responding to a growing body of research and political claims concerning 
the reduction of salmon populations, as well as owl populations and habitat, 
the Scientific Panel concluded that protecting the salmon would require 
controversial decreases in old-growth logging, particularly roadbuilding. 
"[L]ike it or not, the Forest Service would have to start taking fish protection 
seriously in the owl forests west of the Cascade."169 Meanwhile, the FWS was 
preparing to announce its proposed threatened species listing of the marbled 
marrulet, which it published in September, 1992. By Spring, 1992, two House 
committees were considering bills to control management of the owl forests. 
According to the New York Times:
At issue are unlogged forests in Northern California, Oregon, and 
Washington. Even as a Cabinet-level committee votes this week on 
how much forest should be cut, two committees of the House are 
set to deal with proposals that would protect endangered species by 
identifying and preserving ranges covering millions of acres.170
According to the New York Times, the two "bills now in the House would 
slow the harvest of ancient timber and make available millions of dollars for 
retraining workers and restoring lands ruined by clear cutting."171 A bill 
approved in the House Interior Committee (co-written by Representatives 
Bruce Vento, Dem., Minnesota and George Miller, Dem., Cal) would have "set 
aside roughly eight million acres of land to remain uncut and put one million 
acres out of reach of loggers temporarily for researchers." Another bill, out of 
the House Agriculture Committee, would have "establishfed] a 6.8 million- 
acre owl preserve in the Northwest."172
169 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 170.
170 Schneider, Keith, Bush and Congress facing a showdown on forests. New York Times. May 
12,1992: A14.
171 Ibid.
172 Tom Kenworthy, "Logging Approved at Owl Site," Washington Post May 15,1992 A ,l.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
Meanwhile, the Forest Service continued to face difficulties in the federal 
courts. In January, 1992, the Forest Service had produced a supplemental Final 
Environmental Impact Statement on Management for the Northern spotted 
Owl. (The EIS supplemented the Regional Guide, which the Forest Service 
published in 1984.) The agency's preferred alternative and proposed action 
was to adopt the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) plan as the framework 
for management of owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest.173 
Environmentalists appealed the plan arguing that it neglected "information 
produced subsequent to the 1990 ISC report and that the EIS failed to take into 
account the impact that an owl plan would have on 32 other old-growth- 
dependent spedes."174 Judge Dwyer rejected the plan in May, ruling that the 
agency had failed to address three issues: whether or not "the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's jeopardy call on the 13 Bureau of Land Management sales 
released for harvest by spedal review process under the ESA (the "God 
Squad") necessitated a revision of the viability assessments used in the EIS"; 
whether or not "new information about declining owl populations require 
changing the probabilities of maintaining viable owl populations"; and, 
whether or not the agency's plan would "lead to extirpation of the 32 spedes 
dosely assodated with old-growth, which had been part of the Gang of Four 
report."175
Judge Dwyer subsequently imposed a new temporary restraining order 
through the summer and fall of 1992, shutting down logging on old-growth in
173 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 398, fn.66.
174 Ibid., 398,61.66.
175 Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Mosely; See Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Making 
Ecosystem Polity," 10.
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the Pacific northwest. The Region 6 harvest level declined from 4.9 billion 
board feet in 1990 to just 0.77 million in 1992.176 The Forest Service, having 
lost much of its discretion in the management of its lands in its only "paying" 
region, faced the task of providing a planning framework that would suit the 
federal court. Meanwhile, the ruling put pressure on Congress to form a 
legislative solution to the political conflict between timber jobs and the 
northern spotted owl, threatening a farther reaching restraint upon the 
agency, at a time when the conflict was moving east toward the interior 
Columbia basin and the northern Rockies and expanding to include more 
spedes.177
The Conflict Expands
To complicate matters further for the Forest Service, environmentalists 
and the media began to expand the discourse to the "eastside forests" (east of 
the Cascades) and the northern Rockies, as well as other regions, while 
expanding the list of politically important spedes. In December 1991, Time 
magazine prodaimed in its by-line that "the fight is not just about spotted 
owls anymore. Conservationists step up an all-fronts campaign to save 
America's andent forests."178 The artide, entitled "Whose woods are these?" 
(in bold letters), began with an apocalyptic tone: "Deep inside the dwindling 
woods, a rare spedes of bird is threatened with extinction. Before loggers came 
to the forest, the birds could easily find the trees they needed for nesting —
176 Warren, Production, Prices, Employment, 1990; 1991; 1992.
177 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?"; Barry Meier, "Spotted owl dispute jolts another 
timber region," New York Times, February 1, L,7; Tom Kensworthy, "'Unraveling' of Ecosystem 
Looms in Oregon Forests,"Washington Post. May 15,1992, A,14; Tom Kensworthy, "Study of 
Northwest's forests sought," Washington Post June4> 1992, A27.
178 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70.
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trees at least 80 to 100 years old. But the relentless advance of chain saws has 
leveled much of the old woodland." The story, referring to national forests, 
went on to link the Pacific Northwest controversy to other regions and species 
beyond the owl, conveying a voice of alarm and criticism to a large, 
mainstream readership:
This story may sound familiar, but these forests are not in the 
Pacific Northwest, and the bird in question is not the northern 
spotted owl. It is the red-cockaded woodpecker, a striking red- 
black-and-white bird that lives in loblolly and longleaf pines 
from Virginia to Texas. Like the owl, it is being used by 
biologists as an indicator species, a sensitive probe of the vitality 
of forests across a broad swath of the U.S. Just as dying canaries 
once let coal miners know that oxygen levels were perilously 
low, the decline of the red-cockaded woodpecker, the northern 
spotted owl, and many other species is a warning of a far greater 
threat: America's few remaining stands of old-growth forests — 
woods whose ancient trees have never been logged — are in 
danger of disappearing as distinct and valuable ecosystems.179
In November, 1991, the Fish and Wildlife Service "determined that logging 
in the Southwest was rapidly destroying the dense forests in which the 
Mexican spotted owl lives" and proposed that owl also be listed as a threatened 
spedes.180 By January, the Forest Service had "temporarily dosed thousands 
of acres of federal land in the Southwest to logging," dropping timber 
production in the Gila National Forest by 50 percent from the previous year's 
levels, "under a plan to protect the owl while it is studied."181 hi early May 
1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the Snake River chinook 
salmon as a threatened spedes. According to the Washington Post, "East-side 
forests provide spawning ground for some Chinook, and logging could be
179 Ibid., 70.
180 Meier, "Spotted owl dispute" New York Times, February 1, L,7.
181 Ibid., L, 7.
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halted to prevent further degradation of salmon habitat hit hard by clear- 
cutting and cattle grazing that raise water temperatures and cloud streams 
with sediment."182
A Washington Post front-page headline ominously declared that an 
"'unraveling' of ecosystems looms in Oregon forests," further reporting that 
"scientists say recovery could take [a] century."183 At the time, the House 
Interior and Agriculture Committees were debating inclusion of provisions 
for "the east-side" in ancient forest legislation under consideration. In an 
attempt to "reduce pressure to include provisions on east-side forests in 
legislation now being written by the House Interior and Agriculture 
committees," House Speaker, Tom Foley (D-Washington) and Oregon Senator 
Mark Hatfield wrote a letter to Agriculture Secretary Ed Madigan, requesting 
him to "undertake a scientific study of the insect- and disease-ravaged national 
forests in eastern Oregon and Washington."184 This was seen by 
environmental groups as portending an effect in order to increase the east-side 
cut to partially offset the loss of northwest timber production.
The Forest Service was facing similar activism in its Northern Region, 
where environmentalists were winning suits regarding sensitive species on 
national forests as well as crafting regional legislation.185 In Montana, for 
which Congress had not passed a wilderness bill, environmentalists had
182 Tom Kensworthy, "'Unraveling' of Ecosystem Looms in Oregon Forests/'Washington Post. 
May 15,1992, A,14.
183 Ibid., A ,l.
184 Tom Kensworthy, "Study of Northwest's Forests Sought," Washington Post June4,1992,
A27.
185 for instance, see the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act, which the Alliance for 
the Wild Rockies drafted. Congress introduced the bill, which did not pass, in 1993.
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formed, in 1988, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies. In 1990, the popular 
Outdoor Magazine announced that the group was "one of eight 'homegrown' 
or 'low-budgef environmental groups nationwide" to meet its "'honor roll' of 
small environmental groups," which, according to the editors, "may be the 
future of the environmental movement."186
At this time the alliance, directed by Mike Bader in Missoula, Montana, 
was drafting its Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act, which would 
cover over 16.3 million acres in Montana and Idaho (both states without 
Congressional wilderness bills), Wyoming, eastern Oregon, and eastern 
W ashington.187 (Ultimately, the Alliance was unable to gamer the support of 
the Montana delegation, but by 1993, with the help of legislators from other 
states, the group was able to see its bill introduced.)188
Below Cost Timber Sales
In 1991, the House Agriculture Committee decided to visit the issue of 
below-cost timber sales, which had persistently been an object of criticism since 
the beginning of the conflict over PNW ancient forests. Paul Hirt writes that, 
although below-costs sales "have been common since World War Two, the 
losses have accelerated over the years as forest managers increasingly turned 
to the lower valued and more inaccessible timber in the remote high country 
to fulfill their logging quotas."189 As early as 1980, the Natural Resources
186 Sherry Devlin, "Alliance Named by Magazine/' Missoulian , September 1,1990, B-l.
I®7 Sherry Devlin, "New York Lawmaker Sponsors Rockies Bill," Missoulian , July 16,1993, B- 
1.
1®® Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act.
I®9 Hirt, Conspircacy, xxxix.
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Defense Council directed attention to below cost sales when it issued a report 
entitled "Giving away the National Forests." In 1984, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office conducted its own study, discovering that "in 1981 and 1982, 
96 percent of timber sales in the Forest Service's Rocky Mountain Region... lost 
money; while 93 percent in the Intermountain Region lost money; and 60 
percent in the Northern Region lost money."190
In July, 1990, retired Congressional Research Service staffer, Robert Wolf, 
wrote that "the most serious failure in implementing NFMA concerns the 
cost tracking provisions. In sum, the Forest Service claims profits from its 
timber sales that are unrealistic if not egregious."191 Wolf contended that 
roads built by loggers ("purchaser credit roads") should not be counted by the 
Forest Service as a revenue, and that payments made to counties (in lieu of 
taxes) should be counted as a cost. This accounting would turn profits claimed 
by the agency into losses.192
A year later, in October 1991, the House Agriculture Committee held 
hearings on the issue of the timber program's revenues and losses, where 
Wolf presented his figures. A scathing article in the Atlantic Monthly 
entitled "The mismanagement of the National Forests," criticized the political 
manipulation of agency budget reporting, arguing "that the U.S. Forest 
Service, protected from congressional scrutiny by pork-barrel politics and 
imaginative bookkeeping, is devastating America's national forests through
190 Ibid., 279.
191 Wolf, "Promises to Keep," 14.
192 Ibid.
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needless and unprofitable timber sales."193 The author, a one-time "voluntary 
wilderness guard" for the agency, began with a litany of graphically described 
ecological abuses resulting from logging, then proceeded to an analysis of the 
agency's "timber mythology," finally focusing upon the timber program's 
effect on "the federal purse." Knize proclaimed:
The Forest Service has long claimed that the government makes 
money on timber sales, but an analysis performed at the request 
of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on the 
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources shows that the 
Forest Service timber program has lost $5.6 billion over the past 
decade."194
Tim e  magazine, also commented upon the proceedings with a critical 
voice. The magazine argued that agency "logging operations are questionable 
on economic grounds."195 The magazine reported that, "while the agency 
claims it made $628 million in profit last year, critics dismiss that figure as 
absurd. During the hearings Wolf pointed to the agency's use of 'inflated 
revenues and discounted costs,' telling the House Agriculture Committee in 
October that 'these mythical profits are achieved by accounting alchemy.'"196
At issue were several reported timber program costs and revenues, for 
instance whether or not costs should include the 25 percent payment to 
counties required from timber receipts, road maintenance, and "land-line 
location." Other concerns included depreciation rates for a $575 million 
timber fund and amortization rates for roads. According to the Atlantic 
M onthly, The Forest Service has used a number of creative accounting
193 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests," 98.
194 Ibid., 100.
*95 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70.
196 ibid.
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gimmicks, including amortizing roads over 240 years," or, in the Chugach 
National Forest in Alaska, over 1,800 years.197 In an article from 1990, Wolf 
wrote:
On the receipts side of the ledger, the service counts timber that 
it gives to lumber companies in lieu of payments for road 
building as if the trees were money received that could be used 
to defray other costs — implying an expense is a revenue. On the 
expense side, it uses several methods to obscure or understate 
costs. The most famous examples also concern timber access 
roads. For roads with a typical life of 20-30 years, the service uses 
amortization periods that range from 63 years for the lowest 
forest region to 969 for the highest, significantly reducing the 
apparent annual cost. Major expenses for road maintenance are 
omitted entirely. In addition, the service is working on a few 
new cost-hiding schemes. One would make roadbed costs 
disappear entirely. These are but a few examples of how the 
service systematically overstates receipts and understates costs, 
turning actual financial losses for the national forests into 
supposed profits.198
Wolf went on to criticize the agency for overrating its "present net value," 
saying that aside from not even being "money in the bank," it was "not even a 
proven concept," depending, for instance, upon attributing "monetary value 
to such nonquantifiable factors as wildlife and camping."199 Wolf, in pointing 
to the economic irrationality of the Forest Service Timber Program was also 
alluding to the political character of is accounting.
Concluding Remarks
By early summer, 1992, the Forest Service was struggling to maintain its 
agency regarding management of the Pacific Northwest, the "Eastside,"
197 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests," 103.
198 Wolf, "Promises to Keep," 14.
199 Ibid., 14.
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northern Rocky Mountains and beyond. Attempting to rewrite procedural 
regulations and fending off charges of lying to the public regarding public costs 
and benefits and the results of logging were among the challenges the agency 
faced. The Forest Service faced injunctions from timber harvest — a 
devastating loss of authority.200 The agency had severely challenged the 
warm and fuzzy Smoky Bear image it had attempted to construct in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. This tarnishing showed not only in the formal politics of the 
courts and capitols, but on the streets and in the national forests themselves.
If external politics were not enough to challenge the agency's identity, the 
agency was also being forced to confront dissent from within, marking the 
unambiguous end to the relative internal solidarity boasted in earlier decades.
200 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 139-40.
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Chapter 4
Adding Insult to Injury: More Activism, Dissent, and Discord
Out of controlllll 
— Jefferson Starship 
Modern Lave (record album)
While the Forest Service was losing agency before the activism of Congress 
and the mandates of the federal courts, it was also facing hostility and protest 
from other quarters. Environmental activists exerted direct pressure at all 
levels — at the agency doors as well as in the National Forests, and soon a 
variety of popular media — ranging from mainstream newspapers and 
magazines, to television producers, writers and filmmakers — began to add 
their critiques to the discourse. Ultimately, dissatisfaction affected the Forest 
Service itself, and the agency suffered a crisis of dissent and discord among its 
own ranks, foreshadowing an organizational shift that would follow with 
Robertson's memo in June, 1992. This chapter chronicles the activism facing 
the Forest Service from within its own ranks, as well as the political 
demonstrations, civil disobedience, and media criticism that the agency could 
not ignore.
Internal Discord (1984-1992)
In 1940, when Forest Service Chief Q appe lamented on the poor morale in the
U.S. Forest Service, and thirty years later when Chief Cliff empathized with
his subordinates' sense of misdirection, they were not proclaiming an
organizational breakdown, but certainly they demonstrated that diversity of
77
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mind existed within the agency. This diversity was, however, mainly 
diversity among foresters. Environmental legislation of the 1960s and 1970s 
significantly changed this situation. After Congress had passed the National 
Environmental Policy and National Forest Management Acts, each of which 
required the Forest Service to consider the effects of management practices 
upon a wide range of social, cultural, and ecological variables, the agency 
began diversifying its workforce, hiring more wildlife biologists, soil scientists, 
hydrologists, ecologists and economists — even historians and archeologists.
Within a decade, when the Forest Service was losing control of 
management decisions in the face of Congressional activism and adverse 
court decisions, it was also undergoing internal change, as newly hired 
specialists began rising through the ranks. From the mid-1980s on, Forest 
Service workers began criticizing agency policy — from the inside — and by the 
late 1980s, even regional officers were openly critical of the Chief Forester, as 
well as of agency policies. The conflict revealed that, in addition to losing 
control from outside forces, the old-guard agency personnel were losing 
control over its internal affairs as well.
During the 1980s, this diversity of mind manifested in outright schism 
within the Forest Service, fracturing any possible sense of unity the Forest 
Service might have wished to claim. By the early 1990s, this schism had 
become apparent between the agency's Washington, D.G-based central 
directorate and the regionally-based Forest Supervisors and Regional 
Foresters.201 Timber sales were the first internal battle ground. Based upon
201 Alan McQuillan, "Inside Mumma-Gate," Missoula Independent. October 31,1991, 18-19; 
Sherry Devlin, "Region Falls Short on Timber Again," Missoulian, September 15,1991 and
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on-the-ground assessment, regional agency officers were estimating one set of 
Allowable Sale Quantities, while the directorate, responding to pressures from 
the timber industry, a powerful bloc of westerners in Congress, and the Bush 
administration, exploited the RPA data base to manipulate the forest planning 
process and revise those numbers upward. Ultimately, the regional officers 
broke rank. Meanwhile, a schism had also developed between on-the-ground 
staff and the Forest Service administration regarding the effects of logging. 
Regional Foresters were caught in the middle, themselves subject to pressures 
from the Washington Office as well as the proddings of Congress and the 
executive branch, while also being respondent to their own workforce's voices.
An early and poignant statement of this unrest came in 1984 from the 
Forest Service's Northern Region, based in Missoula, Montana. An 
anonymous disgruntled agency worker from the Beaverhead National Forest 
in Idaho whom the Washington Post dubbed "Deep Root" revealed the depth 
of the internal division.202 (Deep Root later revealed his identity.) Deep 
Root's tactics including making collect phone calls to the bureaus of several 
major newspapers and television networks reporting Forest Service road 
practices in "roadless areas where timber values may be marginal or where 
they may be outweighed by fisheries, wildlife or recreations values," some 
with timber receipts below the cost of preparation, and some in violation of 
federal environmental law.203 According to the Denver bureau of the 
Washington Post:
"Forest Service Making Promises It Can't Keep?" Missoulian, October 11,1991, Al; Timothy 
Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much," New York Times 
September 16,1991, A l.
202 T.R. Reid, "Deep Root's Telephone Crusade," Missoulian November 25,1984, A-l.
203 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher, Deep Root Discuss Issues," Missoulian, Dec. 15,1985,13.
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For weeks now his calls have been coining in to the Washington 
Post bureau here and to the Denver offices of the New York 
Times, Newsweek, NBC, and other national media. Invariably, 
they are collect calls from — as the operator puts it — "an 
experienced forest manager in Montana."204
The anonymous whistle blower gave one example "of an illegal road" —
the Howell Creek Road — claiming it was "built inside RARE II (wilderness
study) areas prematurely before any Montana wilderness bill passed and before
any cumulative impact study was performed for all projected roads in the
area," and, in the words of the reporter, "contended that similar examples exist
on the Kootenai, Flathead, Lolo, Bitterroot, Deerlodge, and Gallatin
forests." 205 According to several sources, Deep Root was an experienced forest
manager — a "professional forester" belonging to any of several professional
groups including the Society of American Foresters and the American Forestry
Association.206 Other professionals adopted the tactics, eventually gaining a
defensive response from Forest Service Chief Max Peterson and the attention
of Montana Senator John Melcher (D), who met in private with Deep Root.
Melcher, claimed that he shared many of the concerns with Deep Root and
would investigate whether or not the National Forest Management Act was
meeting Congressional intent. He told the press, "He tapped the root with
m e."207
While the Deep Root spectacle was seemingly a regional event, unrest took 
a national course four years later when disgruntled Forest Service workers 
formed the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics,
204 Tim Reid, ''Deep Root's Telephone Crusade," Missoulian, Nov. 25,1984. A -l.
205 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher to Whistleblower: Have Boots, Will Travel," Missoulian,
Dec. 13,1984> 14.
206 John Kuglin, "Forest Service Nemesis Spreads its 'Roots,'" Missoulian Dec. 2,1984,17.
207 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher, Deep Root Discuss Issues," Missoulian December 15,1984,13.
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or AFSEE. In 1989, Jeff Debonis, a timber sale planner on the Willamette 
Forest, wrote an e-mail memo to Chief Dale Robertson criticizing the Forest 
Service timber program. Debonis, in his memo, which became public, wrote:
We, as an agency, are perceived by the conservation community 
as being an advocate of the timber industry's agenda. Based on 
my 10 years with the Forest Service, I believe this charge is true.
I also believe, along with any others, that this agency needs to re­
take the moral "high ground."208
Subsequently, Debonis formed the Association of Forest Service Employees 
for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE) and began publishing a monthly 
newspaper-style magazine, the Inner Voice, starting with an open letter to 
Dale Robertson criticizing the close relationship between the agency and the 
timber industry:
Our basic problem right now is that we (the Forest Service) are 
much too biased towards the resource-extraction industries, 
particularly the timber industry. We support their narrowly 
focused, short sighted agenda to the point that we are perceived 
by much of the public as being dupes of, and mere spokespeople 
for the resource extraction industries.209
Debonis went on to criticize the agency for overlooking the effects of its 
own management, particularly overcutting, writing that:
This stubborn, get-the-cut-out mindset we tend to embrace as an 
agency blinds us to the actual destructive results of our actions.
We see only what we want to see. As the negative impacts of our 
actions become more and more obvious, we try to pretend it's 
not happening And yet at some subconscious level we know  
that we are overcutting.210
208 Debonis, in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 102.
209 Debonis, "Speaking Out," 4.
210 Ibid., 4
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Early the next year, Robertson replied to Debonis, via the Inner Voice, 
commending him for bringing up "several good ideas," but disagreeing with 
Debonis7 assessment of the "attitude of the Forest Service": "It does not 
represent my attitude nor that of the people I work with and know best."211 
Robertson, again, appealed to "balance," a signifier the Forest Service would 
employ throughout the conflict.212 Robertson wrote:
It seems to me that your letter was one-sided and did not 
appropriately take into account the interest and needs of the 
American people in the Forest. We in the Forest Service have to 
keep a more balanced view of the world under our multiple use 
mandate. I think one of the things we have to guard against is 
getting caught up in the rhetoric of either the timber industry or 
the environmental groups and start believing it without putting 
some balance into it.213
However, Chief Robertson did approve of "participatory management77 and 
encouraged employees to "speak up and let their views be known" so the 
agency could benefit from "advantages of a diverse workforce."214 Robertson 
went on to appeal personally to Debonis to promote constructive, balanced 
and sensitive reform in the agency, writing, "Jeff, I hope I can count on you to 
bring about constructive change in the Forest Service — change that is 
sensitive to both the environment and the people who are affected by our 
decisions."215 Robertson wanted benefit from the advantages of diversity
211 Robertson, "Chief Robertson Responds," 3.
212 The use of the term "balance," and the Forest Service's claim to promote a balanced policy, 
is an example of a political appropriation of a popular term. Balance is a vague reference to 
the themes of civility and reason, primary organizing ideas in the historical development of 
modem bureaucracies. For a good discussion of this relationship between civility and policy as 
it developed in Europe, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, and his Madness and 
Civilization.
213 Robertson, 3.
214 ibid.
215 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
within the agency without suffering the disadvantages of the conflict that 
might result from such diversity.
The Inner Voice soon attracted writers from National Forests and BLM 
lands all over the United States, writing on issues as diverse as abuse of 
archeological sites to the silencing of whistle blowers. It became popular and 
well distributed and attracted contributions from government workers and 
citizens alike, eventually "showing up on the desks and counters of Forest 
Service and BLM offices throughout the West."216
The Forest Service directorate also faced internal opposition from a 
significant number of the Regional Foresters and Forest Supervisors. 
Following a November, 1989, meeting of Forest Supervisors at the "Sunbird 
Conference," in Tucson, Arizona, "supervisors from 63 national forests" from 
Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4 signed a memo recommending agency reform.217 The 
supervisors charged that agency prioritizing and budgeting — particularly its 
emphasis on timber production — was out of proportion with the demands of 
society. The memo stated:
The emphasis of National Forest programs does not reflect the 
land stewardship values embodied in forest plans, nor does it 
reflect the values of many Forest Service employees and the 
public.218
Our timber program has been 35 percent of the National Forest 
System Budget for the last 20 years while recreation, fish and 
wildlife, and soil and water have been 2 to 3 percent each.219
216 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 102.
217 Ibid.,105; Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 300-301.
218 Region 1 ,2 ,3 , and 4 Forest Supervisors to the Chief, 10.
219 Ibid., 10-11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
The memo went on to recommend studies of the agency's "operational 
efficiency/' budget allocation reform, reorganization of "functional middle 
management positions," and accounting reform, as well as suggesting changes 
in "leadership and communications" and "workforce diversity."220
During the same month, November, 1989, all of the Northern Region 
supervisors wrote an "open letter to the Chief' (later appearing in the Inner 
Voice, AFSEEE's bi-monthly publication), similar to the Sunbird memo, 
lamenting that the agency was not meeting the standards expected by the 
public as well as agency workers. Appealing to the mythic legacy of Gifford 
Pinchot, the supervisors warned that without a policy change, the agency 
mission statement would be reduced to mere political rhetoric. The 
supervisors wrote::
We are not meeting the quality land management expectations 
of our public and our employees. We are not being viewed as 
the "conservation leaders" Gifford Pinchot would have had us 
become, despite strong support of the rhetoric in our Mission 
Statement. We are worried that if we don 't make some major 
changes as an agency, our Mission Statement will never move 
from rhetoric to reality.221
Referring to increased and unsustainable "stress" within the agency, due to 
budget cuts, personnel cuts, and an overly aggressive timber program, the 
Supervisors sounded an apocalyptic tone, warning the Chief that old agency 
responses would not suffice to meet the current threats. Change was 
necessary:
220 Ibid., 11.
221 Region 1 Supervisors, "Letter to the Chief," 10.
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The Ranger District plate is overflowing and the stress on our 
workforce to continue to crank out more targets, work on more 
initiatives, work harder on more customer service projects, and 
work harder to resolve conflicting values at the field level, is 
becoming too much to ask them to bear. The stress in the 
organization is serious. A "can do" attitude will not save us this 
time. We are spread too thin. It is time that we start dealing with 
our internal problems, before we crack apart at the seams.222
The language of this letter spelled out what any agency would fear — the 
possibility of losing control -  a possibility to which the Supervisors directly 
alluded. Writing that, despite the diligence of the Regional level officials (to 
whom the supervisors referred as "your people") in meeting program targets 
set at the Washington Office, "there is a growing concern that we have become 
'an organization out of control'."223
An important issue involved the levels of allowable sale quantities (ASQs) 
handed down from Washington Office at behest of the Bush administration; 
supervisors argued that ASQs were "unrealistically high even with full 
funding."224 In 1991, forest supervisors in Region One complained to 
regional forester, John Mumma, that they could not meet the Bush 
administration's demands for timber and the requirements of environmental 
laws also. Ultimately, Mumma ordered the supervisors to meet the legal 
requirements, despite directives from the administration.225 In response, 
several of the supervisors from Region One wrote to the Chief with the same 
message. According to Mumma, "they essentially said that we can't meet our 
timber targets in the northern region and we're asking you to exercise some
222 Ibid., 10.
2 ^  Ibid., 10.
224 Region 1 Forest Supervisors, "Feedback to the Chief."
225 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
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leadership on and on. When [Chief Robertson] got that letter, he was highly 
offended."226 John Mumma and the supervisors invited Chief Robertson to 
meet with them in Big Sky, Montana, and "he was still sensitive about that 
letter, but we had, I think a reasonably good discussion. It d idn 't really resolve 
anything."227 According to Mumma, "many FS people felt that since [forest 
plans] had to go through the Secretary of Agriculture's office for approval that 
the numbers were higher than w hat the people on the ground felt were 
sustainable over time."228 This difference between the supervisors' estimates 
and those approved by the Washington Office found confirmation in the 
September 10 memo.229 Robertson was as unresponsive to the Regional 
Foresters as he was to the Forest Supervisors.
During the same year, 1991, Mumma and the eight other regional foresters 
met in Florida to discuss the lack of communication, eventually drafting a 
letter to Robertson offering to help him do his job "and help, essentially, save 
the Forest Service."230 According to Mumma, the Forest Service was feeling 
the threat that Congress could "actually dismember it and break it down like 
Senator Craig has proposed."231 This was not a recent trend. In the 1950s, the 
Forest Industries Council had proposed such a change, recommending 
Congress to broach the proposition of transferring federal lands to corporate 
ownership. In 1953 the political association distributed a report outlining its 
policy position in craftily selected language, which included recommendations
226 Mumma, "Interview," 1.
222 Ibid.
22* ibid.
229 Sherry Devlin, "Forest Service Making Promises It Can't Keep?" Missoulian October 11, 
1991, A l.
280 Mumma, "Interview," 11.
231 Ibid.
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that Congress study "whether our entire economy would be strengthened by 
restoring [to private ownership] some federal forest lands."232 According to 
Mumma, as late as 1991, the political environment still insinuated change that 
could drastically affect who controlled public land management. "In fact, you 
would think about whether there would be a Forest Service as we knew it 
then, twenty years from then, because certainly there was strong motivation to 
make significant changes."233 Nevertheless, George Leonard, an Associate 
Chief, rather than Robertson, replied to the letter, implying that the issue was 
not necessarily a top priority concern to Robertson.
In September of the same year, 1991, Mumma accepted retirement rather 
than reassignment to "an unspecified job in Washington D .C"234 According 
to The New York Times, Mumma "was forced into retirement at the age of 51 
this month after western Republican senators and timber industry executives 
complained that he was not allowing trees to be logged fast enough from the 
Rocky Mountains."235 Conversely, the agency claimed Mumma was 
transferred because of "poor performance ratings."236 According to Susan 
Hess, "director of public affairs for the Forest Service," Mumma's "inability... 
to meet the timber cut was only part of the reason for his ouster. She said his 
removal as regional forester was not an attempt to stifle dissident voices... but 
rather 'was due to the general job performance.../"237 The same month that
232 Forest Industries Council in Hirt, Conspiracy, 110. Italics added.
233 Mumma, "Interview," 11.
234 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
235 Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much,"
New York Times, September 16,1991, A1,A12.
236 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
237 Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much,"
New York Times, September 16,1991, A l.
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Mumma left the Forest Service, he testified before the House Post Office and 
Civil Service subcommittee regarding "allegations that the Forest Service 
logged national forests illegally and retaliated against agency whistle 
blowers."238 This issue of retaliation against whistle-blowers was soon to 
become a serious political issue.
The following January, 1992, John McCormick, "the former special agent 
who handled whistle-blower complaints at the Forest Service," affirmed 
Mumma's testimony in front of the same committee, saying that "the agency 
violated environmental laws, manipulated scientific evidence to benefit the 
timber industry and punished workers who raised objections."239 That same 
month, McCormick published an Opinion-Editorial piece in the New York 
Times, entitled, "Can't See the Forest for the Sleaze," where he listed 
environmental violations and pork barrel resource give aways, as well as 
describing an agency policy of assigning investigations to regional offices and, 
in the process, identifying whistleblowers to their superiors.240 According to 
McCormick, the "quantity of whistle-blower allegations has increased 
sevenfold since 1987," most of them going unheeded.241 In response to 
McCormick's testimony, Representative Gerry Sikorski, chairman of the 
House subcommittee, asked the Justice Department to investigate the charges. 
Two months later, "a group of former and current employees" held a press 
conference, "charging that America's ancient forests are being devastated by
2^8 "Panel Chairman to Seek Probe of Forest Service, "Washington Post, Jan 30,1992, A, 8; US. 
House Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Hearing..
239 "Panel Chairman to Seek Probe of Forest Service," Washington Post, Jan 30,1992, A8.
24° John McCormick, "Can't See the Forest for the Sleaze," New York Times, Jan. 29,1992, A21.
241 Ibid.
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overlogging," and calling for "radical changes in agency management."242 
According to the New York Times, "Biologists and timber planners also told a 
news conference they had been harassed by superiors when they tried to 
expose Forest Service abuses, including proposed logging in areas where rare 
bald eagles and spotted owls were nesting." According to Francis Mangels, a 
Shasta-Trinity National Forest biologist, "reprisals were vicious and 
im m ediate."243
By 1992, the Forest Service was being assailed by its own officers; 
organizational integrity and rank had broken down. In part, this involved the 
courts assigning decision-making power to the science team members. An, in 
part, this disintegration reflected demographic changes within the agency. 
According to Hirt:
One particularly comprehensive study by researchers at the 
University of California, Davis, interviewed over 1,000 Forest 
Service employees in 1989-92 and compared their findings with 
those of several previous studies dating back to the 1950s. They 
concluded that there had been significant change in attitudes 
among Forest Service personnel, accelerated during the 1980s.
In particular, they found a marked decline in support for 
increased timber harvesting, from 62 percent of respondents in 
a 1981 study to 7 percent of respondents in the 1992 survey. The 
causes for the change in attitude included personnel turnover, 
an increase in the hiring of professionals trained in 
noncommodity disciplines, broader exposure of employees to 
other professions because of NFMA's requirement for 
interdisciplinary planning and actual changes in individual 
attitudes of long-term employees.244
242 "Forest Policy Assailed," Washington Post, March 27,1992, A19.
243 Ibid., A19.
244 Hirt, Conspiracy, 282-83.
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In 1992, University of Michigan researchers who also surveyed agency 
workers found that, while "70 percent of respondents chose wildlife and fish 
or water or recreation as the most important use," the majority also believed 
the Forest Service prioritized timber.245 The survey showed a strong schism 
between agency values and employee values, a split reflected in the agency's 
multifold internal dissent.
On the Streets and in the Woods: Activism and the Negation of Authority
Old-growth supporters, like other environmental advocates, adopted a 
variety of tactics — mass mailings, television spots, and other mass marketing 
techniques, lobbying and so forth — but none brought as much media attention 
and sense of urgency as the direct actions like on-site protests and obstruction 
of logging, the occupation of politicians' offices, the picketing, and other forms 
of protests.
In 1983, "EarthFirst! made its Northwest debut on Bald Mountain Road," 
in the Siskiyou National Forest246 Tipped off by a call from a Forest Service 
soil scientist that the agency was roading into an area of old-growth forest long 
in dispute, several activists, in an act of civil disobedience, entered the site and 
blocked the bulldozer — leading to several arrests. This event, as well as any, 
marks an escalation in direct activism against the Forest Service that was to 
change the face of environmental activism in the U.S.
245 fcid.
246 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 58.
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EarthFirst! tactics varied widely, as did the personalities of "EarthFirstlers," 
with loosely affiliated groups scattered across the country. Several groups 
published local newsletters (for instance, The Wild Rockies Review in 
Missoula, Mont.), and volunteers published the monthly national EarthFirst! 
journal. Most EarthFirstlers engaged in at least some form of "direct action" -  
for instance occupying politicians' offices (some locking themselves to 
furniture), having themselves buried to the neck in the middle of a logging 
road, occupying old-growth trees in platforms 100 feet above the ground, 
disrupting Forest Service meetings, and so forth. In rare cases, people engaged 
in tree-spiking and industrial sabotage, though these practices were subject to 
significant controversy within the group.
Direct action demonstrations persisted for months, delaying the Forest 
Service, "drawing national news coverage" and attracting the funds necessary 
to take the case to court.247 Soon afterward, EarthFirst! held a "Round River 
Rendezvous" on the Rogue River. In the central Cascades, the Breitenbush 
Community, a land-owning cooperative near the Willamette National Forest, 
"became a base of operations for forest activists who blocked logging roads and 
sat in trees to slow the rate of logging in the North Santiam Canyon, a timber 
stronghold long accustomed to getting its way with the Forest Service."248
Outreach and education activities included Lou Gold's lecture and slide 
show, which he presented across the country more than 500 times. And, in 
1989, two former EarthFirst* activists bought a log from a 780-year old Douglas 
fir, and toured the country with it to demonstrate the "magnificence of the
247 Ibid., 59
248 Ibid., 76.
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ancient forests" in the Pacific Northwest to people who, because they lived so 
far away from the region, would never have much if any direct experience of 
the forests. In 1989, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies began promoting 
legislation for the northern Rockies by organizing a traveling slide-show 
presentation that traveled nationally, including a tour of the east coast.
Activists organized by the preservation groups also attempted (somewhat 
successfully) to contribute to (and influence) the legal and scientific discourses 
focusing on old growth forests, particularly those studying old growth forests. 
In 1988, The Wilderness Society published a report, "End of Ancient Forests:
A Report on National Forest Management Plans in the Pacific Northwest."249 
In addition to analyzing draft management plans for twelve national forests in 
the Pacific Northwest, the report publicized the group's own old growth 
inventory numbers, generated in a then on-going study. The author, Peter 
Morrison, an ecologist with a master's degree from the University of 
Washington, "using existing Forest Service data and updating it through the 
use of current aerial-photos," assembled the inventory according to an 
"ecologically-based definition [for old growth] developed by Forest Service 
researchers."250 In June, 1989, Wilderness Society President, George Frampton 
(later to be named as Assistant Secretary of Interior under the Clinton 
administration) presented these findings before a Congressional hearing, 
testifying that "we estimate there is probably about 2.4 million acres of old 
growth left. Of that, 800,000 acres is in parks and wilderness areas; the
249 Morrison, Old Growth in the Pacific Northwest.
250 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 144
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
remaining 1.6 million acres not protected in any system to date."251 These 
figures contradicted the Forest Service's estimations, which were roughly 
double that of the Wilderness Society numbers. Meanwhile, the National 
Audubon Society had organized its "Adopt a Forest" campaign, in which 
"volunteers used Forest Service data, aerial photos, and on-the-ground 
observation to map all groves at least 300 acres in size that had trees at least 100 
years old." Local Audubon groups were then able to use these numbers in 
litigation and appeals against the Forest Service and the BLM.252
Other groups similarly had used monitoring of logging activities in efforts 
to halt old-growth logging. In 1985, while the Headwaters group "was 
monitoring logging on the Medford BLM district," the Siskiyou Citizens' Task 
Force was studying "computer models of timber sales" on the forest.253 
Related to this strain of action was a "know your watershed approach," where 
communities worked together to map local forests using the watershed as an 
organizing principle; the residents of Matole Valley used this approach in the 
mid-1980s to restore salmon runs and bring attention to the effects of logging 
in the watershed.254 Bonnie Phillips of Everett, Washington, published the 
Forest Voice, which featured photographs of clearcuts around the northwest. 
She began by printing 25,000 copies and sending them to activists nationally, 
who eventually gave her enough money to print 1 million copies of the first 
issue.255
251 Frampton in LLS. House, Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the 
Committee on Agriculture and the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Joint Hearing, 20-21.
252 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 145.
253 Ibid., 74.
254 Ibid., 74.
255 ibid., 74
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Meanwhile, the industry and labor groups were organizing direct actions of 
their own. Local communities hosted "rallies" where loggers and their family 
members testified regarding the hardships of unemployment, the virtues of 
the timber worker lifestyle, and other claims in opposition to logging 
decreases. In May 1989, "1,500 loggers, millworkers, and their families staged a 
90-minute parade through Hood River, Oregon, featuring an imposing 
convoy of 178 log trucks and 33 wood chip and lumber trucks." Mills in the 
area closed so workers could participate in the event, which included 
displaying and cheering to signs like the one on a log truck saying ""Eat an 
owl, save the economy!"256
With both sides mobilized, the ancient forest conflict increased in intensity 
by the late 1980s, taking on a more intimidating edge. In one instance captured 
on film by the makers of Rage Over Trees (a film the Audubon Society was 
producing at the time), timber workers attacked activists engaged in direct 
action.257 In the summer of 1990, the group EarthFirst! organized a summer 
long campaign against logging of the red woods in northern California, using 
direct action techniques like tree sitting, picketing and road barricading.
Loggers beat several protesters and their supporters, and one of the organizers, 
Judy Bari, who had been attempting to unite timber workers with 
environmental groups, nearly died when a pipe bomb exploded under her seat 
in an old panel truck she was driving in Berkeley, California.258 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concluded that she had blown herself up by
256 ibid., 97.
257 National Audobon Society, Rage Over Trees.
258 Helvarg, The War Against the Greens, 330-35.
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driving around with an especially volatile pipe bomb under her seat, allegedly 
to bomb a target, but other accounts shed considerable doubt on this 
hypothesis.259
Conflict afflicted the Northern Region as well, where in Missoula, during 
the fall of 1989, Montana, FBI and Forest Service investigated tree spikings that 
had taken place the previous spring in the Clearwater National Forest.260 
Special agents from the two agencies intimidated several graduate students in 
the Environmental Studies program at the University of Montana, believing 
them to be linked to EarthFirst!. The FBI investigated several people at home 
and at their work places and eventually served seven subpoenas by a federal 
grand jury in Boise, Idaho, to submit testimony and hair and shoe print 
samples.261 Agents also attempted to link the tree-spikings to professor Ron 
Erickson, who had opened an academic discussion in a graduate seminar to 
philosophical consideration of the idea of tree spiking.262
The Media (is the Message)
Various forms of "mass media" played a strong role in pressuring the 
Forest Service as well, among them television and video. In 1989, Turner 
Broadcasting Corporation and the National Audubon Society released Rage 
Over Trees, a politically motivated film documenting the political conflict 
over old growth in the Pacific Northwest. Narrated by the mature-looking
259 Ibid.
260 Sherri Devlin, 'Tree Spiking Investigation Outrages Missoula Woman," Missoulian Oct.15, 
1989, A l.
261 Ibid; Sherri Devlin, "Grand Jury Supeonas Leave Little Choice," Missoulian Oct. 15,1989, A l.
262 Sherri Devlin, "Subpeona Stuns UM Professor," Missoulian Oct. 6,1989, A l.
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Hollywood movie star Paul Newman, the film defined the conflict in terms of 
a choice between cutting or not cutting oid-growth: "Will the remaining 
ancient forests continue to be cut? Or should they be protected? This is the 
question."263
Within seconds after the film began with footage of violence against direct 
activists in the Willamette National Forest, the film showed Newman 
declaring that the issue, presented as a choice between cutting "the forests" and 
saving them "for future generations" was related to "the heart of our society's 
values." The film featured aerial footage of thousands of denuded, densely 
roaded corporate lands as well as thousands of acres of roaded, partially 
denuded and fragmented national forests. Emphasizing the effects of 
roadbuilding, Newman's voice told the viewer that "the US Forest Service 
sells national forest timber in swatches of 10 to 60 acres. To access the timber, 
the Forest Service has already built or permitted enough logging roads to reach 
the moon — and plans for 100,000 miles more."264
In contrast with the movie star image evoked by Paul Newman, the film 
also featured prominent activist, John Montieth, director of the Oregon 
Resource Council, an influential preservation group based in Oregon, George 
Atilla, an airplane pilot and activist, Bob Ferris, a mill worker, and Forest 
Service scientist and University of Washington professor, Jerry Franklin, 
among others. Franklin, reasoning in terms of the practicality and functional 
benefits of preserving old-growth, solemnly concluded: "The need for some 
change is extreme — it's extremely urgent that we make our decision as a
263 National Audobon Society, Rage Over Trees.
264 Ibid.
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society... Soon. Very Soon. This Year." Franklin was soon to accept a position 
on the Interagency Science Team formed to formulate an owl management 
plan demanded by the ninth circuit court.265
While media responses to the conflict over the national forests were 
diverse, environmentalism claimed a strong voice, and by the 1990s, various 
newspapers and newsweeklies were posting articles, features, and opinions 
critical of the Forest Service. For instance, recall some of the headlines 
mentioned earlier: in bold black letters, a Tim e  headline inquired, "Whose 
Woods are these?" referencing "an all-fronts campaign to save America's 
ancient forests" from the Forest Service;266 also, the New York Times posted 
the John McCormick opinion piece, called "Can't See the Forest for the 
Sleaze."267 The New Yorker, as early as 1990, published an essay in which the 
author, Catherine Caufield, lambasted the Forest Service for miles of 
clearcutting and roading, unsustainable timber harvests, below-cost-timber 
sales, and generally, poor agency scruples. Regarding the agency's legacy of 
roadbuilding, the author wrote:
If an area is to be clear-cut, there must, of course be a road into it, 
and the United Sates Forest Service has become the biggest road- 
building agency in the world. Into the fragile landscape of the 
national forests it has carved hundreds of thousands of miles of 
roads. ... That is eight times the mileage of the entire interstate 
highway system. Over the next fifty years, the Forest Service 
plans to build about a hundred thousand miles of new roads, 
and to rebuild over three hundred thousand miles.268
265 see chapter 6.
266 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70
267 John McCormick, "Forest for the Sleaze," New York Times, Jan. 29,1992, A21.
268 Caufield, "A Reporter at Large," 61.
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Summarizing the environmental critique and linking the federal agency's 
timber programs to the world economy, the author wrote "In the United 
States, less than ten per cent [of old growth] survives. Almost all that 
remains... is on public lands, and it is scheduled to be cut for lumber, plywood, 
and pulp, much of it for export to Japan."269
More criticism followed in the mainstream media. The Atlantic Monthly 
posted an article entitled "The Mismanagement of the National Forests."270 
In an article entitled "A Wing and a Prayer for the Forests," the W ashington  
Post praised the work of Lighthawk, an organization that was using light 
aircraft to fly policy-makers and others over Northwest ancient forests and 
cutover agency lands. According to the Post, "A few weeks ago, Sky [a 
Lighthawk pilot, took House Interior Committee Chairman, George Miller, on 
a tour of coastal forests. Both came back impressed, Miller with the extent of 
the deforestation, and Sky with Miller's fondness for a certain four-letter 
epithet uttered repeatedly as he looked at the clear cuts."271 In addition to 
articles on whistle-blowers and agency reprisals, the papers published evidence 
of over-cutting and environmental abuse, as well as a covering a wider sphere 
of environmental degradation, creating a general ambiance of environmental 
crisis.
In addition, several books came out criticizing the agency. Tennessee 
Senator Al Gore, running for Vice President on the Democratic ticket, 
published his provocative book, Earth in the Balance, lamenting "how
269 ibid., 46.
220 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests." .
221 Kenworthy, "A Wing and a Prayer for the Forests," New York Times June 16,1992, A19..
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dangerously we are threatening to push the earth out of balance."272 Bringing 
attention to "the developed nations" for their role in "massive deforestation," 
Gore criticized the Forest Service for its subsidized roading and logging 
practices, as well its forestry practices, in general, linking it to "ecological 
tragedy"273:
And in the United States, particularly in heavily logged regions 
like the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, there is a renewed assault 
on the great stretches of temperate forest that are so important to 
us. The statistics about forests can be deceptive too: although 
the United States, like several other developed nations, actually 
has more forested land now than it did a hundred years ago, 
many of the huge tracts that have been "harvested" and 
replanted have been converted from diverse hardwoods to a 
monoculture of softwood conifer forest that no longer support 
the species that once thrived in the woods. In national forests 
throughout the country, logging roads are being built in order to 
facilitate the more rapid logging, even clear-cutting, of public 
lands under contracts that require the sale of the trees at rates far 
below market prices. This enormous taxpayer subsidy for the 
deforestation of public land contributes to both the budget deficit 
and an ecological tragedy.274
Richard Manning, in Last Stand, wrote about the logging industry in the 
northern Rocky Mountains, which in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
liquidating timber on private lands in order to reduce tax liability, circumvent 
future environmental regulation (for example, potential ESA listings), and 
exchange slow-growing assets for high-yielding investments elsewhere.275 
After consuming their own timber, the corporations, particularly Champion 
International and Plum Creek, planned to tap timber supplies in the national 
forests in the northern region. In a critical tone, Manning wrote:
272 Gore, Earth in Balance. 2.
273 Ibid., 120.
274 Ibid., 121.
275 McQuillan, "Accelerated cutting."
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Over the years, about ten million acres of trees in Montana 
remained in the public domain, and that is hard enough on 
the trees. Hard enough, because the U.S. Forest Service, 
charged with looking after them, really exists to cut trees. It is 
run by the timber beasts. In recent years, the Forest Service 
has made noises about reform, has been forced to reform by a 
string of national laws inspired by the environmental 
movement and by the demand for more recreational use of 
the forests. 276
Manning went on to ridicule the agency's woodsy public image by focusing 
upon the issue of production, arguing that "People think of the Forest Service 
as a sort of collection of overgrown Boy Scouts, rangers sheltering trees, 
flowers, and Bambi from errant campfires and carelessly flicked butts, the 
prototypical Smoky Bears. In the West, though, where most of its domain lies, 
it is difficult to consider the Forest Service as anything but a branch of the 
timber industry." Explicating upon the Forest Service's successful political 
efforts to institute clear cuts (in NFMA), Manning portrayed a geography of 
destruction as seen from the air:
From the Cessna as we flew that day, we could see all of this 
history written on the hills of Fish Creek, giant clearcuts, some 
twenty years old, some with no new trees, splotched across the 
hills. Even more striking than the clearcuts, however, was a 
landscape sewn together by roads.... The hills stood terraced with 
roads like the decks of a pyramid, roads that wind around the 
hills like a peel spiraling round an apple, cut and cored. Cut and 
fill operations these roads are called, cats and graders biting 
gouges straight out of the side of a hill and laying the gravel in 
swaths across draws. Then the log trucks roll on this new bed of 
grit, sand and d u s t277
This book received a considerable popularity, bringing further attention to the
conflict east of the Cascades. The voices of criticism were many — including
276 Manning, Last Stand, 46.
277 Ibid., 67.
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those who would soon control the executive branch ~  and by 1992, the Forest 
Service was not only severely constrained by the courts, but potentially faced 
further erosion of its agency by the legislative and executive branches as well.
Concluding Remarks
Interviewed in the 1980s, John McGuire, who had been Forest Service 
Chief in the 1970s, said that all organizations pursue the objectives of survival, 
growth, and autonomy.278 By the late 1980s, from the perspective of the Forest 
Service, all three of these objectives were imperiled, yet it seemed unable to 
change direction in the face of political pressure.
Politics to the Forest Service meant pleasing everyone — everyone with 
compelling political demands — or, at the very least, raising no unmanageable 
political ire.279 (Ironically, in attempting to raise no ire, it did just that, and 
from all sides.) That approach was not to change, but a shift in decision- 
making was in process, encouraged especially by the court m andated owl plan. 
The plan, itself a political document, would signify a shift of land allocation 
authority to the authors of the science being employed. This science, itself, 
would be a political product.
278 Hirt, Conspiracy, 44.
279 This political interpretation poses an interesting question. Having evolved to an overt, by- 
the-whim political calculus, Utilitarianism, as manifested by the Forest Service, mutated yet 
another step when political utility maximization came to be expressed in negative terms. The 
favored policy became "that which displeases the least," particularly in the Appropriations 
Committee.
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Chapters
Big Science: The Synthetic Discourses of Landscape Ecology and 
Conservation Biology
Big Science, Hallelujah!
— Laurie Anderson 
Big Science (record album)
By the late 1980s, the Forest Service had lost credibility as a "can do" 
agency, able to manage the national forests competently and coherently. To 
get its credibility back, it would have to demonstrate a straightforward, 
rationale, which it sought in a science-based framework for decision-making. 
The Forest Service would have to find a new way to work the credibility of 
science into policy — specific enough to meet the requirements of the 
environmental laws, and general enough to regain lost political acceptability. 
The agency was able to turn to recently formed disciplines synthesized exactly 
for the purposes of managing large areas of land — particularly conservation 
biology and landscape ecology.
Landscape ecology and conservation biology played a central role in the 
construction of forest policy on all federal (and many state) lands, particularly 
in the Pacific Northwest; in the late 1980s, when court injunctions began to 
shut down logging on national forests over the spotted owl, land agency 
researchers used the language of landscape ecology and conservation biology 
in attempts to meet the scientific requirements of the law.280 In this chapter, I 
will trace the evolution of landscape ecology and conservation biology, the
28  ̂ The Interagency Science Team's Conservation Strategy and the Forest Ecosystem 
Management Assessment Team's Forest Ecosystem Management provide good examples of this 
synthesis.
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language of which came to shape the political conflict during the demise of 
the Forest Service, and which the agency would eventually use to craft its 
Ecosystem Management. I also will discuss the creation of "New Forestry" 
management principles — a synthesis of landscape ecology and conservation 
biology applied to forestry — which Forest Service researchers created and 
built into ecosystem management. In tracing these "discourses," I will 
describe some of the language and concepts that came to be politically 
important in the old growth conflict.
Scienceism
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, while politicians were creating 
highly politicized science programs, the Forest Service promoted its own 
sdentific-imbued "intensive management."281 But intensive management's 
acceptability had deteriorated significantly by the late 1960s and clearcut 
logging had become a political problem. Science would become part of the 
solution (as it had been part of the intensive management solution to 
predicted timber famine). In the environmental legislation of the 1960s and 
70s that forced forest reform management — science would play a leading role. 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA), and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) all imposed
281 Since the late 1950s, when television first became a major force in politics, science, as a 
general and vague signifier, has held an esteemed position in American politics. After the 
Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik in 1957, politicians began to speak of a "missile-gap," 
preparing the political environment for the expensive and well-published space program, 
culminating in NASA's "space spectaculars." Heath, Decade of Disillusionment, 97. John 
Kennedy, recently elected to president, would waste no time "getting a man to the moon," 
telling the world: "No single project in this period will be more impressive to mankind." 
Kennedy in Heath, Decade of Disillusionment, 97. Scientists and technicians would find the 
way.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
planning structures that required scientific analysis from diverse fields 
(especially fields related to biology and economics): the ESA with its species 
consideration language, the NFMA, with its multiple-use consideration 
language, the NEPA with its call for interdisciplinary scientific teams, all call 
upon scientists to get together and make decisions regarding land 
management.282
Through these laws, Congress forced the Forest Service to expand its 
scientific vision from logging and its effects upon watersheds, charismatic 
wildlife, and future trees to consideration of a wider array of values — 
especially a wider range of wildlife (plants and animals). To gain the 
information necessary to write forest plans and environmental impact 
statements, the agency would have to allocate resources to researching new 
questions — new hypotheses — often working through universities in 
cooperative grant agreements.283
At the same time, university and government researchers (often one and 
the same) were expanding their capabilities with the aid of advancing 
instrumentation and computer technologies, allowing for progressively more 
powerful measurement and modeling methods, making questions 
approachable that were previously unanswerable (or unknown). Using 
satellite technology (for instance, through the LANDSAT program), scientists 
could assess huge areas, while using electron microscopes, they could see 
entities once too small for the human eye. Ecologists and biologists took
282 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; Endangered. Species Act of 1972 (and amended 
in 1978); and the National Forest Management Act of 1976.
283 U.S.D.A, Forest Service, Forests for America's Future, 5.
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advantage of this technology to develop various models, and ecology as a 
field flourished.
As research progressed, several scientists became aware of the effects of 
ongoing environmental degradation, particularly extinction, and many began 
to engage in politics or research pertaining to political questions.284 In the 
early 1980s, an overtly political scientific community began to conglomerate 
and eventually formed the "disciplines" of landscape ecology and 
conservation biology to influence land-use policy.285
Landscape Ecology
Landscape ecology is a "branch of modem ecology that deals with the 
interrelationship between man and his open and built-up landscapes."286 It is 
a young discourse, and since its inception in the 1970s in Europe to its 
adoption by researchers and land-use planners in the United States in the 
mid-1980s, it has undergone sign ifican t change. It is a practice-oriented 
discourse including an interdisciplinary mixture of geography, regional 
science and planning, and ecology, w ith an eclectic theoretical background.287 
According to Naveh, by the 1980s, this discipline was "viewed in Europe as 
the scientific basis for land and landscape planning, management, 
conservation, development, and reclamation. As such it has overstepped the 
purely natural realm of classical knowledge — the sodopsychological,
284 Erlich, "Extinctions." Regarding "became aware of the effects of ongoing environmental 
degradation": duh.
2®  Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
286 Nevah, Landscape Ecology, 3.
287 ibid., 3.
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economic, geographic, and cultural sciences connected with modem land 
uses."288 Most of the earlier, theoretical work came out of Europe, where "as 
early as 1939, while studying problems of land use and development in East 
Africa, [German biogeographer Ed Kroll] coined the term 'landscape ecology/ 
realizing its great potential in the aerial photographic interpretation of 
landscapes. He hoped for a closer collaboration between geographers and 
ecologists, from which a unified earth and life research might develop — a 
new 'ecosdence'."289
Since its inception, the discourse was interdisdplinary, w ith wide 
aspirations of attaining a unified super theory of development. According to 
Naveh, "landscape ecology had its roots in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
biogeographers viewed the landscape not just as an aesthetic asset (as done by 
most landscape architects) or as part of the physical environment (as by most 
geographers), but as the total spatial and visual entity of hum an living space, 
integrating the geosphere with the biosphere and the noospheric man-made 
artifacts."290
During this stage, the "conceptual and epistemological framework" of 
landscape ecology derived from three "dosely connected sdentific theories": 
"general systems theory," dealing with the concept of "reality as an integrated 
hierarchy of organization of matter and energy"; "biocybemetics," the 
"sdence of interaction systems," which explained the "regulation" of flows of 
matter and energy within and between biological systems through positive
288 Ibid., 21.
289 Ibid., 4
290 Ibid., 21.
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("deviation amplifying") and negative ("deviation-counteracting") feedback; 
and, "ecosystemology," a theory focusing on the idea of a 'Total Human 
Ecosystem (THE)," an ecosystem that includes humans and our landscape 
altering practices as well as our artifacts, as "the highest level of ecological 
integration with the ecosphere as its concrete space-time-defined global 
landscape entity."291
Several of the concepts imbedded within this "framework" endured 
through the development of landscape ecology, for instance, the idea of 
"holism," which the field appropriated from the work of German General 
Smuts (1920s).292 Holism, from the perspective of the new landscape 
ecologists, was the idea that, on a metaphysical level, "the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts,"293 and on a practical level, researchers and planners 
must consider ecological problems in a context larger (spatially and 
temporally) than the organismic and niche level. Central to this emphasis is 
the idea of hierarchy, not merely a "order of rank on a linear scale or ladder," 
but, rather, like "a living tree" — a multilevel, stratified, outbranching pattern 
of an organizational system, branching into subsystems that branch into 
subsystems of lower order, and so on: a structure encapsulating substructures,
291 Ibid., 26.
292 Smuts' development of the idea of holism was a metaphysical project, concerned with 
reconciling the general with the specific in a non-mechanistic explanation: "This character of 
'wholeness' meets us everywhere and points to something fundamental in the universe. Holism 
is the term here coined for this fundamental factor operative towards the creation of wholes in 
the universe. This character is both general and specific or concrete...." Smuts, Holism and 
Evolution, 86. "This is a universe of whole-making. The explanation of Nature can therefore 
not be purely mechanical." Ibid., 87. Holism according to Smuts, is itself, creative: "As holism 
is a process of creative synthesis, the resulting wholes are not static but dynamic, evolutionary, 
creative." Ibid., 87.
292 Naveh, Landscape Ecology, 50. This varies from the concept of Smuts, who wrote that "in 
fact the whole is not something additional to the parts, but is just the parts in their synthesis." 
Holism and Evolution,, 87.
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and so on; a process activating subprocesses, and so on.294 Naveh elaborated 
upon the idea of holism with in-depth references to the idea of the holon — "a 
stable, integrated structure equipped with self-regulatory devices and 
enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy or self-government," yet part of a 
larger system known as a "holarchy."295
Other ideas discussed during this time virtually disappeared soon after, 
though sometimes they appeared in other guises. For instance, Naveh 
attempted to link "complexity theory" to landscape ecology, writing on the 
"self-organizing" characteristics of systems far from equilibrium, as found in 
the works of Iliya Prigogine (Nobel Prize winner for chemistry and his work 
on thermodynamic systems).296 As landscape ecology matured, it de­
emphasized these ideas, but, in mutated form, some of them would later 
emerge as the idea of "disturbance." Likewise, Naveh emphasized the 
concept that landscapes include hum an processes, which increasingly are 
ecologically dominant, and, in the "Total Human Ecosystem" concept, should 
be treated as the culmination of evolution — a combination of biological 
processes and processes emerging from the human mind.297 While some of 
the theoretical terminology dropped from the discourse, the idea that 
humans were part of the ecosystem persisted.
Research methods consisted primarily of variations of "remote sensing," 
and related classification and cartographic systems (including overlay
294 Ibid., 51.
29  ̂ Ibid., 51. Naveh refers to the work of Arthur Koestler, among others.
296 Ibid., 62-66.
297 Ibid., 84.
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mapping and eventually geographical information systems, which built upon 
Ian MacHarg's Design with Nature, 1968298), as well as "simulation" and 
"interpretation models" (models for interpreting the effects of simulation 
models) and "capability analysis."
Until the 1980s, "the term 'landscape ecology' [was] virtually absent from 
North America,"299 but by the mid-1980s, discussions under the landscape 
ecology rubric proliferated in the U.S., where, by the early-1990s, the most 
conspicuous adherents of landscape ecology had abandoned its modesty 
concerning uncertainty, as well as heartily embracing the power of humanity 
to direct and control its ecosystems. In the preface of the edited Land Mosaics, 
E. O. Wilson, the well-known population ecologist and prolific writer on 
biodiversity wrote: "In Land Mosaics, [Richard] Forman joyously embraces 
the human-altered environment and proposes that its living part can be 
improved by use of the best principles of environmental biology."300
By the time of New Perspectives' inception, the discourse was in 
transition. Until the later 1980s, landscape ecology had explored and 
articulated a diverse body of theoretical work, as well as constructing a new 
methodology and method, but by the early 1990s it had approximated its 
present status as an integrated research framework, de-emphasizing 
theoretical debate in favor of an integrated methodological structure — a 
"spatial language" for researchers, land planners and managers.301 According
McHarg, Design with Nature.
299 Naveh, Landscape Ecology, 4.
300 Wilson, "Preface," xiii.
301 Forman and Godron, "Landscape Ecology," 1986.
301 Forman, Landscape Ecology, 442-43.
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to Richard Forman, the most prolific writer and editor of landscape ecology 
textbooks in the United States, "the language of landscape ecology" would 
"make the [planning] process gel." Forman reduced the landscape to a system 
of "patches, corridors, and a background matrix," each with "simple familiar 
characteristics." These "characteristics" were simply a matter of geometry: 
"Patches are large and small, rounded or elongated, and smooth or lobed. 
Corridors are wide or narrow, straight or curvy, and connected or with gaps. 
The matrix is continuous or subdivided, extensive or limited, and contracting 
or expanding." The language of this descriptive framework implied that 
"patches" were privileged or special in an analytical sense — connected by 
corridors — against a "background" matrix.302 Necessarily, the cartographer 
would define the patch in terms of some measurable, spatial trait, for 
instance, the existence of some tree species or some age or stand structure.303 
The background matrix would represent those lands where the trait did not 
exist. Yet, the background matrix was neither inconsequential nor trivial; 
historically, it constituted the "original forest matrix," which was carved into 
patches and corridors by logging and other forms of human disturbance.304 In 
the present, it constituted the conceptual, non-special base in which patches 
were situated, and, in theory, its structure and composition affected wildlife 
(flora and fauna) that resided in patches and moved between them. By 1994, 
after the Forest Service and other agencies had appropriated landscape ecology 
into major planning projects (particularly, through the Interagency Science 
Committee, the Scientific Panel, the Scientific Assessment Team, and Federal 
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team), Forman stated, "The matrix has
3°2. Franklin and Forman. "Creating Landscape Patterns," 15.
303 This "designation" would necessarily be a "political construction"; matrices, patches, and 
corridors were zones.
304 By the time of the model building, matrix lands had become background.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
the greatest control over landscape and regional dynamics/"305 Thus, 
defining the matrix — and the patches and corridors situated within — was a 
matter of great concern because the definition had implications for managing 
the corresponding land areas.
By the early 1990s, Forman had distilled the diverse theoretical works of 
the early landscape ecology into the "Patch-Corridor-Matrix Model,'" 
emphasizing "spatial structures," particularly "mosaics." According to 
Forman, "mosaic pattern is the central feature of land, and ecological 
structure, function, and change of the mosaic is the central paradigm of the 
book. Spatial arrangement matters. It is the structure of a landscape or 
region. It determines the movements and flows between local ecosystems, 
and across the mosaic It changes in form over time."306 Forman was rather 
comprehensive with his spatial description system, claiming that "mosaic 
patterns are found at all spatial scales, from submicroscopic to the planet and 
universe. Land mosaics, however, were at the "human scale," measured in 
kilometers to hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers," including 
"landscapes, regions, and continents."307 A landscape, in turn, was "a mosaic 
where the mix of local ecosystems or land uses is repeated in similar form 
over a kilometers-wide area."308
According to Forman, this language shaped the perspectives of all those 
involved in the processes of planning and management — the political
Forman, Land Mosaics
306 Ibid., xvi.
307 Ibid., 5.
308 ibid., 13.
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processes of allocation: "Ecologists, hydrologists, attorneys, conservationists, 
elected officials, transportation engineers, foresters, geographers, and others 
understand and share this spatial language."309 But, Forman did not discuss 
the process of attributing significance or meaning to each of these geometrical 
spaces, presumably leaving to politics the question of what landscape entity or 
entities the landscape ecologists would use — presence of owl habitat, presence 
of certain types of timber stands, riparian attributes, and so forth. Still, 
landscape ecology provided a language, establishing general organizing 
principles for designating patches and corridors. The concept of mosaics 
requires heterogeneity, "where objects are aggregated , forming distinct 
boundaries," resulting from "thermo-dynamically open conditions, with 
solar energy creating and maintaining structure."310 Mechanisms that create 
this pattern include "substrate heterogeneity," "natural disturbance," and 
human activity. Linking the concepts of spatial structure and function (or 
processes) is the idea that "form or structure, i.e., what we see today, was 
produced by flows yesterday."311 The effects of forces are determined by scale, 
as described in the "space time principle," which simply states that "most 
short duration changes affect a small area, and most long-term changes affect 
a large area."312
Another of landscape ecology's linkages between spatial structure and 
ecological function is the "size effect on biodiversity," a relationship that 
researchers have attempted to elucidate with "island biogeography theory."
Ibid., 442-43.
310 Ibid., 5.
311 Ibid., 5.
312 Ibid., 8.
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Island biogeography theory, which has focused cn bird populations on 
islands, relies on two major principles: the principle of "spedes-area curves," 
suggests that spedes number is positively correlated with habitat size, 
qualified by a "m inim um  area point," where the rate of increase in spedes 
diminishes — a sort of saturation point — as area continues to increase 
(linearly); the "equilibrium theory" (developed by E.O. Wilson) simply states 
that islands and island-like mainland areas will exhibit an equilibrium point 
between extinctions and colonization, mediated by landscape features like the 
"spedes source" — the mainland — and "stepping stones," intermediary 
islands between the young, colonizing island and the mainland.313 
Researchers such as Richard Harris have applied island biogeography theory 
to mainland conditions where habitat such as a forested mountain 
surrounded by desert is isolated and thereby displays island-like features. In 
relationship to the patch-corridor-matrix theory, small patches are analogous 
to islands with large patches being analogous to mainland, with corridors 
providing passage through matrix lands — large, relatively inhospitable areas. 
Within patches, species differentiate according to their preference for 
"interior" or "edge" conditions. Forman writes that "larger patches have 
more species than smaller patches, and area is more important than isolation, 
patch age, and many other variables in predicting species number. Exceptions 
often result from the presence of another variable covering w ith area, or 
where no specialist interior species are present. The prevalence of edge 
species in small patches, and interior species in the patch interior or core, is 
commonly emphasized."314
313 Ibid.,55-58.
314 Ibid., 62.
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In this context, Forman and his contemporaries shaped landscape ecology 
to emphasize methodology and methods, which had been developed and 
enhanced in the 1980s alongside recent advances in computer technology. In 
terms of "experiments and observations," landscape ecology concerned itself 
with: "measurements of natural patterns," which overlap with 
"measurements of anthropogenic patterns"; "landscape-scale experiments," 
wherein "studies evaluating the ecological effects of forest patch size, using 
both pretreatment and untreated controls, are the best known and most 
ambitious to date"; and, "micro-scale experiments," wherein "experiments at 
a fine spatial scale are especially useful, because replicates are better 
controlled, and time, energy, and money budgets are more feasible," and 
"experimental results are then carefully extrapolated to the landscape or 
regional scale, where some results apply but others do n o t"315 Other 
methodologies and methods included "modeling, analytic, and statistical 
approaches," such as "spatial modeling," the use of geographical information 
systems, "parametric studies," and "spatial statistics." Finally, landscape 
ecologists have further developed remote sensing techniques, as "images 
from satellites have revolutionized our perception and approaches to 
understanding landscapes and regions," and thus, "a whole region can be 
examined in a single image, " and "images showing clear patterns of 
interdigitating landscapes, as well as ecosystems and land uses within 
landscapes are widely available."316 As well, infrared technologies, other 
spectral wavelength techniques, computer technologies, and radiotracking
315 Ibid., 31-33.
316 Ibid., 35.
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techniques have increased the methodological toolbox of landscape 
ecology.317
Conservation Biology.
In August, 1988, Jack Ward Thomas and Hal Salwasser, both of whom 
were soon to play major roles in the construction of Forest Service owl policy 
(Thomas as leader of the Interagency Science Team and Salwasser as head of 
the New Perspectives Program), co-presented a paper before the Annual 
Meeting of the Society for Conservation Biology. In their paper, entitled 
"Bringing Conservation Biology into a Position of Influence in Natural 
Resource Management," these two bureaucrats claimed to be "conservation 
biologists when conservation biology w asn't cool." Now they offered advice 
on "how conservation biologists can become more effective in influencing 
land and wildlife management."318 According to the team:
Maintaining diversity is a philosophy and a management goal 
whose time may be at hand in the field of land management — at 
least in the United States. This discussion is aimed at helping 
conservation biologists be more effective in bringing their 
expertise to bear on natural resource management in the United 
States.
The stage is set. Capable players are at hand. The script outline 
has been prepared. Laws governing federal land management 
and other activities have gradually evolved, albeit through 
circuitous routes, to the point where conservation of 
biodiversity is recognized as a management goal.319
317 Ibid., 35.
318 Thomas and Salwasser, "Bringing Conservation Biology," 124.
319 Ibid., 124.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
Thomas and Salwasser, in language speaking to impending crisis 
(biological as well as bureaucratic), urged the society members to "hurry"; 
"management agencies need help, and the time is running out," and 
"conservation biologists must help managers, and themselves, focus on high 
priority issues."320 Conservation biologists, the two bureaucrats argued, 
must learn to maneuver within the political realm of federal wildlife 
management: "they must learn and practice effective biopolitical techniques 
in addition to good science and management — to gain influence, change 
minds, marshal resources of people and money, and make things happen." 
Both Thomas and Salwasser offered a "welcome" to conservation biologists as 
"new players with a new mission in the natural resource management 
game," encouraging them to join in the political struggle around wildlife 
preservation on federal lands.321
Conservation biologists, though virtually unheard of to the general public, 
believed themselves to be in a crucial role, because they were bringing their 
knowledge to the problem of conserving species and retarding the effects of 
untimely extinction.322 To save species, conservation biology would apply 
itself to providing "principles and tools for preserving biological diversity."323 
It would be a prescriptive discourse, and because of its focus upon the urgent 
problem of extinction, it would be a "crisis discipline."324 In this way, Soule 
argued, conservation biology "differs from most other biological sciences."325
320 Ibid., 124.
321 Ibid., 124.
322 Lovejoy, "Foreward," ix. "Untimely" is a loaded and loadable term, so to speak; in much of 
the conservation biology writing it directly referenced humans.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
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Because time was critical, conservation biologists would have to take 
exception to the normal standards for applying science to public policy. 
Uncertainty would be unavoidable. Soul6 stated:
In crisis disciplines, one must act before knowing all the facts; 
crisis disciplines are thus a mixture of science and art, and their 
pursuit requires intuition as well as information. A 
conservation biologist may have to make decisions or 
recommendations about design and management before he or 
she is completely comfortable w ith the theoretical and empirical 
bases of the analysis. Tolerating uncertainty is often 
necessary.326
Like landscape ecology, conservation biology would employ a mixture of 
theory, experimentation, modeling, and practice.327 According to Michael 
Soul6, its most visible proponent, conservation biology is "a new stage in the 
application of science to conservation problems, [that] addresses the biology of 
species, communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed either directly or 
indirectly, by human activities or other agents."328
According to its own texts, it was a young, interdisciplinary discourse 
synthesizing various scientific branches. Among the ranks of conservation 
biology were population biologists, "ecologists, physiologists, behaviorists, 
and all other biologists concerned with the functioning of organisms in 
natural and artificial environments," as well as "taxonomists and 
sy stematists." 329
326 ibid.
327 Soul6, "What is Conservation Biology?" 727.
328 ibid.
329 Ibid.; Ehrenfeld, "Editorial," 6.
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In May, 1985, the Society for Conservation Biology "originated... at the 
conclusion of the Second Conference on Conservation Biology." Two years 
later, the Society published the first edition of its journal, Conservation 
Biology.330 According to Michael Soul6, Conservation Biology relies upon 
four "functional" and four "normative postulates." While all of the 
functional maxims concern the processes and functions of ecology, two of 
them refer directly to spatial phenomenon and demonstrate similarities with 
principles enunciated in the landscape ecology literature, while the other two 
demonstrate the differences as well as similarities between conservation 
biology and landscape ecology.
The first of these postulates, "the evolutionary postulate" states that 
"many of the species that constitute natural communities are the products of 
revo lu tionary  processes"331 This postulate makes apparent one of the more 
significant differences as well as one of the similarities between conservation 
biology and landscape ecology. Restated, this postulate means that "the 
structure, function, and stability of coevolved, natural communities differ 
significantly from those of unnatural or synthetic communities." Non­
human systems are different than human systems. According to Soul§, 
"Corollaries" of this postulate include: "species are interdependent"; "many 
species are highly specialized"; "extinctions of keystone species can have 
long-range consequences"; and "introductions of generalists may reduce 
diversity."332
330 soul#, "History," 4.
331 Soul#, "What is Conservation Biology?" 729.
332 Ibid., 729-730.
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Apparent in these corollaries, particularly the first, is the "organicist" 
outlook, which according to Bryan Norton, was a diagnostic view point.333 
According to Norton: "Conservation biologists must reject the role of 
biological mechanics and embrace oganitism. They must insist that whole 
systems of nature can be judged 'healthy' or 'ill'." Soule stated that the first 
postulate "does not necessarily rely on deterministic factors," since 
population systems must be holistically studied.334 This emphasis on 
"holism" permeates the conservation biology, demonstrating another 
likeness to landscape ecology. According to Soul&
Conservation biology tends to be holistic, in two senses of the 
word. First, many conservation biologists, induding many 
wildlife spedalists, assume that ecological and evolutionary 
processes must be studied at their own macroscopic levels and 
that reductionism alone cannot lead to explanations of 
community and ecosystem processes... [second] is the 
assumption that muitidisdplinary approaches will ultimately be 
most fruitful.335
The second functional postulate "concerns the scale of ecological 
processes," reflecting commonalties between conservation biology and 
landscape ecology.336 According to Soule: "Many, if not all, ecological 
processes have thresholds below and above which they become 
discontinuous, chaotic, or suspended," and therefore are "interrupted or fail 
altogether where the system is too small."337 Two "major assumptions... 
underlie this postulate: The temporal continuity of habitats, and successional 
stages depend on size ... [and] outbursts reduce diversity."338 This postulate is
333 Ibid., 728.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid., 729.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
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almost identical to the language of landscape ecology that deals with the "size 
effect on biodiversity," and indeed, "island biogeography" is an important 
part of conservation biology.339 In an earlier discussion of "community 
ecology," Soul6 and Wilcox make reference to patches and patchiness — 
terminology familiar to the landscape ecology literature: "The world is patchy 
and patches come and go."340
A postulate w ith directly political connotations is that nature reserves are 
inherently disequilibrial for large, rare organisms. This postulate reflects, 
again, island biogeographic theory, as well as highlighting one of the main 
fod for conservation biology, which is the design, maintenance, and 
assessment of "nature reserves." According to Soule and Wilcox:
When considering the preservation of a particular biota, a 
system of nature reserves can be described by reference to three 
features: number of reserves, size of reserves, and density (or 
proximity) or reserves. With regard to number and size, some 
biogeographers have argued that reserves should be large and 
not necessarily numerous; others have argued for many, 
smaller reserves. Nevertheless, all agree that the best solution 
from the biogeographical standpoint is many, large reserves.341
This issue was central in the spotted owl debate and was discussed in-depth in
both the ISC Strategy and the Gang of Four report, which in part, helped
define the particulars of reserve needs for the owl, generally considered to be
mutually exclusive to timber harvesting.
339 SouI£, "History," 4; Shaffer, "Minimum Population Sizes," 131-134.
340 Soul£ and Wilcox, Conservation Biology, 5.
341 Ibid., 4.
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The last of conservation biology's functional postulates (the third in 
Soule's writings) "concerns the scale of population phenomena."342 
According to Soul6: "Genetic and demographic processes have thresholds 
below which nonadaptive, random forces begin to prevail over adaptive, 
deterministic forces within populations."343 The main point here "is that 
the probability of survival of a local population is a positive function of its 
size."344 Thus, the corollaries include the maxim that [bjelow a certain 
population size... the probability of extinction from random demographic 
events increases steeply."345 This statement reflects the literature from 
landscape ecology concerning perturbations and fluctuations.346 Other 
corollaries include the statement that, "populations of outbreeding organisms 
will suffer a chronic loss of fitness from inbreeding depression as effective 
population sizes of less than 50 to 100."347 Also, "genetic drift in small 
populations... will cause a progressive loss of genetic variation," reducing 
"immediate fitness."348 Finally, "natural selection will be less effective in 
small populations because of genetic drift and the loss of potentially adaptive 
genetic variation."349
The study of population was a major part of conservation biology. Central 
to this project was the concept of "minimum viable populations," which 
concerns itself with "criteria for successful preservation at the population
342 Soul£, "What is Conservation Biology?" 730.
343 ibid.
344 ibid.
345 ibid.
346 ibid.
347 ibid.
348 ibid.
349 ibid.
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level [and] various methods... for determining the population sizes and their 
area requirements to meet these criteria."350 Soule phrased the question the 
question: "What are the minimum conditions for the long-term persistence 
and adaptation of a species or population in a given place?"351
The '"viable population problem' is very young/' emerging in the 1970s 
and 80s amidst political turmoil concerning endangered and threatened 
species, in the context of law, and species extinction in general, and 
"confusion" and ambiguity characterize the debate. Yet, the questions 
conservation biologists were posing concerning population viability of the 
northern spotted owl and other old-growth associated species would soon be 
important in the political dialogue concerning the northern spotted owl.352
Because the idea of extinction is so central to the political debate regarding 
preservation and land-use policy, "viability is now a cause celebre."353 
Researchers, attempting to define "minimum conditions" for viability, focus 
upon habitat, which in turn, depends upon land base. "If the likelihood of 
survival depends on both population size and time, then what degree of 
persistence constitutes preservation and how much habitat is necessary to 
achieve such preservation? This is the essence of the minimum viable 
population problem and the central question facing conservationists
350 Shaffer, "Minimum Population Sizes," 131. Central to the concept of minimum viable 
populations is the problem of extinction. Conservation biologist Mark Shaffer studied sources 
of extinction, including "demographic stochastidtjr," "environmental stochastidty," "natural 
catastrophes" (summoning the ideas of perturbations and fluctuations) and "genetic 
stochastidty."
351 Soul£, ed., "Viable Populations for C o n serva tio n 1.
352 Interagency Sdentific Committee, Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl.
353 Soul6, ed., "Viable Populations for Conservation." 2.
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today."354 Deteraiming such conditions has direct political ramifications and 
involves political negotiation.
Furthermore, scientists as stakeholders must define viability in terms of 
probability ~  due to uncertainties resulting not only from stochastic events, 
but from methodological structure (for instance, the difference between 
modeled and empirical realities) — and deciding acceptable levels of 
confidence is a matter of subjective choice to be decided through political 
process.355 Another topic of debate regards the propriety of designating 
"minimal" conditions. "Some conservationists argue that the term is 
tactically self-defeating and ethically offensive. Their reasoning is that the job 
of conservation biologists should be to recommend or provide for more that 
just the minimum number or distribution of a species. ... They should 
prescribe to managers and policy makers the conditions for robust and 
bountiful populations."356
Shaffer sums up the difficult, political nature of the maintaining species:
There are no easy answers to the problem of defining successful 
preservation or what really constitutes endangerment. The one 
certainty is that the issue is not strictly a biological or scientific 
matter. Of all the issues facing the conservation of biological 
diversity, the definition of preservation itself, in quantitative 
terms subject to objective evaluation is both the most crucial and 
least addressed.357
S54 Shaffer, "Minimum Viable Populations," 70.
355 An interesting question arises concerning whether or not policy makers, who are often 
unfamiliar with the reasoning involved with scientific process, understand the difference 
between a straightforward assurance of viability and a less-tangible, if acceptable "risk." 
Soule writes that "whatever jargon we choose to adopt, the point is that there is no single 
value or 'magic number' that has universal validity." Soul#, "History," 5.
S56 Ibid., 4.
357 Shaffer, "Minimum Viable Populations," 81.
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Underlying the "functional" substance of conservation biology — as a text 
and a practice — are its "normative" postulates, which reflect conservation 
biology's bias towards natural systems (versus human constructed or altered 
systems), or in SoulS's words, a "preference for nature over artifice, for 
wilderness over gardens."358 First is the proposition that "diversity of 
organisms is good," with the corollary that "the untimely extinction of 
populations and species is bad."359 Second is the argument that "ecological 
complexity is good," extending value to "habitat diversity and complex 
ecological processes."360 Third is the argument that "evolution is good," as is 
its "continuity, and finally, "biotic diversity has intrinsic value."361 Taken as 
a whole, the postulates more or less enunciate Conservation Biology's 
primary goal: to preserve "biodiversity," a concept central to the rhetoric 
around land policy.
People have used the term "biodiversity" (sometimes referred to as 
"biological diversity") in various ways. From the microbial scale to the 
"landscape," biodiversity can refer to "functional diversity7' (the diversity of 
ecological processes), which determines and is determined by "structural 
diversity" (diversity of spatial configurations), all of which support the 
diversity of species composition — the primary focus of the ESA. As a 
principle in political discourse, players must pay attention to the idea, and
358 Soule, "What is Conservation Biology," 731.
359 ibid, 730.
360 Ibid., 730.
361 Ibid., 731. This postulate is significantly different than the others insofar as it asserts an 
"intrinsic" value, or in other words, a prior good. This assertion implies a certainty or 
knowledge of such prior value, which would logically be "a priori knowledge," claims to which 
are necessary to religion. See Norton, Toward Unity, 234-5 for a brief discussion on this 
distinction.
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many find it profitable to shape its meaning in political discourse. Thus, 
biologists, the most "credible" and technically agile subjects, are obvious 
recipients of political power. David Takacs interviewed Soule, Ehrenfeld, and 
other prominent conservation biologists for his doctoral dissertation on the 
"meaning of biodiversity." According to Takacs:
While they whip up public concern over the diminution of 
biodiversity, biologists simultaneously gamer the resources that 
go hand in hand with increased concern. Biodiversity is a 
formidable constituency to represent: she who represents it gains 
quite a bit of power in a society that cares to preserve it.
Biologists, who have been called upon to provide "facts" about 
the natural world, now clear space to speak of nature's 
"values."362
The relationship between these biologists of power and national forest 
politics would become clear when the courts and Congress began ordering 
and commissioning teams to produce decision-making frameworks — as well 
as sets of management options — that politicians could use to allocate the 
national forests and other public lands as they existed in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.
lust Gettin' Through: the Ambiguous Adaptive Management
Scientists, like other political players, often disagree about most issues 
having bearing upon their work — from the working out of methodologies 
and methods, to the interpretation of data and constructing of conclusions.363 
This type of conflict is especially apparent in the "applied sciences," where 
groups of scientists (or groups including scientists) are producing scientific
S62 Takacs, Finding Meaning, 6.
363 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions; Walters, Adaptive Management.
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statements for use in management situations. In the politics regarding old- 
growth forests and associated species, players from industry, the Forest 
Service, and environmental groups frequently portrayed these management 
situations as crisis situations.364
The political appropriation of science (in a general sense — as a set of 
discourses) requires a refining step. The policy maker must link the various 
individuals and individual teams (using specific research frameworks and 
facilities to do their own work) — the "scientists" — with statements that will 
justify management decisions. This linkage involves synthesizing the 
positions of several individuals who may or may not agree on issues 
concerning methodology, formulation of questions and hypotheses, 
interpretation of data, and so forth. Out of group of particular comes a 
collective declarative statement, usually written as if by one author. The 
linking process must somehow respond (adeptly or miserably) to the various 
levels of conflict between official knowledge producers, while responding to 
the stress resulting from the perceived crisis situation. The process must also 
endure various forms of critique and insult, because, when management 
decisions depend upon the resulting scientific statements, political players try 
in various ways to influence the science. In the case of the politicized 
scientific discourse around the spotted owl issue, most of the science — 
particularly that under the rubrics of landscape ecology and conservation 
biology — consisted of new methodologies and methods, particularly
364 Walters, Adaptive Management. The portrayal, per se, especially in the context of public 
agencies dealing with "problems" (of which crises are a significant subset) is by definition 
political. See Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle. Also, see Gramsci, "Prison 
Notebooks," in The Modem Prince, for a theoretical discussion of why social production is 
political.
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modeling, and confronted new problems, themselves emerging from an 
unpredictable political discourse-365 Knowledge on the owl was new and data 
sparse and difficult to acquire, yet research objectives required long-term 
projections on issues like "genetic viability." Uncertainty (acknowledged or 
not) would determine any decision made regarding owl management (and, 
ultimately, management of several other "old-growth species"), and agency 
scientists would produce them in an environment of internal and external 
conflict and negotiation.
In 1986, as the owl issue was becoming well known in the already national 
debate on old-growth forests, Carl Walters outlined a process to deal with 
these research issues. For several years, Walters had been working with a 
group called the 'International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis," 
which had been formed in 1972, at a time when systems analysis scholars and 
practitioners were appropriating newly available computer capabilities to 
their modeling. In the mid-70s, C. S. Hollings, long-time colleague of 
Walters and director of the Institute, responding to failures of previous 
resource management approaches, had coined the phrase "adaptive 
management," an idea that Walters proceeded to develop.366
The idea was timely, because by the mid-1980s, many researchers and 
managers had become disillusioned by the unsatisfactory results of their 
modeling — upon which public agencies had come to depend — and were 
becoming aware of sources of uncertainty they had not earlier perceived. 
According to Walters, "The model building has not been particularly
365 Walters, Adaptive Management, Ch. 11.
3^6 Lee, Compass and Gyroscope, 54.
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successful, and it keeps drawing attention to key uncertainties that are not 
being resolved through normal techniques of scientific investigation."367
Much of the uncertainties arose as researchers began to perceive new 
levels of complexity in the natural systems they were studying. According to 
Walters, these uncertainties arose on three levels. First, "certain inputs or 
disturbances that occur rather regularly or frequently over time will generate 
unpredictable and uncontrollable change" — which he referred to as 
"background noise."368 Second, was "statistical or parametric uncertainty" — 
mainly regarding the conceptual instruments researchers were using — and 
third was "basic structural uncertainty about even what variables to 
consider."369
To deal with these uncertainties yet move ahead with management — 
which agencies would inevitably continue to do — Walters recommended 
"experimental" management, whereby managers would learn from 
experience. According to Walters:
We keep running up against questions that only hard experience 
can answer, and a basic issue becomes whether to pursue 
management policies that will deliberately enhance that 
experience. Such policies would represent a radical departure 
from traditional prescriptions about how to deal with 
uncertainly, namely to proceed with great caution or to act as 
though there were no uncertainty in hopes that mistakes and 
opportunities will automatically reveal themselves.
367 Walters, Adaptive Management, vii.
368 Ibid., 162.
369 ibid., 162.
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My major conclusion is that actively adaptive, probing 
deliberately experimental polices should indeed be a basic part of 
renewable resource management.370
Walters and his team devised a structure for this experimental, adaptive 
management, which was highly dependent upon modeling as a heuristic 
strategy, and statistical analysis, optimization, and game playing as modeling 
strategies. Thus, the "design of such policies" would include "mathematical 
modeling to pinpoint uncertainties and generate alternative hypotheses, 
statistical analysis to determine how uncertainties are likely to propagate over 
time in relation to policy choices, and formal optimization combined with 
game playing to seek better probing choices."371
But, these technical matters only provided a forum for investigation and 
idea generation; they did not, in and of themselves provide solutions or 
scientific management statements. To provide statements, participants 
would have to come forward and reach some sort of agreement — a political 
process — upon what should be said and done. According to Walters, "such 
technical developments will be of little value unless they are accompanied by 
progress in dealing also with the very human problems of reaching 
consensus by embracing uncertainty, and of reaching some balance when 
there is, in fact, no identifiable decision maker and policies proceed from the 
competitive or cooperative activities."372 Decision-makers would have to 
contend with conflict, internal as well as external.
370 Ibid., vii.
37  ̂ Ibid., viii.
372 Ibid., 333.
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In this process of "moving from analysis to synthesis" — or perhaps, from 
analyses to synthesis — Walters recommended some sub-processes (not 
necessarily sequential). The first was the "modeling to pinpoint 
uncertainties." The second had more room for contention, insofar as it 
required generating predictions of future policy options (conclusions with 
immense political implications). This process would involve developing "a 
range of predictions about key policy indicators, using the alternative models 
and basic policy options identified during the initial modeling work."373 This 
exercise was designed to "gain consensus about how large is the range of 
future outcomes and how deep are the conflicts about which outcomes would 
be best." It would be a testing of the political waters, as well as putting the 
participants under the stress of responsibility, in an effort to promote creative 
tendencies — "to engender a healthy frustration about the state of affairs.
"This frustration will help later in the search for imaginative policy options, 
but at this stage it has the more immediate value of motivating those 
involved in the analysis to 'get down to essentials'."374 The third process is 
the most significant object of focus for adaptive management — to reiterate 
and negotiate and "seek the best option," involving a mutually inclusive 
process called "imaginative synthesis."375 This process involves gracefully 
recognizing and correcting for past mistakes, discovered through the process 
of monitoring.
Thus, Walters and his group had devised a structure for managers — and 
manager-scientists, to do what they had to do anyway — act under uncertainty
373 Ibid., 335.
374 Ibid., 335.
375 Ibid., 336.
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and negotiate decisions among themselves in an environment pervaded by 
conflict. He had also provided a justification and structure for managers — 
and manager scientists — to try out new ideas for management, which is 
exactly what Forest Service researchers could use at the time. Adaptive 
management could bridge the gap between management and research 
divisions that existed in many agencies.
New Forestry
In the 1980s, Jerry Franklin, Dave Perry, Fred Swanson, and others were 
working together to study old-growth forest ecosystems under the rubric of 
the Andrews Ecosystem Research Group. The Andrews Group, named after 
the Forest Service H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest near Blue River, Oregon 
was formed in the late 1960s as "a voluntary association of scientists" — "an 
interdisciplinary team representing the earth and life sciences from both field 
and theoretical orientations."376 In the late 1980s, it included "a large outer 
circle of collaborators, and an inner core of 15 to 20 researchers who have 
provided continuity over the 20 years of the group's existence."377 According 
to Swanson:
The Andrews group has no formal affiliation with a university 
or the Forest Service, but one-third of the members are scientists 
and forest managers associated with the [FS] Pacific Northwest 
Research Station and Willamette National Forest, and two- 
thirds are scientists connected with Oregon State University and 
the University of Washington. ... Most of the funding is 
provided by the National Science Foundation and the U.S.
Forest Service.378
376 Swanson, "The People Behind the New Forestry," 44.
377 ibid.
378 ibid.
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The team's leader, Jerry Franklin, "Bloedel Professor of Ecosystem 
Analysis at the University of Washington, Chief Plant Ecologist for the 
[PNW] Research Station, and... a Bullard Fellow at Harvard," was already well 
known for his role in the SAF Old-Growth Management team; the New York 
Times heralded him as "the nation's foremost expert on ancient forests."379 
Until the mid-1980s, Franklin had been a fairly conventional forestry 
researcher. In 1966, at Washington State University, he had written his 
doctoral dissertation, in Botany, on the "Vegetation and Soils in the 
Subalpine Forests of the Southern Washington Cascade Range," and his 
conclusion was in line with the work of his mentor, Robert Daubenmire.380 
Until the mid-1980s, his research concerned fairly conventional topics related 
to forest ecology. Titles of some of his various publications from the years 
1973 to 1980 reflected this concern with conventional forestry topics: "Effects 
of Various Harvesting Methods on Forest Regeneration"381; "Natural 
Vegetation of Oregon and Washington"382; "Seeding Habitats of Upper-Slope 
Tree Species"383; and "Ecological Site Classification Activities in Oregon and 
W ashington."384
Later in his career, Franklin began to change his views on forest 
management, especially after observing recent "disasters" in public forestry, 
particularly the massive blowdown in the Bull Run river drainage in the 
Mount Hood National Forest (the watershed for Portland, Oregon), in 1983.385
379 Davis, "The Making of a Revolutionary," 39.
380 Franklin, "Vegetation and Soils."
381 Franklin and Debell, "Effects of Various Harvesting Methods."
382. Franklin and Dryness, "Natural Vegetation of Oregon and Washington"
383 Franklin and Smith, "Seeding Habitats."
384 Franklin, "Ecological Site Classification Activities."
3®  Franklin, "Interview."
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In 1984, he co-authored the Society of American Forester's policy statement, 
"Scheduling the Harvest of Old-Growth," which expanded the concept of 
multiple-use and stated flatly that allocation of old growth was a political 
issue, presaging later documents he would help write.386 Publishing in the 
first issue of Landscape Ecology, w ith Richard Forman, a leading American 
proponent of landscape ecology, and dean of the Harvard Graduate School of 
Design, Franklin criticized the geometry of Forest Service timber 
management. He observed:
The Bull Run River drainage in the Mount Hood National 
Forest in western Oregon provides strong evidence of the 
potential for catastrophic disturbance created by the checkerboard 
pattern. We analyzed windthrow patterns on a 37,000-ha area 
including the Bull Rim and adjacent tracts. Major windstorms 
in this area in December 1973 and 1983 blew down forests of 482 
ha and 899 ha, respectively. Nearly 1 /2-billion board feet of 
timber fell in the 1983 blowdown. About 48% of the 1973 and 
81% of the 1983 blowdowns were adjacent to existing clearcuts 
and roads; both are statistically significant relations.387
Employing a conceptual framework based upon landscape ecology, 
Franklin and Forman went on to assess the Forest Service's widespread use of 
a checkerboard pattern of clear cut logging. First, they built a model wherein 
they could measure boundary-to-area ratios corresponding to various 
geometrical patterns for dividing a two-dimensional square into black and 
white areas — patterns such as a checkerboard or evenly divided between black 
and white. They treated the model as analogous to timber management in 
the western cascades, designating the black areas as clearcuts and the white 
areas as remaining patches, with various patterns signifying various 
"treatments." They measured the effects of incrementally removing patch
386 Society of American Foresters, Scheduling.
387 Franklin and Forman, "Creating Landscape Patterns," 14-15.
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areas (signifying clear cut logging) upon the availability of remaining patch 
areas in terms of "core" (or "interior") or "edge" ("boundary") patch -  given a 
distance from the edge that defines interior patch.388
This model allowed Forman and Franklin to determine the point at 
which removing a patch would eliminate the last (or second to last, so on) 
viable patch of a certain dimension (for instance, one theoretically 
corresponding to a spotted owl niche). These breaking off points in the model 
they likened to ecological thresholds, for instance, levels where major 
disturbances become more likely, particularly wind throw damage. Then they 
discussed measurements taken from the Mount Hood Forest and found 
correlations between the checkerboard geometry of logging and disturbances 
such as landslides and the windthrows at Bull Run, though they did not 
elucidate the relationship between their model as it concerned interior versus 
edge patch and data from the national forest.389
They also found that the idealized checkerboard sequence they represented 
in their model did not fit the actual pattern of logging, constrained as it was by 
topology and road costs; adjacent squares had been cut, violating the sequence 
assumed in the model. While they did not test any specific hypotheses aside 
from possible disturbance effects of quasi-checkerboard cutting, they reviewed 
the literature regarding the biotic and structural effects of creating edge 
conditions. They concluded that, for the purposes of management, large 
patches would be preferable to small, all other conditions being the same.
They further concluded that the Forest Service's use of checkerboard patterns
388
389 ibid.
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of logging worked counter to maintaining large patches, in addition to 
maximizing "the high-contrast edge between primeval forest and cutover 
areas," and exceeding geometrical "thresholds," beyond which interior 
patches could not exist Forman and Franklin suggested that the agency 
"reduce the emphasis on dispersing small dearcut patches," to reduce 
fragmentation," and "identify and reserve large patches of primeval forest in 
the landscape for maintenance of interior species and amenity values."390 
According to the team, "Clearcutting generally must be avoided within the 
reserved patches because of the substantial vulnerability that results from 
placing even small cuts within a reserved tract."391 In addition, they argued, 
agencies should manage for corridors between reserved tracts. Aside from 
being technically informed statements regarding resource management, these 
were political statements, because the establishment of reserves directly 
signified constraints upon timber harvesting. The authors continued, "It is 
urgent because many current cutting programs are rapidly reducing the size of 
available patches."392
Cognizant of the developing conflict in the politics of forest management, 
Franklin and his cohorts began to focus on the new objectives that later 
evolved into New Forestry. Franklin became convinced that large-scale 
ecological and political disasters resulting from past management activities 
would continue until public agencies instituted new forms of management 
and past management errors had been resolved.393 In 1989, he began to take
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Franklin and Forman, "Creating Landscape Patterns," 14-15.
393 Franklin, "Interview."
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his message to the general public Appearing in the film. Rage Over Trees, 
released by the National Audobon Society and Turner Broadcasting System in 
1989, Franklin lamented that old growth forest was disappearing faster than 
even Forest Service staff knew.394 Referring to (and affirming) the 
Wilderness Society estimations of remaining national forest old growth, 
Franklin appealed to the practical issue of allowing for future flexibility in 
forest management: "It looks like there's a lot less old growth — real old 
growth — Douglas fir forests than most of us had supposed. But one logical 
strategy might be to try and retain most of the old growth in the larger patches. 
You probably want to leave these alone so that you retain your options on 
those for a longer time period."395 Standing in the Oval Creek drainage, a 
Forest Service roadless area in the Willamette National Forest and one of a 
few remaining intact, lower elevation drainages, Franklin admiringly referred 
to a "complexity of structure" and outlined the "two principles" that he felt 
were "very important to productive capacity": "don't reduce the capacity to 
reduce" ("don't timber mine") and "don't extirpate species."396 According to 
Franklin, the old growth issue related to both principles, and he soon went on 
to articulate this message in other ways.
In November, 1989, the research team, under the authorship of Franklin, 
published an article entitled 'Tow ard a New Forestry," in the popular 
magazine, American Forests.397 In  the article Franklin advocated "the "New
394 Franklin in Rage Over Trees.
395 Certainly this language refers to a utilitarian perspective that had evolved beyond the 
more narrow "stoic" sense of utility preferred by Pinchot and his heirs up until the major 
environmental laws of the 1960s and 1970s. See McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings," p. 198.
396 Franklin in Rage Over Trees.
397 Typically, forestry and ecology researchers, especially Forest Service and "cooperative 
research" university researchers publish through the "professional" avenues — the huge FS
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Forestry/' "an alternative" management concept, obviating the management 
choice between "tree farms and total preservation."398 Management 
objectives would be shifted away from use concepts — farms and preservation 
— and towards "ecological values," "while allowing for the extraction of 
commodities" as a by-product of good management; management objectives 
would be phrased to reflect concern for the perpetuation of the "structure and 
processes" of forest ecosystems with provisions for board feet. Borrowing a 
phrase from President George Bush, Franklin looked upon the approach as "a 
kinder, gentler forestry."399
The article discussed old-growth systems in  terms of their ecological 
functions, "as important reservoirs of biological diversity," and discussed 
some of the strategies for maintaining old-growth features in management 
activities (particularly timber harvesting). In an article the following year, 
"New and Renewed Stewardship: Toward a Silviculture of Diversity," 
Franklin, with Perry and Swanson, was more explicit.400 In this article, the 
authors compare old forestry with new forestry, favoring the latter in 
language with political overtones. The authors wrote:
There are basically two choices regarding how forests should be 
managed. One, which has had precedence since it was originated 
in Germany in the 19th century, is to homogenize forests and 
forested landscapes, reducing natural diversity in order to 
concentrate on the economics of wood production. The second, 
advocated by a growing number of scientists and managers, is to
publishing office or the trade and science journals — Western Journal of Applied Forestry, 
Journal of Forestry, Forest Science, Science, Ecology, for instance.
398 Franklin, 'Toward a New Forestry."
399 Ibid., 38.
400 Franklin, Perry, and Swanson, "New and Renewed Stewardship."
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manage forested landscapes in such a way that natural diversity 
is preserved.401
The group validated its call to change forest management upon the need 
to maintain aesthetics, preserve species (particularly if endangered or 
threatened, such as the owl or red cockaded woodpecker), and protect "natural 
stabilizing mechanisms," especially "biological diversity."402 The group 
characterized "two important lessons" for management, noting:
First, stability in nature does not mean "no change"... but rather 
means constraining change within certain bounds which 
includes maintaining both the productive capacity of soils and 
populations of indigenous species. Second, forestry does not 
necessarily degrade ecosystems, and can even be a tool for 
keeping them diverse and healthy. Thus, silviculture must do 
two things: a. protect species and habitats that may have no 
market value; and b. reflect, to at least some degree, natural 
patterns.403
Thus the group suggested "some principles" for managers to follow: 
Managers should leave "large dead wood" to serve as habitat "for animals 
that consume defoliators and barkbeetles" as well as acting as "water 
reservoirs, sites of nitrogen fixation, and habitat for organisms that cycle 
nutrients"; maintain "diverse plant species" for nutrient cycling and 
"retention following disturbances," as well as providing habitat and food for 
animals that prey on defoliators"; manage for "diverse landscapes" to reduce 
the extent and intensity of disturbances; apply "green retention" of large trees 
to allow two or more canopy layers to develop and provide sources of "snags 
and soil logs"; use wide spaces to allow "noncommercial plant species to 
coexist with crop trees"; use longer rotations "to avoid creating too much 
early successional habitat for animals such as deer that can become serious
ibid., 200-01.
402 Ibid., 199-200.
403 ibid., 200.
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pests when too abundant"; and keep a 'landscape focus/' "maintaining 
migration corridors and avoiding fragmentation."404
The Franklin led group was suggesting changes in the forest practices that 
challenged entrenched conventions in forest management, conceptually and 
financially, and through a channel that was overtly political. According to 
Franklin, the team wrote the article "because, basically, we thought we were at 
a critical junction point, and that point of view needed to be laid out before as 
many of the potential stake-holders and decision makers as possible."405 
Insofar as the situation involved management — an institutional problem — it 
was political, and therefore, the team concluded, policy makers should be 
audience to the team's conclusions regarding these urgent environmental 
matters. The team decided that the conventional mode of communicating 
research results was too slow, so they went directly to the more widely-read 
literature venues that decision-makers read. Regarding the "New Forestry" 
article, Franklin states:
I wanted to get to a much broader audience than just professional 
foresters; of course, that has just been further emphasized since — that 
people who really, in the end, are going to determine policy are not 
foresters. So, whenever you're trying to influence thinking and policy, 
you don't want to go to the professional forestry journals; you want to 
go to outlets that you hope are going to get a distribution to interested 
lay personnel — potentially decision makers — that sort of thing.406
New Forestry was soon to become well known to the public — in addition
to publicity afforded it by Franklin's authorship — through his work on the
404 Ibid., 201-207.
405 Franklin, "Interview," 1.
406 Ibid., 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
major politically-commissioned science reports in which he would 
participate.
Concluding Remarks
The two emerging discourses, Conservation Biology and Landscape 
Ecology, are in some ways quite different. Some of these differences reflect 
differences in other political discourses pertaining to forests. While 
Conservation Biology favors "naturalistic" landscapes and reserves and 
admonishes human artifact, landscape ecology focuses on and even embraces 
the human-built landscape, and while the latter has largely evolved into a 
"spatial language," the former is concerned more with "functional" 
relationships between organisms and species.
Yet, the two paradigms also share many similarities, including 
overlapping and shared literature, terminology, methodology, and method, 
an interdisciplinary mix of practitioners, a focus on planning and practice, 
and an interest in large areas (ranging from a few to hundreds of square 
miles). Also common to these two disciplines was a plethora of terms and 
concepts open to debate and interpretation, setting the stage for further 
political negotiation when applied to management.407
People with political agendas and normative biases articulated the 
concepts constituting Conservation Biology and Landscape ecology, "sciences" 
that are concerned with the political practice of land management. They both
407 Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
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constitute similar languages of definition and of cause and effect — relying 
upon categories and designations that would (and did) affect policy decisions 
affecting millions of people, not to mention myriad other species and 
ecologies. Thus, in effect, they provide the scientific parts, themselves 
political constructions, to be politically appropriated and assembled in various 
ways to form national forest policy — particularly through the courts, through 
congressionally mandated scientific committees, and in the context of agency 
programs. Adaptive Management provided a protocol for this political 
assemblage of scientific parts. Central to adaptive management's 
methodology (its principles of experimental design) was the idea of crisis — 
the idea that the problem at hand, preservation of a species, required 
expedient action. Actions would be evaluated in hindsight, and agency policy 
would shift accordingly. This emphasis on crisis provided the conceptual 
link that would make adaptive management so useful to the practitioners of 
conservation biology and landscape ecology.
Franklin's work in new forestry epitomized this synthesis and is a good 
example of the construction of science and its political appropriation by 
politics. In addition to helping construct the concept, he had a strong hand in 
its application in the context of the Interagency Science Committee and the 
Scientific Panel, as well as the Forest Service's New Perspectives program, 
and, ultimately, Ecosystem Management.
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Chapter 6
The Power of Science: The Interagency Science Team and the Scientific Panel
Thomasina: Each week I plot your equations dot for
dot, Xs against Ys in all manner o f algebraical 
relation, and every week they draw themselves as 
commonplace geometry, as i f  the world of forms 
were nothing but arcs and angles. God's truth,
Septimus, if  there is an equation for a curve like a 
bell, there must be an equation for one like a 
bluebell, and if  a bluebell, why not a rose? Do we 
believe nature is written in numbers?
Septimus: We do.
— Tom Stoppard 
Arcadia (a play)
In autumn 1989, the Forest Service was still suffering an injunction 
against selling stumpage on northern spotted owl lands — practically all the 
old-growth forest in the Pacific N orthwest408 Judge Dwyer of the Ninth 
Federal Circuit court had imposed the injunction because the Forest Service 
had failed to present an owl protection strategy that was based on the most 
current information on the owl. The agency needed science that the court 
would accept in order to continue its timber program.
In October, 1989, the Forest Service, in conjunction with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the BLM, chartered The Interagency Science Committee 
(ISC), to produce a "scientifically credible conservation strategy for northern 
spotted owl management" — which it published and submitted to Congress 
April, 1990.409 In November, Congress passed its Appropriations Act of
408 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 114.
409 Interagency Scientific Committee, Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl, 8.
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1990.410 Among its directives were to redraft the Environmental Impact 
Statement it had issued for selling stumpage in owl territory, based upon the 
latest in science. Congress also endorsed the agency's formation of the ISC, 
which would assemble much of the science to be used in the EIS.
In spring, 1991, the Forest Service continued to be enjoined from timber 
operations in owl forests, and Congress was facing pressure to solve the 
mutually exclusive demands of old-growth advocates and the timber 
industry. In April, the House Agriculture Committee and the House 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee convened a Scientific Panel on 
Late-Successional Forest Ecosystems (hereafter, Scientific Panel), in an attempt 
to start the process of drafting legislation for managing the old growth in the 
Pacific Northwest.411 The following July, the Panel, dubbed 'The Gang of 
Four" by industry rhetoric, released its report, which it presented to Congress 
in October.412
In this chapter, I trace the history of the two projects as well as discussing 
the significance of each report insofar as it would influence forest policy and 
politics in the next few years — particularly the premier of ecosystem 
management in 1992.
410 Section 318 of 1990 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.
411 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 168.
412 U.S. House Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the Committee on 
Agriculture and the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Joint Hearing.
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The ISC and its report (October, 1989-April. 1990)
In October, 1989, U.S. Congress incorporated the ISC charter into the 
controversial Hatfield-Adams Appropriations Act, thereby assuring the 
committee some prominence in the political drama governing forest 
management in the Pacific Northwest.413 Congressmen and agencies alike 
seemed to take as given the assumption that producing a "scientifically 
credible" management plan — a "conservation strategy for northern spotted 
owl management and cooperation" was possible and feasible, for no 
provisions were made for the opposite possibility.414
The committees thus ratified the agencies' pick of internal scientists, 
which itself was inevitably restricted to a relatively few possibilities, for 
political and technical reasons.415 The Forest Service chose Jack Ward 
Thomas to lead the committee because he appeared to be one of their most 
"credible scientists."416 According to historian Stephen Yaffee, a "wide array" 
of scientists perceived Thomas as a "good scientist," but "good" went beyond 
the issue of "credibility," to include a certain "big stature kind of 
personality."417 Not only was he seen as a "straight shooter," but people 
perceived in Thomas "a sense of hutzpa," particularly from his refusal to 
leave his work in La Grande, Oregon to accept an agency management 
position." People formed a mythical image of Thomas, "because he faced the 
line officers in the eye and said T m  doing what7s right.' That gave him both a
413 Section 318 of U. S. Public Law 101-121
414 Interagency Scientific Committee, Conservation Biology, 47.
415 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 123-27,194.
446 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 123. George Leonard signed the charter for Dale Robertson.
417 Yaffee, "Interview," 10.
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sense of somewhat mythic proportions, but also kind of reinforced his sense 
of independence."418 Also attractive to people involved in the discourse was 
a sense of "folksiness" that people imbued upon Thomas, according to 
Charles Philpott, director of the Pacific Northwest Research Station:
The person [chosen as ISC leader] had to be credible not just with the 
scientists but with environmentalists and other interest groups. We've 
probably got 5 to 10 people in the Forest Service who can do that. Jack 
has a knack for explaining complex things in good, simple English.
And he can get folksy when i f  s appropriate.419
By 1989, Thomas was known to various people for various reasons. He 
was responsible for arranging funding, through the Forest Service 
cooperative research structure, some of the early research on the northern 
spotted owl, especially graduate student work. Among the work Thomas 
assisted was Eric Foreman's graduate research in the late 1970s (at Oregon 
State University). Foreman was already bringing attention to his research on 
the owl, and he would later become a major contributor to owl policy, 
including his participation on the ISC, as I discuss below.420
Thomas was also known to others in context of his service on the Society 
of American Foresters (SAF) committee that authored the policy statement, 
"Scheduling the Harvest of Old-Growth" (SHOG) in the early 1980s.421 The
418 Ibid.
419 In Durbin, Tree Huggers, 112.
420 Yaffee, Wisdom of the Spotted Owl, 27
421 Society of American Foresters, Scheduling.
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SAF committee's membership was as significant as its statement. Many SAP 
committee members, including Thomas, would later serve on the ISC and 
Scientific Panels and other high profile teams and would be instrumental in 
the events leading to the Forest Service adoption of ecosystem 
management.422 Jim Lyons, then SAF director of resource policy, organized 
the committee. Later, as a congressional staff assistant, Lyons worked to 
assemble the Scientific Panel, and in 1993, he became Assistant Agriculture 
Secretary in charge of the Forest Service, where he oversaw the Federal 
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. Looking back at the SAF 
membership, Lyons recalls:
Back even further to when I was the policy at SAF — and SAF 
should take some credit for this — we put together a task force to 
look at scheduling the harvest of old-growth timber. That involved 
many of the same players who were involved with the "Gang of 
Four" on Capitol Hill. That task force report was really 
instrumental in accelerating the evolution of ecosystem 
management.423
One of those on the task force destined to become one of the "Gang of 
Four" was Jerry Franklin, a Forest Service researcher University of 
Washington professor soon become well known for his work in "New 
Forestry." Before his work on the Scientific Panel, however, Jack Ward 
Thomas would choose him for the ISC. Another member of the SAF team 
who would later serve on the Scientific Panel was John Gordon, Dean of 
Yale's School of Forestry. Gordon was a tree physiologist by academic 
training, and had earlier taught and researched in the Pacific Northwest.
422 Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
423 Lyons in Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
Regarding this line-up and its relationship to the ISC and the later 
construction of ecosystem management, Thomas places Lyons and his work 
on the SAP committee and the Scientific Panel as central to the development 
of ecosystem management Thomas recalled:
[Lyons] influence goes back before ISC to the genesis of the 
technical consideration of the "old growth" issue. This was the 
SAF [Society of American Foresters] assessment and subsequent 
report on scheduling old-growth timber harvest. Lyons was the 
SAF staffer who organized and guided that effort. When you 
trace the players in the entire old growth issue, there are those 
who continue a role through this entire drama. For example,
Jerry Franklin and I were on the SAF committee staffed by Jim 
Lyons. Lyons did not have anything to do with the ISC, but was 
cognizant of the effort. When Congress tried to make a 
legislative fix, he was Chief of Staff working for the Agriculture 
Committee, and he know all the players for the previous SAF 
effort.424
Franklin, Gordon, Thomas, and Lyons, all who had helped articulate the 
task of linking political demands with the scheduling of old-growth, would 
help construct a solution to this problem.
According to Lyons, the importance of the task force followed from its four 
recommendations, including regarding old-growth as "valuable unto 
itself."425 Lyons recalled:
If you go back and look at the task force report, it had four 
recommendations: It said define old-growth, determine how much 
is there, recognize that old-growth is an ecosystem, and that it is 
valuable unto itself — that was the first time it was ever said and it 
was said by the forestry professionals firs t426
424 Thomas, "Interview," 2.
425 Lyons in Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
426 Ibid.
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Perhaps more importantly, the policy statement explicitly acknowledged 
the political (and potentially whimsical) nature of public forestry — 
developing the multiple-use idea and presaging the rhetoric of the popular 
forestry soon to be developed as the New Perspectives program and as 
Ecosystem Management Policy.427
In the first sentence of the introduction of the SHOG report, the SAF 
committee conceded that, technical questions notwithstanding, "[djedsions 
affecting the preservation and harvest of old-growth will ultimately be made 
through political processes."428 Old-growth policy was a political matter. 
Imposing the constraint of non-declining yield was inappropriate for 
scheduling timber harvest from public lands, it claimed. Rather, the Forest 
Service (and BLM) should determine appropriate harvest and preservation 
levels through the forest planning processes (which by 1984 had become 
highly politicized). Through the planning process, the agendes could 
consider the expanding set of values politically attributed to the national 
forests and plan for the highest utility. According to the task force, "the 
harvest schedule should be determined on the basis of sodal, economic, and 
environmental values found important during the planning process. These 
values collectively represent an appropriate measure for maximizing net 
public benefits."429 The committee had directly linked sodal utility — 
"maximizing net public benefits" — to political values. Presumably, "sodal, 
economic, and environmental," values would be ascertained through 
political demands made in the course of the planning process.430
427 Society of American Foresters, Scheduling, 5.
428 Ibid., 5.
429 Ibid.
480 Ibid.
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Determining harvest would involve treating political demands as "a basis" of 
decision-making; politics would drive the project of social utility.431 The 
process of determining this maximization would require a framework for 
transforming political demands into an old-growth harvest schedule, but the 
SAF committee did not approach the large problem of constructing such a 
framework. That task the ISC would grapple with.
The ISC had a large part in constructing the framework necessary to 
perform the translation of political demands into resource decisions. Among 
those chose was Franklin, who had been on the SAF committee and was 
recently known for New Forestry. Also on the committee were Charles 
Meslow, the Oregon State University professor who had been Eric Foreman's 
academic advisor during his early owl work, and Forsman himself. During 
the same time period, Meslow served on the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
owl listing review committee, and he and Foreman both later served on the 
Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (1993). For the ISC, 
Thomas had assembled a team including consisting entirely of members with 
biology-related backgrounds, ranging from wildlife management to animal 
ecology; none came from other fields, for instance sociology or economics.
Of the ISC members, many were well known among those involved in 
the political conflict around old-growth, and many would continue to play 
key roles in high profile debates regarding old growth. By virtue of its high-
^31 ibid.
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profile membership, the high profile status of the project itself, and the 
mission assigned it, the ISC report would inevitably be a political product, the 
technical nature of the planning process aside. Much of the language in the 
report verified this eventuality, pointing out that, necessarily, biological data 
had only constituted part of the analysis. Other social and politically 
constructed matters had exerted their influence, for instance, history and 
historical land use and ownership, current law, and "culture" and cultural 
constructions of economics and economic "trade-offs." In the ISC report, the 
authors stated:
Our conservation strategy was not, nor could it be, formulated 
solely from biological data. Various Federal and state laws and 
regulations, land ownership patterns, past and present land uses, 
landscape features, existing habitat conditions, current and 
anticipated allocation of forest land to various uses, regional and 
national culture and the reality of trade-offs in all land-use 
decisions also influenced our choices.432
The cultural (and political) negotiation of these trade-offs — particularly 
between timber and an old-growth dependent species — had inevitably 
influenced the team's "choices," presumably those concerning which 
questions to investigate. This negotiation of trade-offs constituted the heart 
of the political dialogue over the national forests, and in this sense, the 
national dialogue had structured the team's decision-making. However, in 
applying themselves to the questions involved, the committee claimed, it 
had remained objective:
To pretend that a workable conservation strategy for the owl can 
be derived and instituted without considering such factors is 
unrealistic We did not, however, feel unduly constrained by 
these realities. Had we concluded that only total cessation of
432 ISC, 8.
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logging in remaining suitable habitat would save the owl, we 
would have so recommended. Conversely, we were equally 
prepared to state that the owl needed no protection, if that were 
indicated.433
Thus, the committee wrote that, though "the best management for the 
northern spotted owl obviously is to preserve all stands of mature and old- 
growth timber within the range of the bird and to grow more such stands as 
soon as possible," it was willing to settle for a more politically palatable 
solution: "Recognizing the real-world situation, however, we will consider a 
less than optimal approach to spotted owl habitat management that will, to 
the extent possible, simultaneously provide a high probability of population 
viability for the northern spotted owl, well-distributed within its range, and 
still allow the cutting of old-growth and mature timber."434 Taking as its 
mission to designate the trade-offs between timber and owl viability, the ISC 
(whatever the intentions of its members, the chartering agencies, Congress, or 
Judge Dwyer), in effect, reified the reduction of public forestry in the Pacific 
Northwest to the trade-off between these two "uses" or benefits.
To gather information regarding owl habitat characteristics, extent and 
location of current owl habitat, and technologies for managing for habitat, the 
ISC consulted with an assortment of "experts," including "wildlife biologists 
experienced in owl management," silviculturists, landscape ecologists, forest 
ecologists, and foresters," as well as "experts in conservation biology and 
landscape ecology."435 Using this information, the committee, working 
through the "delphi process" (designed to help groups of "experts" reach
433 Ibid., 8.
434 Ibid., 11.
435 Ibid., 12.
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"statements") constructed a "rule set," which they then used to choose which 
of the 17 million acres of federal lands they would designate as owl habitat 
(and which they would not). They expressed owl habitat in terms of "Habitat 
Conservation Areas," which were larger but fewer than the "Spotted Owl 
Habitat Areas" (SOHAs) the Forest Service was using at the time. SOHAs, 
which the agency designed to provide habitat for one to three owl pairs, 
apiece, contained contiguous land areas laying within circles of radii ranging 
from 1.5 to 2.1 miles (1,000 to 3000 acres apiece).436 HCAs, by contrast, would 
generally hold at least 20 pairs and would convey many benefits for owl 
ecology, minimizing the effects of "random fluctuations in birth and death 
rates," "habitat fragmentation and edges," and "small scale disturbances" and 
encouraging "juvenile dispersal" and "recruitment" from within.437 Each 
HCA would be placed within 12 miles of another HCA, encouraging 
movement between the blocks, theoretically, increasing rates of genetic flow. 
According to the ISO "Large blocks of habitat capable of supporting multiple 
pairs of owls, and spaced closely enough to facilitate dispersal between blocks, 
are far more likely to ensure a viable population than the current SOHA 
system." The HCAs would also be defined by management objectives — 
particularly the lack of 'logging (including salvage operations) and other 
silvicultural activities (with the exception of stand regeneration)."438
HCAs would constitute the "patches" within the "matrix" of non-owl 
lands — known by the team as "Forest lands outside of HCAs."439 But, the
436 Ibid., 17.
437 Ibid., 3.
438 ibid., 4.
439 ibid., 27.
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team dispensed with "corridors," arguing that owls would not use narrow, 
linear corridors for travel, and opted to encourage owl dispersal by managing 
for stand conditions within the matrix:
We considered dedication corridors of forests between HCAs to 
facilitate dispersal by juvenile owls, but decided corridors were 
unnecessary, provided at least 50% of the forest landbase outside 
of HCAs is maintained in stands of timber with an average d.b.h. 
of 11 inches or greater and at least 40% canopy closure. We also 
rely on lands currently allocated to such uses as riparian 
corridors, streamside management zones and special 
management areas for pileated woodpeckers and pine martens 
to provide additional habitat for dispersing spotted owls.440
The ISC had appropriated the hierarchical, descriptive patch-corridor- 
matrix model of landscape ecology and turned it into a prescriptive forest 
management model.
To create the map, the team devised a rule set, governing the number of 
birds per HCA (roughly, 20 or more pairs), distances between them (no more 
than 12 miles — or 7 miles for the few smaller HCAs), stand conditions in 
"matrix" lands between them (50-11-40 rule), and creating 80 acre old-growth 
HCAs "around activity centers of up to seven known pairs of owls per 
township in the forest matrix."441 Using the HCA concept, the team 
identified 7.1 million acres of spotted owl habitat and over ten million acres 
of matrix on federal lands in the owl region.
The team then conducted viability assessments for ten "physiographic 
provinces" (the "Oregon Cascades East," "Northern California Coast Range,"
440 Ibid., 4.
441 Ibid., 28-29.
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and so on) that it demarcated.442 In this way, the owl resources available in 
each of the subregions would be accountable from the perspective of the 
entire range of the northern spotted owl, giving the team a means by which 
to assess the species' genetic viability as a whole. In context of the mapping, 
the committee produced the framework by which planners could roughly 
translate board feet to spatial area to diminished viability, or increased risk. 
Though risk was rated in subjective, qualitative terms (from "very high" to 
"very low") and not according to numerical indices, the structure represented 
the trade-offs in terms negotiable by some of the less technically minded in 
the political realm. Thus, they were able to describe the trade-offs in terms 
more explicit than available before, making stark the trade-offs. In choosing a 
"less than optimal approach," the team under the aegis of "scientific 
credibility," was in the position of legitimating (again, intentions aside) 
timber as a primary management objective, aside from assuring owl viability. 
Insofar as timber is the only competing use (and virtually always the objective 
for the road-building upon which recreationists later drive) and the major 
determinant of spotted owl habitat, any reference to loss of viability was, in 
essence, a reference to timber harvesting.
The ISC further reified primary status of timber harvesting in its 
development of the idea, found in the New Forestry work, that logging and 
old-growth management, particularly, management for the viability of the 
spotted owl, were compatible. According to the report, "[m]any management 
practices, including those associated with certain timber harvest methods, 
provide habitat attributes conducive to spotted owl dispersal. Examples
442 Ibid., 62,202.
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include visual corridors, riparian corridors, and streamside-management 
zones, all which contain possible stopover spots."443 (Though the structure 
of the first sentence in this passage implies that the following examples 
would pertain to "certain timber harvest methods," it is not clear that 
corridors or streamside management zones are particular to any particular 
one.) The report argued for the possibility that managers could use 
silvicultural practices to promote stand structures that would benefit owl 
viability, though the team was careful to note that the technology was not yet 
available:
Silvicultural prescriptions might be developed that would yield 
significant volumes of wood products while maintaining 
suitable habitat for spotted owls, but we find no clear evidence 
that such prescriptions currently exist. ... Nonetheless, 
examining younger forests where spotted owls reproduce 
successfully should yield valuable insights into silvicultural 
techniques that could produce both wood products and owls.444
The uncertainty and inexperience associated with such silviculture would 
be acknowledged by taking a careful approach of "experimentation," 
involving testing silvicultural treatments followed by careful monitoring. 
The report's authors claimed:
Silvicultural modifications may include producing multilayered 
canopies in stands, and leaving structures such as large trees, 
snags, and fallen trees in place. If such treatments prove 
successful for producing owl habitat, timber sales of certain types 
might eventually be scheduled in [Habitat Conservation Areas].
But such sales can legitimately occur only after conclusive data 
are obtained showing that associated owl populations are stable 
or increasing, and after verifying positive owl responses to 
stands that have been so treated.445
443 Ibid., 27.
444 Ibid., 2
445 Ibid., 37.
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This emphasis on experimentation directly alluded to the idea of 
"adaptive management/' which explicitly advocated "actively adaptive, 
probing, deliberately experimental policies."446 (Forest Service policy makers 
were using this concept in other forums, also, for instance in the New 
Perspectives program, and later, in the production of ecosystem 
management.) With these ideas, the ISC was able to make rhetorical 
deference to the uncertainties of applied sciences and management. On one 
level, the complexity of the population dynamics of the endangered species 
the team was concerned with preserving resulted in uncertainty. On another 
level, the unpredictability of the politics that affected these species added 
uncertainty to management As well as adapting to the uncertainty associated 
with the biological and political, the team had to defer to their consequences, 
as they acknowledged in their report: "[mjonitoring, research, and 
development activities must then continue in a likewise coordinated fashion 
for the conservation strategy to succeed both biologically and politically."447 
Politics, they recognized, would have the last say.
Politics, as it were, would have the last say, but the ISC participants played 
a large part in constructing the language in which the statements would be 
made. Also, using the logic of risk analysis, the team constructed the 
decision-making framework politicians — bureaucratic, congressional, 
executive, or judiciary — would use to guide their decisions. The ISC had 
constructed a rough structure for designating and comparing trade-offs, which 
the Scientific Panel, made up some of the same people, would refine.
446 Walters,-Adaptive Management vii.
447 ISC, 43.
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Report of the Scientific Panel (May. 1991-October, 1991)
In 1990, as Congress was in the process of "entertain[ing] intervention,"
Jim Lyons, staff forester for the House Agriculture Committee, was 
orchestrating the formation of the Scientific Panel ("Gang of Four") in an 
effort "to get things going by providing members of Congress with a menu of 
options from which they could build forest protection legislation."448 
Apparently, "Lyons persuaded Harold Volkmer, the Missouri Democrat who 
chaired the forestry subcommittee of House Agriculture [who was a active 
protection advocate], to appoint the four to a new team that would develop 
options for protecting owls and other old-growth spedes."449
Like the ISC, the committee induded a high-profile group of players. Jack 
Ward Thomas, still Chief Research Wildlife Biologist for the Forest Service 
Pacific Northwest Research Station, had barely finished leading the ISC. Jerry 
Franklin also had recently partidpated in writing the ISC owl strategy, and 
when chosen for the Panel, he was an active force in the Forest Service's 
"New Perspectives" program.450 John Gordon, still Dean of the Yale Forestry 
school, had chaired the SAF committee. Having worked in the Pacific 
Northwest on old-growth forests, (induding work with Franklin) and having 
been "Dean of the old school of forestry," he had gained some credibility; 
working with Lyons on the SAF committee and having testified before 
Congress before regarding old-growth, he had gained political exposure.451 
Thus, he was a sensible pick from a political point of view. Norm Johnson, a
44  ̂Durbin, Tree Huggers, 168.
449 Ibid., 168.
45  ̂ See Chapter 6.
451 Gordon, "Interview," 4.
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professor at Oregon State University, had helped invent FORPLAN, the 
linear programming model that the Forest Service used to construct its forest 
plans and had worked with both Gordon, who had been Dean at OSU in the 
1960s.452
The Panel's report was an elaboration and refinement of the ideas in the 
ISC, put in even more overtly political form. This resulted in a menu of 
management options and a projection of their consequences for comparison 
of their respective timber and wildlife trade-offs. Using much of the 
inventory data organized under the ISC, the team delineated management 
areas in "the owl forests" that were supervised by the Forest Service and BLM 
into various qualities of "late-successional/old-growth" (LSOG) including 
three classes, ranging from "most ecologically significant," to "ecologically 
significant," to "the remainder."453 Again, the division reflected the 
landscape ecology model, using it as zoning structure as it had done with the 
ISC report. "Ecologically significant" lands, upon which logging would be 
most severely constrained, corresponded with the patches, while "the 
remainder" would correspond with matrix lands. But these background 
lands were not background from a political point of view, because any rule 
applied to them, particularly the team's 50-11-40 rule, would affect timber 
harvests.454 In the team's words: "Applying the 50-11-40 rule generally 
lowers the harvest rate on the available forest-Iand base."455
452 Johnson, "Is FORPLAN obsolete?"
45^ Scientific Panel on Late-Successional Forests of the Pacific Northwest. "Alternatives for 
Management of Late Successional Forests of the Pacific northwest," 2. (Hereafter, Scientific 
Panel.)
454 The 50-11-40 rule stipulates that at least 50 percent of a stand be forested with trees 
averaging at least 11 inches in diameter at breast height with a canopy closure of at least 40 
percent.
455 Ibid., 60.
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The team then drew up a range of alternatives variously emphasizing 
timber and wildlife objectives, expanding wildlife objectives to include 
retention of enough old-growth forest to assure the viability of old-growth 
"associated species/' "viable populations of northern spotted owl," and 
"providing adequate habitat on federal land for marbled murrelet nesting, for 
other... associated species, and for sensitive fish species and stocks."456 In its 
projected consequences, the Panel used risk analysis to consider effects on the 
expanded set of wildlife concerns as well as expanding its estimated effects 
upon timber production to include economic analysis of job losses.
The Panel constructed its twelve alternatives in reference to the combined 
land management plans from the various BLM districts and Forest Service 
Forests in the owl forests:
An alternative starts with the land allocation from a variation 
on the Forest Plans that emphasizes wood production 
(Alternative 1) or from the land allocation in the Forest Plans 
(all of the alternatives). Then any or all of the following are 
added: (1) additional reserves (HCAs from the ISC strategy and 
the modified ISC strategy or an LS/OG network), (2) a watershed 
and fish option (current, watershed /  fish emphasis option), and 
(3) a management option for lands outside of reserves.457
As with the ISC report, the Panel structured its risk analysis in subjective 
terms, this time using a "seven-point scale of ranking ranging from 'very low' 
to 'very high.' A very low probability indicated a low chance (considerably 
less than 50 percent) of attaining the above objectives, while moderate 
approximated a 50/50 chance. A high probability indicated a high likelihood
456 Ibid., 4.
457 ibid., 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
or reliability (over 90 percent) of meeting the objectives."458 The Panel was 
not explicit about its argument for constructing the various levels nor about 
the certainty (confidence level) of the system. In its application of the rating 
system, the Panel was unable to use an algorithmic or automated process of 
evaluating alternatives, owing to inadequate data. Rather, the team used a 
communicative process, perusing previous research work and drawing 
conclusions as a group:
We conducted the risk analysis with the assistance of scientists 
who are expert in the species being considered. With their help, 
we reviewed the available literature and evidence on the 
habitats of the species being rated and then applied this 
knowledge to create the risk ratings.459
Next the group authors claimed:
We did the analysis without sophisticated models, but the data 
base for most species does not support such analysis at this time.
In addition, we did it in a short time. Still we are confident that, 
in general, further analysis would at most shift the results by 
one level either way.460
In table form, the report associated the various alternatives with the 
viability of five wildlife objectives (to use the term "wildlife" rather loosely), 
including protection of a "functional Late-Successional/Old-Growth 
network," "viable spotted owl populations," marbled murrelet nesting 
habitat, "other LS/ OG species" habitat, and "habitat for sensitive fish 
species /  stocks."461
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid., 7.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid., 31.
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The report also associated the alternatives with timber yield projections, as 
well as projecting "job losses," particularly associated with the timber 
industry, enabling Congressional members to compare trade-offs between 
timber and wildlife viability. Of the various political-economic effects 
possible — for example, the encouragement of other forms of economic 
production such as recreation — the team focused on the trade-offs between 
wildlife and timber. When presenting the panel's findings at a joint hearing 
before the House of Representatives committees that commissioned the 
report, Thomas referred to the charts in the report demonstrating the trade­
offs.462 Thomas testified: "What I want you to see in those charts is there is a 
dramatic cost benefit effect here. Additional levels of protection of assurance 
of achieving the objective [providing a viable owl plan] come at significant 
cost, in terms of the economy and in terms of jobs."463 In focusing upon this 
particular trade-off, the panel effectively strengthened the primacy of these 
particular uses that had defined the history of the ancient forest issue.
Concluding Remarks
The reports of the ISC and the Scientific Panel (and the internal teams' 
political process that they represented) formed the language and framework 
by which the Forest Service and other land management bureaucracies that 
became involved in "Ecosystem Management" were to appropriate science 
and scientific texts. They also foreshadowed the role the agency would take in 
the future, which consisted of providing a framework — including 
terminology and methodology -- for politicians, particularly Congress — to
462 Ibid., 34.
463 Thomas, in U.S. House Subcommittees, Joint Hearing on Review of the Report, 23.
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refer to when politically divvying up the Pacific Northwest forests and 
administering the politically prescribed uses. Thomas repeatedly emphasized 
this role of agency science in his testimony before Congress:
The old-growth research program has listed those species.
Essentially what we're saying is "here, that's for you to decide.
Here's our level of knowledge. Here's the risk assessments 
associated given that level of knowledge. How much do you want 
to spend to be how safe?"464
Later in the same testimony, Thomas reiterated his message, informing
Congress of his role vis-a-vis them: "That's the entire object of this report,
that there are levels of uncertainty, there are levels of risk, and they have
very high cost associated with them. But a scientist or a professional biologist
is not the person to make those calls."465 Thomas might not have been the
person to make those calls, but as team leader of both the ISC and Scientific
Panel report, he had a great amount of influence.
In the House joint hearing where the Panel discussed its report with 
Congress, Harold Volkmer (D-Missouri), Chairman, who had chartered the 
panel, forecast when he rhetorically asked Panel member Norm Johnson: 
"Basically, as I read the report, and I remember the statement, we're looking at 
ways to now manage the national forests and public lands up there on an 
ecosystem approach. Is that correct?"466 Johnson affirmed. According to 
panel member John Gordon, the connection between the Scientific Panel and 
the later Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team project three 
years later (FEMAT, again led by Thomas) is direct: "It set the framework for
464 Ibid., 30.
465 Ibid., 35.
46*> Volkmer in US. House Subcommittees, Joint Hearing on Review of the Report, 24.
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the FEMAT process, which was basically an elaboration of what we did there, 
and Jack led that, so it was a direct connection."467 In this sense, both reports 
represent the political appropriation of several years of discourse concerning 
old-growth forest ecology, the spotted owl, the economics of timber cutting, 
biodiversity, rural sociology, conservation biology, and landscape biology, to 
name but a few. This effort was a synthesis of these discourses -- discourses 
that themselves focus upon referents produced and reproduced by society at 
large and are reflected in the media of the day.
As important texts defining the allocative trade-offs of these desired 
referents, the ISC report and the Scientific Panel report set the terms of 
negotiation for the planning process that would later become known as 
ecosystem management. The report of the ISC — a radically political 
document — signified the mapping out of the costs and benefits of 
management in terms of the demands that were the most politically 
important at the time — owls and timber. The "Scientific Panel" expanded 
upon the ideas in the ISC document to include more species — including the 
politically important salmon. Though the Forest Service adopted neither the 
strategy of the ISC nor the preferred alternative of the panel, these texts 
formed the prototypes of the "ecosystem management" framework for 
designating and allocating "resources" (translatable into "uses" or "benefits," 
and later, "desired future conditions") and accounting for their trade-offs — 
particularly, timber for endangered and threatened species.468 As well, the 
reports established and legitimated the process by which the Forest Service 
would appropriate science (as a process as well as a body of text) in the era of
467 Gordon, "Interview," 6.
468 Ibid., 6; Thomas, "Interview," 1
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Ecosystem Management. Teams would produce scientific statements using a 
process wherein scientists with expertise (based upon primary research and 
literature) would negotiate qualitative statements regarding the effects of 
management upon the viability of species. Both teams produced models 
using the logic of "risk analysis," and while particular variable values might 
change according to the process of scientific revision, and while variables 
(such as endangered species) might be added or subtracted, the organizing 
principles would remain the same.
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Chapter 7
Poly Science: The New Perspectives Program
Perhaps, after all, modem capitalism is a great factory for 
the production o f angels.
— Sol Yurich 
Metatron
By the end of 1989, the Forest Service had become aware that its current 
approach to forest planning was not working in the Pacific Northwest, 
particularly in the face of the injunction on timber harvesting imposed in 
March. Constraints imposed by the legal protection of the northern spotted 
owl directly conflicted with timber planning. So did political demands made 
by old-growth advocates for protection of wildlife habitat, "biodiversity," 
water quality, and ecological processes, preservation of "intangible values" 
(aesthetic, ethical, sacred or "spiritual"), and production of "recreation 
opportunities." But selling stumpage had long been the central priority of 
the Forest Service, which was strongly influenced by the timber industry and 
its friends in Congress.
The Forest Service found itself in the position of having to reconcile these 
demands or have a solution forced by Congress, while the courts were 
consistently deciding against the agency in context of the spotted owl. Dale 
Robertson, then Chief, remembers that "we were losing court cases. ... [W]e 
were kind of getting cornered with the Endangered Species Act and losing our 
flexibility to manage the land."469
469 Robertson, "Interview," 4.
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The creation of the "New Perspectives" program was the Forest Service's 
response to this impasse — a program that the agency had recently 
conceptualized as a way of getting itself out of "the crossfire" of political 
conflict over unroaded and old-growth lands.470 The politically based 
program was an administrative answer to politics — the agency's response to 
an expanding and often conflicting set of political demands. Associate Chief 
(at the time) George Leonard later reflected:
I think the thing that finally triggered New Perspectives and 
which evolved — in terms of the Forest Service program ~ into 
Ecosystem Management, was the continued level of appeals and 
lawsuits that raised those kinds of issues — the endangered 
species issues and issues like island bio-geography in the lake 
states and whatnot, all of which we found that the traditional 
approaches towards the management of the timber resources, in 
particular, didn't satisfactorily address.471
All these conflicting demands — or "values" in Forest Service language472 —
signified politically-demanded goods and the Forest Service's mandate was to
somehow reconcile them. New Perspectives was the vehicle by which the
agency attempted this reconciliation by devising a set of forest management
principles (derived, for instance, from adaptive management and new
forestry) and applying them to various prototypical "projects" at the district
level — on "project level planning efforts."473 This chapter traces the history
of the Forest Service's political production of the New Perspectives program,
outlines the principles and framework developed by the Washington Office
staff, and discusses one of the program's most significant pilot projects — the
470 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 32.
471 Leonard, "Interview," 2.
472 U.S.DA, Forest Service, New Perspectives Program. "Memo"; New Perspectives, New 
Times.
47  ̂ U.S.Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest. Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, 1-2.
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Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Project, Siskiyou National 
Forest, Oregon.
Dreaming up New Perspectives (Tune 1989-December 1989)
In June, 1989, Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson appeared at a joint 
hearing before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms and 
Energy (of the Committee on Agriculture) and the Subcommittee on 
National Parks and Public Lands (Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs). 
Robertson said: "Old-growth forests are really important."474 The joint 
hearings specifically concerned the "Management of Old-Growth Forests of 
the Pacific Northwest," and in this context, Robertson added, "They include a 
lot of values such as biological diversity, wildlife, fisheries habitat, esthetics, 
water quality as well as industrial raw material values."475 The Chief went 
on to implore that, "we have to reach some kind of a reasonable balance in 
managing this valuable environmental and economic asset."476 Presumably, 
the "we" included all stake-holders, while the Forest Service considered itself 
to be the proper arbitrator of "reason."
In October 1989, Robertson again appeared before Congress to discuss the 
Forest Service's strategy for coping with the controversy around old-growth 
management, particularly in owl country, or in Robertson's words, to discuss 
strategies to help the agency "through some difficult times."477 Again,
474 Robertson, 'Testimony/'June 22.1989,478-79.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 Robertson, Testimony," October 1989,24.
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Robertson appealed to reason and balance: "Somehow we have to work 
together to try to manage through this situation and arrive at some kind of a 
sensible, reasonable, balance approach to managing these forests."478 
Robertson repeatedly uses these terms — "sensible," "reasonable," and 
"balance" in this address.479 Robertson argued that the Forest Service, 
through its rational planning process, was still the right agency for this task, 
telling Congress, "I believe the planning process has worked reasonably 
well."480 According to Robertson, much of the turmoil the Forest Service 
faced resulted from changing times, but given some "flexibility," the agency 
could make the planning process work: 'Times change. Needs of people 
change. Resource conditions change. New thinking comes along — like old 
growth — and we need the flexibility to deal with those changes as they 
occur."481
Robertson, having referenced "new thinking," submitted a written report 
announcing to the committee that the Forest Service was working on a new 
program, "New Perspectives." The program would attempt to strike this 
"reasonable balance" and appease the public by providing for "diverse 
values," particularly ecological concerns, in addition to — but not at the 
expense of — timber: "'New Perspectives in Forestry7 reflects our recognition 
of the need to continue to produce traditional forest products and provide for 
traditional forest uses while being more responsive to public concerns for all
478 ibid., 24.
479 ibid., 26.
480 ibid., 25.
481 Ibid., 25.
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forest values."482 A month later, George Leonard, Associate Chief, testified 
to a House subcommittee regarding the New Perspectives concept:
Basically, the idea is to combine knowledge of forest and 
rangeland ecosystems and landscapes with appropriate elements 
of traditional management practices. The objective is to develop 
management systems that will continue to provide for sustained 
production of commodities, such as wood and forage, while also 
providing a wider range of noncommodity values, such as 
wildlife and fish habitat, water quality, and recreational 
opportunities.483
Robertson recalls that he decided to adopt the term "New Perspectives" 
after frantic negotiation among Washington Office staffers preparing for the 
hearings, opting for a compromise term that insinuated a change in the 
agency's modus operandi without fully adopting the contentious term, "new 
forestry." The Chief had first heard the term only the day before the hearings. 
Reflecting upon the events, Robertson commented:
I didn't come up with that term. I remember some of my staff 
didn't like "New Forestry." We were facing some Congressional 
hearings in Congress that I had to testify about something. I 
don't even remember the topic — I guess it was about what we 
were doing about New Forestry and that sort of thing. So, my 
staff, really working on the testimony, came up with this word 
"New Perspectives." I don't know if I would have come up with 
it, but I was the one who had to announce it, because I had to go 
to the Congressional hearing and talk about a new program, a 
new initiative, and it was "New Perspectives" — a new 
perspective.484
Robertson recalls that the term was not only new to him, but the concept 
was also somewhat vague: "I can remember the staff came in for my 
testimony and briefed me and I saw this new term, "New Perspectives,” and I
482 Ibid., 102.
488 Leonard, "Statement," 38-39.
484 Robertson, "Interview," 2.
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asked them, now tell me what that means."485 As Robertson remembers it, 
the staff explained the concept as a sort of expanded forestry — "a broader 
perspective both geographically as well as the spectrum of values we were 
trying to perpetuate through time."486 He added:
Basically what it meant was a broader look at forestry. Again, we 
weren't in the Ecosystem Management yet, but it was a new 
perspective looking at, first, the whole spectrum of values of a 
forest that we needed to maintain over time; and then the other 
aspect was the looking at the broader area, you know, and they 
came up with the landscape area as opposed to a smaller area.487
Robertson was not completely comfortable with the term, especially 
insofar as it reflected the controversial "new forestry." But political 
expediency required some action, and Robertson went with the advice of his 
staff, adopting what he recognized as a political term. He noted:
I remember saying in the meeting, "Well, I don't particularly 
relate to New Perspectives but I relate to what you're trying to 
portray." And they asked me the same question, "Do you have a 
better term?" and I said "no." I didn't have a better term. So, I 
think New Perspectives was kind of ... I was having to go to 
Congress to testify, it was where we kind of coined the term, and 
you know there's something new in the Forest Service, so it was 
kind of a more compatible, political term to describe what 
Franklin was callin g  New Forestry. So I just didn't have a better 
term and we were facing a deadline of about 24 hours. I said 
"well, unless I can come up with a better term we'll just go with
it."488
The top-line officers were unable to articulate the program in any precise 
way, but they were generally aware that "something new" was advisable, and 
the increasingly familiar "new forestry" would provide some of the 
substance. Robertson recalls that, "again it was... just kind of a label that we
485 Ibid., 2.
486 Ibid., 2.
487 Ibid., 2.
488 Ibid., 3.
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pretty much put on Jerry Franklin’s work — it was probably modified as it 
came through the management process —to reflect that this is something 
new."489 Associate Chief Leonard later reflected upon New Perspectives as a 
sort of vague polyglot of features that signified something new, stating:
The term New Perspectives was kind of an accidental thing, but 
it was to get across the idea that we wanted people to look at our 
forests with some new perspective, not the traditional timber 
and big game perspectives and in effect said that "you’re 
empowered to go out and deal with some of these new ideas that 
a few people are putting out in the professional publications and 
whatnot."490
The Washington Office of the Forest Service, facing political w rath from 
all fronts, had created a term, New Perspectives, that might afford the agency 
some "flexibility to manage the land," without knowing exactly what the 
term meant. It had created a signifier which it was in the position to fill.
The Contents: Filling the signifier of New Perspectives from Dr. Salwasser's 
Medicine Bag
The Forest Service directorate had promised to Congress that it would 
produce a "new perspective," though they did not seem to know what such 
an object would be. To accomplish this double task of inventing and 
administering a new perspective, the agency needed a new departm ent — a 
"program." To this end, the Washington Office began to assemble the staff 
and prepare and official charter. According to Hal Salwasser, chosen to lead 
the project
489 Ibid., 3.
490 Leonard, 'Interview," 3.
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[A] week or two before the Christmas holiday [1989] they called 
me in -- I was the Deputy Director of Wildlife and Fisheries at 
the time — they called me in  and asked me if I would accept the 
job of heading up this New Perspectives effort. And somewhere 
in that period, between the hearing in September [1989] and 
when they formalized the charter for this New Perspective thing 
[April, 1991], it took on the name "New Perspective for 
Managing the National Forest System." And it had, as some of 
its principles, that it was going to be a management-research 
partnership.491
Salwasser was already familiar with political proceedings at the 
Washington Office. Through much of his tenure in Washington, he had 
been a successful bureaucrat, serving in the interesting role of keeping the 
Forest Service abreast of changes in mainstream political opinion. For 
instance, in 1986, he served as senior natural-resource analyst for the 
"President's Commission on Americans Outdoors," providing "technical 
expertise," conducting workshops, and publishing findings and 
recommendations regarding recreation vis-a-vis environmental quality, 
greenways, and wildlife, fisheries, and water.492
As a senior analyst earlier in the 1980s, Salwasser had played roles 
epitomizing the agency's post-NFMA and -NEPA mandate of 
interdisciplinary planning and management, seeking reconciliation between 
planning and management and newly formed bureaucratic concerns such as 
"biodiversity," "viable populations," and "cumulative effects analysis." 
During his tenure in Wildlife and Fisheries, Salwasser developed and 
promoted programs reflecting his "multiple-resource outlook," based on the
491 Salwasser, "Interview," 3. Salwasser, a long-time Forest Service bureaucrat, reflected his 
acculturation into the bureaucratic worldview — deference to officers up the line of command — 
by following this quotation by noting that "I ended up reporting to the two deputy chiefs 
simulataneously, Sessco and Overbay." Ibid.
492 Salwasser, "Curriculum Vitae," 2.
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proposition that managers can and should produce wildlife in a rational 
framework. To the 47th North American Wildlife Conference (1982), he 
implored that "to fulfill the responsibilities for wildlife and fish habitat on 
lands managed for all resources, decision makers need specific and accurate 
information on the capabilities of land areas to produce wildlife and fish and 
the probable consequences of alternative management prescriptions for 
wildlife and fish and their habitats."493
Through his writings, Salwasser developed the concept that the agency 
could manage forests to please all — excepting the "me-first forces in our 
society," who "are pulling us apart as every special interest wants its exclusive 
slice of the pie."494 These "extremists," he believed, had created "the vision 
for how forests should be managed," as well as describing "what constitutes 
excellence in performance," and had sabotaged "common ground for the 
long-term public good," creating "a nearly impossible task for those who are 
asked to craft policies and programs that seek balance among conflicting 
values and uses, harmony between people and land — like us."495 The agency 
had to be the ultimate arbiter of what was reasonable and harmonious.
In a similar vein, Salwasser was concerned with efficiency in the 
production of goods and services from the National Forests.496 His 
enthusiasm and optimism in this regard was especially apparent in a
493 Nelson and Salwasser, "The Forest Service Wildlife and Fish," 174.
494 Salwasser, "New Perspectives for New Realities," 5. This title implies Salwasser's 
awareness that, for the agency, reality was multiple and relative.
49  ̂ Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 34; and Ibid., 5.
496 Ibid.
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statement made at the 1985 Society of American Foresters Annual 
Convention, where he likens the managed forest to a factory:
It is a rich and exciting time to be involved in forestry in this 
country. The fruits of our labors serve more people's needs than 
ever before; enriching their lives greatly through diverse, high 
quality products and experiences. The source is the managed 
forest. Where else can you find a factory with such wonderful 
products as clear grain white pine, elk, pure water, veneer 
walnut, wild turkeys, wilderness recreation, colorful 
woodpeckers, trout, bass, and salmon? This diversity of products 
is found only in managed forests that are tended by innovative 
professionals schooled in a broad spectrum of resource 
disciplines. The multiple-use forest, planned according to 
integrated, interdisciplinary, multi-interest, ecosystem concepts 
is coming on line.497
To realize this utilitarian view of the forest required both a concern with 
the social work of technology transfer and aggressive marketing to the 
public.498 According to Salwasser, the success of the factory model of forestry 
depended upon two prerequisite projects:
(1) Help resource managers know how to get the most out of 
their efforts in integrated forestry — that is Technology Transfer 
to make better uses of new methodologies, and (2) market the 
success stories in integrated forestry -- that is, and aggressive 
sales and advertising effort at all levels of society to get the 
message out on what multiple use forestry is doing for people.499
Apparently, by mid-decade, a lack of "specific and accurate information on 
the capabilities of land areas to produce wildlife and fish and the probable 
consequences of alternative management prescriptions for wildlife and fish 
and their habitats" was not enough to discourage Salwasser from aggressively 
promoting many of the same goals that the New Perspectives program would 
later adopt. Uncertainty was inherent, he argued, insofar as "no two species,
497 Salwasser, Holthausen, and Darden, "Using Wildlife and Fish," 170.
498 In a situation like this, the line between "marketing" and "propaganda" is indiscemable.
499 Salwasser, Holthausen, and Darden, "Using Wildlife and Fish," 170.
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populations, or management situations are identical" and, therefore, 
"universally valid generalizations about minimum population sizes... are not 
possible. Each case must be judged on its merits, and each case will be clouded 
with uncertainty. We always lack full knowledge of a spedes' biology, habitat 
needs, and population dynamics. We can never be certain that habitats will 
respond to treatments exactly as expected."500' Further, nature can be 
"random and beyond our control"; disturbances could change large areas of 
forest, reduce viability of a spedes, and eliminate management possibilities, 
altogether.
Salwasser concluded that since uncertainty was inherent, and since the 
Forest Service had a mandate to manage and produce goods and service, the 
agency must proceed in the face of uncertainty. But, he argued, forest 
managers must use the best in sdentific tools — particularly "risk 
management," towards the goal of an integrated multiple-use management: 
"to make prudent land use dedsions regarding viable wildlife populations we 
must use existing knowledge and experience to convert uncertainty into 
actions designed to meet the goal."501
Salwasser argued that the agency could manage for the entire range of 
political demands, given the flexibility; his directorship of the suitably 
ambiguous New Perspectives production apparently presented the 
opportunity. Once the Forest Service had committed itself to the new 
program, Salwasser and others in the Washington Office had to dedde what 
the new program would be. According to Salwasser:
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
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After having said [that the Forest Service was going to explore 
some new perspectives in forestry] in a hearing in September or 
October, we had to put a team of people together to figure out 
what it was we just committed to. So there was an 
interdisciplinary group in the Washington Office that had 
Nelson Waftus from Silviculture Research and it had Ed Slater 
from Range Ecology, and three or four other guys -some of the 
more ecologically oriented people in the Washington Office Staff 
as an interdisciplinary group to lay out a set of ideas for what this 
New Perspective search would be.502
After the preliminary conceptualizing, Salwasser began work on 
assembling a team to articulate the contents of the new program and set to 
work promoting it within the agency as well as to the academic community, 
environmental and industry activists, professional groups, and politicians:
I started on the project in January or February of 1990 and I 
recruited a very small team of people: Chip Cartright off of the 
Jefferson National Forest and Jim Caplin of Planter on the 
Bridger Teton and Winnie Kessler who was an ecologist for the 
Fish and Wildlife staff out of Logan, Utah. But they didn't start 
showing up until May and June. So, between February and May 
and June, I spent a lot of time going out and visiting people and 
seeing what they were doing and getting their ideas, for what we 
should be trying to accomplish with this New Perspective 
opportunity.503
Soon Salwasser organized a convention, inviting representatives from 
professional groups and mainstream political interest groups to formulate 
"some guiding principles." Then, he began to encourage field level 
demonstration of some of these emerging New Perspectives principles. 
Salwasser later recalled:
Then we hosted a workshop in Philadelphia and invited 
seventy-some odd people to come in for several days, and half of 
the people were not Forest Service people. By design we opened
502 Salwasser, "Interview," 2.
5°3 Ibid., 4.
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it up to try to get a broad spectrum of ideas. We had people from 
what you might consider traditional view points: Society of 
American Foresters, the Wood Products Industry, and we also 
had people from the conservation community — National 
Wildlife Federation and that sort. And, we came out of that 
workshop with some guiding principles, and that stimulated us 
to engage the field folks in putting forward a series of projects 
that would exemplify managing for diversity of values in the 
land and team work between science and management. It 
expanded beyond Forest Service research to approve university 
type folks and the partnership idea. 504
The New Perspectives program had now constructed a conceptual 
framework from which to proceed. This conceptual framework was 
organized around a set of substantive management "principles," to be 
implemented at the planning and analysis stages of management, which 
would proceed according to the procedural principles that the New 
Perspectives team had assembled.
The Filling: the Text of New Perspectives
The architects of New Perspectives synthesized the program's textual 
substance from diverse sources, themselves filled with political content by 
players (scientists) in a political struggle. The emerging discourses known as 
landscape ecology and conservation biology constituted significant textual 
sources, as did proposals for their application to silviculture and forest 
management, particularly by "the Andrews group."505 New Perspectives also 
appropriated ideas from discourses on planning process, particularly the 
concept of "Adaptive Management," reflecting the centrality of social 
processes in producing conservation biology and landscape ecology. Both of
504 Ibid.
505 So named in Swanson, "The People Behind the New Forestry."
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these discourses, which emphasized questions of methodology and technique 
— the "scientific process," in which interpretation and "art" were notably 
active — had emerged in a high-stakes political environment.506
Salwasser, in turn, linked statements common to these fields to the 
concept of multiple use and the emerging literature emphasizing the term 
"sustainable" — "sustainable development, sustainable forestry," and so 
forth.507 According to Salwasser, New Perspectives was a form of 
"sustainable ecosystem management," and though he was not sure what that 
meant, he believed it to be "an elaboration of the concept of multiple benefit, 
sustained yield resource management."508 Insofar as "multiple benefit" was 
merely a euphemism for multiple use, Ecosystem Management affirmed the 
agency's mandate for "multiple use, sustained-yield."509 According to 
Salwasser and staff, developing this "sustainable ecosystem management," as 
the cause celebre of New Perspectives, involved three general goals.510
The first goal would be to "broaden" the concept of multiple-use. This 
broadening took place on two levels. First, and most important, New 
Perspectives would "broaden the concept of multiple use to include multiple 
value, and extend the concept of sustained yield to sustainability of all the 
values and uses of healthy ecosystems."511 Multiple-values would include 
health and function in the national forests, as well as the availability of
506 por instance, see SouI£, "What is Conservation Biology?" 1.
507 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
508 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 35.
509 ibid., and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
510 ibid.; Ibid.
511 Salwasser,"Gaining Perspective," 36.
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diverse management options. Kathy Johnson, ranger of the Gold Beach 
district of the Siskiyou National Forest, appeared in the Forest Service 
promotional video, New Times: New Perspectives in Forestry, promising 
that New Forestry would "allow us to keep our options open," and "save a 
healthy, functioning forest"512 In literature that the New Perspectives team 
circulated to the regional offices (1991), this was an affirmation of the agency's 
mandate to multiple use, but with an "ecological" perspective. As a result, 
the authors of the foundational memo proclaimed:
This direction reaffirms sustainable, multiple-use management.
But it is multiple use with a difference. It is strongly based on 
ecological concepts to assure that resource management sustains 
the health and productivity of the land. And it emphasizes a 
better balance among the many values and uses of land.513
Managing for such "balance" would mean protecting "the most sensitive 
elements and processes of the land community from degradation, especially 
the rare species, wetlands, old-growth forests, and processes that sustain 
productivity and provide resiliency to stress"; recovering "the endangered 
species and restor[ing] areas and ecological process degraded by past practices"; 
meeting "people's needs through economically sound, sustainable uses of the 
land and its goods and services... without impairing the continued vitality of 
the land"; regenerating "healthy, resilient, and productive land... with an eye 
towards natural health, diversity, long-term productivity, and the esthetic 
and spiritual values that derive from such accomplishments"; and 
integrating "management, research, and monitoring to allow management to 
become a grand learning opportunity, from which periodic adjustments are 
made."514
512 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times: New Perspectives in Forestry.
U.S.D.A., Forest Service, "Memo: New Perspectives," 1.
514 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
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A key and unifying concept in the New Perspectives rhetoric was 
management for "biodiversity" as a natural resource. According to its 1990 
Resources Planning Act Program, "the Forest Service views conservation of 
biological diversity as a multiple-use issue, not simply a land preservation 
scheme."515 The team presented biodiversity — and, more generally, merely 
"diversity" -- as "values" that manifested in many forms of analysis, for 
instance as "structural," "functional," or "compositional diversity" 
(respectively, diversity of spatial and temporal forms, processes, and 
spedes).516
Diversity was to be analyzed on various scales, from the stand level to the 
regional level, introducing another term given great coinage by the New 
Perspectives staff — "managing according to scale." By maintaining and 
enhancing biodiversity — using old-growth forests to learn from — the Forest 
Service could construct a "managed forest" that would allow for a sustained 
supply of goods as well as maintaining "ecological values." In the words of 
Franklin, again speaking via the New Perspectives video: "Nature put her 
forests together in a very different way than we've been putting forests 
together, and what lessons we can learn from these old forests we can then 
put to work in creating a different kind of managed forest.517
In addition, Salwasser and his team implied a more subtle modification of 
multiple-use — a shift from allocating different zones to timber or non-timber
515 Excerpted from the Forest Service, Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources: A Long- 
Term Strategic Plan, 1990," in Rockwell, "RPA — The Sleeping Giant," 11.
516 Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
517 U S .D A , Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives.
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uses (through the process of designating certain lands to "suitable timber 
base") to managing for different uses on the same piece of land — or, in the 
words of Bill Atkinson, then manager of Oregon State University's 
experimental forest — a shift from managing for "a single, dominant use, 
spatially separated," toward managing for "several uses on the same piece of 
forest land."518 According to the program's promotional video, New Times: 
New Perspectives in Forestry, "Everyone wants their piece of the Forest. And 
the impression has been given that only by slicing up the pie can the various 
interests and values be served. But the new perspective of the Forest Service 
is that pie slicing no longer works, and is unnecessary."519
The film then featured Jerry Franklin — as Forest Service and University 
of Washington scientist. Franklin promoted the New Perspective's mixed 
use approach using the language of silviculture. In his statement, Franklin 
alluded to clear-cutting, but carefully avoided using the term. According to 
his view:
There's absolutely no reason why we have to continue to go 
through the pie slicing process. What we do have to do, 
however, is move away from these dichotomies — as with, for 
example, "there's no choice but clean-cut forestry or selection 
m anagem ent."520
This switch in the meaning of multiple-use implied that the management 
of special reserves was obsolete. In the New Perspectives video, Lynn 
Burdett, then ranger on the Blue River district of the Willamette National
518 Atkinson, "Another View of Forestry," 1.
519 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives. Proposed changes to the Forest 
Service planning regulations would have eliminated designating "suitable" timberlands — a 
process that had been set in place to implement section 6 (k) of NFMA. See McQuillan, "Wolf 
in Sheep's Clothing."
520 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives. The use of "clean-cut" is not a 
misspelling.
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Forest -- the "top timber producer in the U.S." — alluded to this implication. 
Interestingly, only minutes (film time) after the film's narrator claimed that 
New Perspectives was abandoning the pie-slicing metaphor, Burdett 
resurrected it in another form — the pie would remain, but it would be 
- reduced to include only what forests were left to negotiate for. In her words: 
"The pie is getting much smaller and it's difficult to imagine that it will work 
very well to have reserves and highly intensively managed areas under our 
old way of doing business and meet the ecological objectives that we might 
want to."521 Pie slicing would be out; mixed forestry would be the new 
perspective.
The second goal of "sustainable ecosystem management" was to "expand 
forestry as applied science from a tree orientation to a forest orientation by 
integrating biological, physical, social, and political sciences."522 This goal 
reflected Salwasser's earlier experience in synthesizing scientific texts into 
administrative language. The agency would do its "integrating" in the 
context of cooperative research arrangements between the agency and 
universities, between the agency and other agencies (especially those in 
Interior) and in forest planning, linking managers and scientists (using a 
model analogous to the Scientific Panel). The Forest Service would create 
"close partnerships between managers, researchers, and educators."523
This procedural concern — the formation of research partnerships, 
especially in the interest of studying old-growth ecosystems for knowledge
521 Ibid.
522 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 37.
523 Ibid., 37.
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useful to silvicultural management — was to become a main focus of the 
agency, and all concerned groups would be included. According to Salwasser:
Applying these lessons in order to maintain ecological values 
and produce a sustained supply of goods has been a major focus 
of research conducted in a partnership involving the national 
forests and the research branch of the Forest Service. Other 
partners are universities, the forest products industry, 
environmental groups, and those who represent other personal 
and public interests.524
This would be a democratic, inclusive science project, but it would include 
experimentation on a grand scale, including "megascience projects for natural 
resources that capture the imagination of the best and brightest intellects — 
like the Apollo project did for space."525 But, while grand, the science would 
still be a people's science — with an emphasis on utility and action, rather 
than the product of a detached, elite scientific community. According to the 
program's video:
New Perspectives research is not some esoteric, test tube 
experiment. It is science in action. And when the experiments 
are completed, the results are implemented on the ground as 
management prescriptions.526
Using the present tense — "the results are implemented" — the film implied
that New Perspectives was already established and involved in the "action" of
applying its science to the better management of national forests. This
assertion was not necessarily true.
The final goal of "sustainable ecosystem management" was purely 
political. Salwasser proposed to reduce legal and political opposition to its
524 Ibid., 37.
525 Ibid., 37.
526 U .S.D A  Forest Service,Nero Times, New Perspectives
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policies, or in his words, New Perspectives must negate "the ability of spedal- 
interest groups to play political trump and legal 'gotcha.'"527 This would 
involve several strategies, ranging from an intensive propaganda effort to 
recrafting laws and regulations to curb lawsuits and administrative 
appeals.528 Among Salwasser's suggestions were mass "education" regarding 
forestry issues, shaping "goods and services" to "satisfy the customer," and 
developing a mass advertising program. Thus, the agency would "find out 
how people get their information and form their opinions and aggressively 
enter the game. People must know what it takes to produce the things they 
desire and at what cost and consequence."529 Given the correct information, 
agencies and people could come together to discuss what was best for the 
forest and the public. In addition, changes in "laws, regulations, and 
incentives" would discourage disruption of the planning and management 
process by "extremists" and other "unreasonable" people. Since Salwasser 
made this statement one year after the 1989 appeals regulation changes, 
presumably the agency envisioned additional changes to preclude action by 
the irrational elements.530
With "guiding principles" now formulated, the New Perspectives team 
encouraged field officers to undertake a number of projects -- mostly 
demonstration and research projects, or "pilot programs." By April 1991, 
shortly before the Scientific Panel presented its report to Congress, the team 
sent out the official charter as well as a "Progress Report" to Regional
527 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 37.
528 Ibid., 37.
529 Ibid., 37.
530 See Chapter Two, "Smokey's Identity Crisis."
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Foresters and Research Station Directors. In a mailer distributed to the 
regional offices and research stations, the Washington office pronounced that, 
"[m]ost of what will come to characterize New Perspectives is yet to unfold; 
most field demonstrations and research projects are still being shaped. 
However, a lot has happened so far."531 "A lot" included "silviculture 
research," "New Perspectives sessions at leadership team meetings," 
"biodiversity workshops" and conferences, educational projects, inclusions in 
regional guides, and "demonstration" projects in ten regions. By this time, 
the staff had established its principles and framework and had begun 
implementing them.532
Shasta Costa
To implement his newly devised principles for New Perspectives, 
Salwasser and his crew used the idea of "project level" planning, wherein the 
program would work with Forest Supervisors and District Rangers to devise 
plans for a controversial roadless area.533 Forest Service personnel would 
consult with the public and the timber industry through hearings and 
meetings, and the resulting plans would reflect the principles of New 
Perspectives. The "Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource 
Project" (Siskiyou National Forest), one of the agency's first attempts at 
instituting New Perspectives, was a telling example of project level planning. 
It was a highly controversial and visible project, introducing timber 
management and roading into the Shasta Creek drainage roadless area, which
531 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, "Memo: New Perspectives in April," 1.
532 Ibid., 1.
533 Ibid., 1.
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was situated between the Wild Rogue and Kalmiopsis wilderness areas 
(though not contiguous to them), and provided significant salmon and trout 
habitat. According to an anonymous staff writer at the Inner Voice: "The 
creek, a tributary of the Rogue River, is one of the last unsilted spawning 
streams in the region, critical for several species of salmon and trout."534
In Spring 1990, after intensively studying, classifying, and mapping the 
watershed, the agency released its Draft Environmental Statement for the 
Shasta Costa project. The Siskiyou had chosen as its "preferred action" 
alternative B, which "incorporate[d] the full array of New Perspectives 
concepts, such as m in im iz in g  fragmentation, maintaining biological diversity 
and habitat connection, and establishing structural integrity of riparian 
ecosystem.535 The alternative proposed a 25 percent reduction in timber 
harvest from earlier proposals and involved 2-1/2 miles of road off the Burnt 
Ridge and Bear Camp roads, which encircled the drainage. According to the 
plan, the agency would harvest timber using selection cutting with small, 
group clearcuts, and remove it using helicopters, existing roads on the 
perimeter, and the additional two miles of newly built road.536 But, the 
agency "kept its options open" by limiting the plan to a three year planning 
horizon, stating that "any shortfall in timber volume cut from the area may 
be made up after the 3 year planning period expires."537 Nevertheless the 
agency declared that the Shasta Costa planning area was a unique choice for 
implementation of the program and that its implementation provided a good
334 Inner Voice, "Forest Service Hedges its Bets," 11.
535 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
S-8.
536 Ibid., S-8.
537 inner Voice, "Forest Service Hedges its Bets," 11.
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example of what the program was all about. In the agency/s words, the areas 
was a "unique area for the exploration of New Perspectives. The Shasta Costa 
planning effort offers one of the most exhaustive glimpses of New 
Perspectives and Forest Plan implementation found to date."538
Meanwhile, the team in the Washington Office was dedicating significant 
resources to promoting the image of the Shasta Costa project as a shining 
New Perspectives success. In early 1990, for instance, the team publicized a 
glossy, color pamphlet on the Shasta project entitled, "New Perspectives on 
the Siskiyou National Forest, the Shasta Costa Integrated Resource Project 
Landscape Level Approach to Timber Sale Planning." In March, the agency 
promoted the project in its promotional video, New Times: New
Perspectives in Forestry. The video featured Kathy Johnson, district ranger 
on the Gold Beach district within which the drainage is situated, Siskiyou 
Forest Supervisor, Ron McCormick, and even Forest Service Chief Dale 
Robertson. The video placed each of these officers "in the field," discussing 
the drainage and the possibilities of New Perspectives. Making several 
spoken and visual references to the science and technology involved, the 
team had also attempted to portray the project as a democratic process. For 
instance, the video situated McCormick, standing in the field, propositioning 
the "environmental community" to "roll around together" with the Forest 
Service. Facing the camera, almost sheepishly, McCormick told the camera:
We want you to join us here, on the ground, and let's roll 
around together, in the environment, and try to learn together 
what's happening here and how we can work with it in our 
management of the National Forests.539
538 Ibid., 11.
539 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
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Nevertheless, the Oregon Natural Resources Council announced its 
intention to fight the plan in court, and the timber industry criticized it on 
the grounds of the planned harvest reduction. Subsequently, the Forest 
Service stalled for time, maintaining a period of silence, and the agency 
shifted personnel, particularly Johnson and McCormick, removing much of 
the official support for the New Perspectives option. According to journalist 
Kathie Durbin, "Forest Supervisor Ron McCormick retired, and Kathy 
Johnson, a rising star in the Forest Service, was promoted to a job in the 
agency's Washington, D .C  office [and in] 1991, Mike Lunn replaced 
McCormick on the Siskiyou."540 Li March 1991, the agency released its final 
EIS, replacing the New Perspectives option for its proposed action. The new 
alternative, which the agency declared "best reflects the Capital Investments 
and Ten Year Action Plan" called for increased road construction — 6.2 miles 
— and higher timber harvest levels — 17.5 million board feet.541 New 
Perspective's role, which was mainly linked to planning by providing a 
conceptual basis for "considering the implications of several timber sales, 
road and trail construction, fish habitat, and water quality improvement 
projects from a stand, watershed, and landscape perspective" had been 
sidelined.542 The Shasta Costa New Perspectives innovation faded into 
oblivion, but, undaunted, Salwasser and his team continued to promote the 
program and claimed successes.
540 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 130.
541 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
S-8.
542 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, "New Perspectives in the Siskiyou National Forest," 1.
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Marketing the Idea
The agency continued to promote New Perspectives in conventions, 
journals, and other media, and the program soon began to attract the 
attention of foresters outside the Forest Service. The agency's video used 
dramatic images in an attempt to situate the program as the solution to 
political conflict and redefine multiple-use in its image.
In an intense introduction — under three minutes long — the film laid out 
its entire position. Beginning with a dramatic drum rhythm repeated over 
and over, increasing in volume as ominous newspaper headlines flashed 
into view. First came headlines pertaining to environmentalists: "A blow to 
Northwest timber interests — spotted owl study calls for saving vast tracts of 
trees," then "Conservationists fight Pacific Coast logging."543
Then followed poignant allusions to the resulting difficulties and 
consequences for the working people of Oregon: "Forest Chief assesses owl's 
plight," and "390 jobs at Klamath Falls Mill."544 Then the headlines "trade 
groups back log export," "drive to save old forests begins," "Senate should 
pass old growth bill," and finally "Shortage of logs hurting." At the close of 
this segment, a voice-over ominously told the audience, "More and more 
people want parts of the national forests reserved for their particular needs 
and interests," before fading into Jerry Franklin's promotion of a new 
perspectives approach to "sharing the pie." By the end of the video, with the
543 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
544 This sequence cleverly linked these effects to the environmental movement, despite the 
existence of several plausible alternative explanations common in the discourse at the time — 
for instance lay-offs resulting from increased "worker production" (increased automation).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
folksy music of banjos in the background, Franklin assured the audience that 
the various interests were "always gonna have to share the pie... give up 
portions of it. There's never gonna be enough pie to go around." Forest users 
would "have to share," in what Franklin promised to be "a win-win 
situation."545
Three months later, in July, the Forest Service publicized its 1990 Resource 
Planning Act Program ("The Forest Service Program for Forest and 
Rangeland Resources: A Long-Term Strategic Plan"), promoting the New 
Perspectives program as a commitment to new political values. According to 
the report, the New Perspectives program "commits the Forest Service to a 
broadened sensitivity to ecological and social values in providing a sustained 
yield of uses from the national forests and grasslands."546 By September, 
when the agency published its color, glossy brochure, "Shasta Costa from a 
New Perspective," the agency was apparently confident enough to promote 
the belief that New Perspectives was a tested and working system. In a section 
titled "Why New Perspectives Works," the agency told readers:
There are several advantages to managing lands with New 
Perspectives. First, New Perspectives conserves important 
elements of biological diversity on every acre, not just on the 
acres that are protected in wilderness. Second, by keeping the 
area for resource use large enough, we can use a lighter touch 
over a wider area to balance biological needs with social ones.547
The agency continued to spread the word, and even in the environmental,
academic, and professional communities, it found tentative support. In the
545 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
546 USDA Forest Service, Forest Service Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources: A Long- 
Term Strategic Plan, 1990," 5-7, in Rockwell, "RPA — The Sleeping Giant,"ll.
547 USDA, Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Shasta Costa From a New Perspective,
15.
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Inner Voice, the reader could find endorsements of New Perspectives. For 
example, in a series on New Forestry, Ken Foss, "a Forest Service veteran of 
13 years" and timber sale planner on the Wenatchee National Forest 
(Washington), touted New Forestry as a new "state of mind" and "a way out" 
of "this mess."548 New Forestry, he exclaimed, involved "the global 
perspective."549
Alan McQuillan, University of Montana professor of forest planning and 
management — formerly a for Champion International Corporation resource 
analyst and Forest Service economist — proclaimed New Perspectives to be 
"Forestry for a Post-Modern Age."550 The new approach would open up new 
possibilities for meeting the various political demands — for instance 
demands for "ethical considerations."551 McQuillan wrote:
Post-modern forestry is not abandoning reason but has already 
progressed beyond mechanistic science to embrace ethical 
considerations. ... New Perspectives opens up an exciting range 
of possibilities, an opportunity to flesh out an entire spectrum of 
styles of forest management, providing for an eclectic mix of 
desires. This is the promise of post-modernism.552
McQuillaii attended several professional association meetings in which 
the New Perspectives program was a main focus of discussion. McQuillan, to 
whom the terms "new perspectives" and "new forestry" were "becoming 
interchangeable," wrote that "New Forestry, like perestroika, has attained a 
level of popular support within the profession's public sector from which
5^8 Foss, "New Forestry — a State of Mind," 4. 
5*9 Foss, "The Global Perspective," 10.
550 McQuillan, "New Perspectives."
551 Ibid., 14.
552 Ibid.
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there can be no retreat."553 For example. New Perspectives was prominent at 
an industry-sponsored Western Forestry Conservation Association (WFCA) 
Annual Meeting in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho (December 1990), at the Montana 
Society of American Foresters' Annual Meeting (March 1991), at the Western 
Forest Economists' Annual Meeting in Wemme, Oregon (May 1991), where 
the New Times, New Perspectives video was shown, and at the Wilderness 
Society's "Defining Sustainable Forestry" workshop (January, 1992).554 
Subsequent meetings also focused upon New Perspectives, including WFCA's 
"Seeking Common Ground" conference in Portland, Oregon during February 
1992 and again at the annual Montana SAF meeting in Kalispell during 
March.555
Meanwhile, Salwasser was continuing his own campaign to promote the 
program, which he claims was gaining support. In December, 1991, the 
Forest Service had "repeated, in Roanoke, Virginia, what we had done in 
Philadelphia." He added:
In, Philadelphia we'd invited a bunch of people in to help us 
shape what we ought to do; in Roanoke, two years later, we 
brought some of the same people back, but not entirely the same 
group, but the same type of venue, where we had half non- 
Forest Service people and we did a show and tell and basically 
said "here is what we have put together in the field. Here are 
the kinds of things people have done, here’s what it looks like."
... And in the workshop setting after the show-and-tell, the 
message came back strongly to us: "adopt Ecosystem 
Management as the Forest Service operating philosophy, and 
focus around a set of principles.556
553 McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings," 192. McQuillan actually presented the paper in early 
1992, but it did not appear in print until 1993.
554 Ibid., 212, fn.6.
555 Ibid., 212, fn.6.
556 Salwasser, "Interview," 8.
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In early 1992 the New Perspectives staff was willing to advocate for 
expanding the scope of its activities. According to Salwasser, "as we got well 
into this and it became increasingly dear that this set of ideas and prindples 
was practical, was working alright, and there was enough field evidence that 
we could embrace the set of prindples as an operating philosophy."557
At the same time, the Washington Office was promoting the New 
Perspectives on an international basis. A1 West, Assodate Chief for Private 
and State Forestry, "was involved as the lead forest person with a Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) group, United Nations FAO Regional 
Commission on Forestry. FAO's got these regional commissions all over the 
world, and we're in the North America Commission with Mexico and 
Canada." West arranged for the United States presentation at the North 
American Commission meeting to focus upon the Forest Service New 
Perspectives program. Hal Salwasser also "enlisted the help of a person in 
research, named Tom Snellgrove, who is involved with forest products and 
harvesting systems and Doug MacCleary, who is an Assistant Director of 
Timber Management, and who has spent a part of his career as a political 
appointee as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Agricultural Office, 
overseeing the Forest Service." According to Salwasser, the "paper was given 
in February of '92 in Cancun at the regional commission meeting and Dale 
was there," where it was "well received" by the Mexican and Canadian 
delegations.558
557 Ibid., 5.
558 Ibid., 6.
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By March 1992, the New Perspectives team was ready to move beyond 
pilot projects and encourage the directorate to adopt the program on a full- 
scale level. It would make a proposal to agency professionals at a Forest 
Service workshop in Salt Lake City. Because of the highly charged political 
atmosphere, Salwasser decided to proceed cautiously, assembling a team to 
draft the politically testy proposal and getting approval through the 
Washington office directorate before presenting it to the meeting. Salwasser 
later recalled using an address given by Jim Overbay, the Deputy Chief for 
National Forest System, at a "soils and water type" workshop in Salt Lake 
City, March of 1992 as a forum for introducing new perspectives as a policy. 
Overbay noted:
And we used the opportunity of his key note address to this 
workshop — it was a soil and water type workshop — to lay out as 
a trial balloon, so to speak, the idea that it was time to adopt 
these principles as Forest Service policies and not just a pilot 
program. A team of people worked on writing his speech. Many 
of the people who worked on writing his speech were the same 
people who developed the charter for the New Perspectives 
program about a year and a half earlier.559
Because Salwasser and Overbay perceived the event — introducing New 
Perspectives as a major policy initiative to a group of agency professionals — 
to be politically sensitive, they routed the speech through the Washington 
Office staff for approval, an unconventional process. According to Salwasser, 
"we knew that this speech was a policy sensitive kind of speech."560 He added 
that the speech was important insofar as it tested internal receptivity to the 
New Perspectives framework which ultimately metamorphosed into 
"Ecosystem Management" Of the event, Salwasser reminisces: "Internally
559 Ibid., 5.
560 Ibid.
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that was a major deal. That was the speech that got the Forest Service ready to 
accept what Dale did a couple of months later."561 Salwasser and his team 
had prepared the way for the agency to adopt New Perspectives, or 
(ultimately), at least a similar program under a new name, based on 
principles synthesized during the program's short two years of existence.
The New Perspectives promotion touched upon many politically 
significant signifiers — "Science," particularly the language of "landscape 
ecology" and "conservation biology," "Adaptive Management," health and 
diversity, and an end to "legal gotcha" to name a few. The controversial issue 
of clearcut logging was conspicuously absent, which was no accident. 
According to Salwasser, the directorship was "trying to maintain a distance 
between the New Perspectives, which was managing land for diversity with 
science/management teamwork — with partnerships and all that stuff — and 
clear cutting which is technical practice. But it didn't work. The switch away 
from clear cutting kept getting cast as a part of what New Perspectives was all 
about."562
Clearcutting was not merely a "technical practice," it was part of a larger 
production system vigorously promoted (as a political agenda) by the timber 
industry and opposed by environmental activists. Thus, any policy on 
clearcutting was a political product, much like the political products 
associated with the New Perspectives program, reformed resource policy, for 
instance. The boundaries between the two policy areas remained unclear. As 
the controversy around the Forest Service evolved, the issues involved in
561 Ibid., 16.
562 Ibid., 10.
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New Perspectives and those around clear cut logging became more tightly 
associated, despite Robertson's efforts to the contrary. In August, 1991, 
"Senator Pryor, alarmed about clear cutting in the South having an effect on 
forest diversity, asked to go out in the field with the Chief, on a summer day 
in August, Dale Robertson and Senator Pryor went for a walk in the woods." 
According to Salwasser, Dale Robertson went "for a walk in the woods in 
Arkansas" and came out with "an agreement to change the clear cutting 
policy of the agency."563
Increasingly, Robertson was having to cope with demands for change 
within the agency. Congressional members were directly summoning him to 
force the Forest Service to discontinue practices known as conventional for 50 
years. By political circumstance, clear cut logging was a New Perspectives 
issue, and in the near future, it would be an ecosystem management issue.
Criticism and Dissent
The New Perspectives program itself emerged through a process of political 
negotiation, maneuvering, and propagandizing, mainly by members of the 
Washington office — who resided in a hostile political milieu — but also 
involving officers in the field and regional offices. As could be expected, it 
drew criticism and opposition from the timber industry as well.
An early criticism from the "old school" of forestry came from William 
Atkinson, head of the forest engineering program at the Oregon State
563 Ibid., 9.
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University and the manager of its School of Forestry's experimental forest 
Atkinson presented a paper titled "Another View of New Forestry" at the 
May, 1990 Annual Meeting of the Society of American Forests in Eugene, 
Oregon. The paper, which was as much a bitter commentary on the effects of 
environmentalism on national forest management as it was a critique of 
New Forestry and its application (i.e., New Perspectives), lambasted the 
program for its political nature as well as what Atkinson perceived as its lack 
of technical and scientific credibility. Atkinson began his speech with a 
sarcastic tone, arguing that the system was not new, but rather, "it has been 
around for years — we have just called it a 'Real Estate Cut'."564
Portraying the program as being technically absurd and untenable, 
Atkinson directly alluded to it as a product of academics out of touch with the 
realities of forestry. He dismissed its application as a product of political 
expediency, and further noted:
You don't see anyone asking forest engineers, forest economists 
or practical operating people what they think about New 
Forestry. I have been wondering "why this lack of debate?" and 
have come to the conclusion that nobody took these people 
seriously. New Forestry was dreamed up by academics working 
as a closed group on the HJ Andrews Forest. Most of us felt that 
nobody in their right mind would actually practice this stuff.
But it turns out today that not only are people applying New 
Forestry across the landscape but proponents of New Forestry 
have been successful in catching the ears of some very 
influential people. People such as the Chief of the Forest 
Service, supervisors of National Forests and regional foresters.
The academics had a program when the Forest Service badly 
needed a program. So now we are all charging off to practice 
New Forestry.565
5*^ Atkinson, "Another View of New Forestry," 1.
565 Ibid.
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Atkinson claimed that this political "charging off and practicing something 
new in forestry" was an example of a "lemming effect/' where "we all move 
in the same direction at once without a whole lot of thought and caught up in 
the spirit."566
Atkinson developed "five points" to his argument, the first being that 
"New Forestry is obsolete."567 Here, Atkinson criticized the agency's 
redefinition of multiple use to mean "managing for several uses on the same 
piece of forest land."568 According to this argument, Congress had already 
rejected this view in the 1960s and 1970s. At best, new forestry was an ill 
attempt at residing between these two approaches to multiple use. His second 
point was that new forestry obscured "the Real Issue," which was "a loss of 
land base for commercial forestry," resulting from the political appropriation 
of the landscape, especially by "resource specialists." According to Atkinson, a 
"major problem that we have in forestry today is the locking up of our 
timberlands, which results in the loss of commercial forest land base. 
Contributing to this loss of land base are the various resource specialists 
(fisheries and wildlife biologists, hydrologists, etc.) who are carving out their 
own set of land withdrawals."569
Next, alluding to a looming timber famine in Oregon, Atkinson 
sarcastically lamented that "the wood supply situation is too serious for 
Hobby Silviculture."570 According to Atkinson, "we are in deep sheepdip
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid.
568 Ibid.
569 Ibid., 3.
570 Ibid.
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regarding wood supply in Oregon."571 In an emotional summary appealing 
to the specter of social collapse, the author claimed: 'This is a shocking 
situation! We are looking at nothing less than social calamity/'572 Then 
Atkinson claimed that the application of new forestry was a technical 
"disaster," owing to increased harvesting costs, "the loss of revenue and 
decreased yields," windfall damage, "damage to residual trees from logging 
and site preparation," and hazards to worker health from snags and 
blowdowns, in addition to environmental concerns such as soil 
compaction.573 Atkinson's recommendation, articulated in his final point, 
was to "modify plantation forestry" — including the continuation of 
clearcutting: "I think we ought to use clear cuts except in areas that are 
visually sensitive."574
One of Atkinson's most poignant arguments concerned the fast tracking of 
new forestry in defiance of conventional scientific process. According to 
Atkinson, conventional, science-based research management, moved in an 
orderly process from constructing a "research hypothesis," to 
experimentation, to statistical tests, to conclusions, to interpretation, to field 
trials, to "evaluation and change," and finally to "operational 
im plem entation."575 Atkinson wrote that new forestry practitioners have 
replaced much of this process with the production of substanceless political 
rhetoric — "an end run around the right way to establish new practices." He 
added:
571 Ibid.
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid., 10-14.
574 Ibid., 14.
575 Ibid., 9.
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They start with a research hypothesis, experiment, draw a 
conclusion and jump right into operational implementation on 
a large scale. And in between is a great deal of hype with 
scientists running around the halls of Congress, banging on 
doors in order to get their system in place. Completely lacking is 
the operational testing that is needed.576
Atkinson restated his critique in a winter 1992 article titled, "Silvicultural
Correctness: the politicalization of Forest Science," in 'Western Wildlands
(published by the University of Montana's School of Forestry). He concluded
that forest managers could and would have to choose between selfishness,
emotion and politics on one hand, and science and objective management on
the other — the new versus the old. Atkinson clearly sided with the latter:
We have a choice. We can determine future forest practices 
based on personal values, emotion and selfish political 
expediency. Or we can apply the best available biological and 
operational knowledge to meet honestly debated public goals. It 
is time to stand up and fight for proper resource management.577
Atkinson's criticism of the substitution of politics for scientific process 
involved in new forestry and its application cut directly to one of New 
Perspective's claims to legitimacy — its purported scientific basis. Other critics, 
particularly environmentalists, also pointed to the political nature of the 
program. After attending one of Salwasser's New Perspectives workshops, 
AFSEE leader Jeff Debonis and other agency employees questioned whether or 
not the program was not another "smoke and mirrors public relations games 
typical of past Forest Service responses to the public's calls for reform."578
576 Ibid., 8.
577 Atkinson, "Silvicultural Correctness," 12.
57  ̂ In Hirt, Conspiracy, 285; Debonis, "New Perspectives," 8.
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DeBonis found the program's language to be unacceptably vague and 
lacking in support from the Washington office. He wrote:
There seem to be no specifics from the Washington Office about 
what the Forest Service will do to become a more "environ­
mentally sensitive" organization. The New Perspectives 
initiative appears to be a volunteer effort on behalf of individual 
forests and districts to do what they can to buck the status quo.
Other than Hal and his NP staff, there doesn't appear to be a real 
push from the WO to really change the status quo from the 
top.579
In Sierra magazine, Peter Zuckerman wrote, "Working in the gray area 
between preservation and all-out logging, New Forestry was devised to satisfy 
demands both for healthy forests and for an adequate wood supply. That is 
precisely its seductive appeal and its gravest threat."580 In regard to the New 
Perspectives program in Ouachita National Forest, Arkansas, the Sierra Club's 
southern plains representative proclaimed, "It's just the same old clearcutting 
with a little gloss. ... New Perspectives? We call it new PR."581 Senator 
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, in 
Congressional hearings in April 1991, criticized the agency, exclaiming that 
"You cannot have 'New Perspectives' and at the same time have a 66 percent 
increase in the Green Mountain's timber sale program. That is contradictory 
and it has to stop."582 Despite Salwasser's promotion and New Perspectives' 
apparent "popular support within the profession's public sector," skeptics 
remained, within industry as well as within the environmental groups.583
579 Debonis, "New Perspectives," 8.
580 Zuckerman, "New Forestry or New Hype," 41.
581 Ibid., 67.
582 Leahy in Hirt, Conspircacy, 285.
583 McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings," 192.
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Concluding Remarks
Criticism notwithstanding, Salwasser continued to market New 
Perspectives, which, soon enough, would evolve into Ecosystem 
Management. Robertson's and Salwasser's Cancun New Perspectives speech 
went well, as had others, and advocates of its methods continued to be 
emboldened. New Perspectives staff — especially Salwasser -- continued to 
press Robertson to expand the scope of the program as well as adopting the 
"terminology of Ecosystem Management," which was soon to supplant New 
Perspectives. According to Salwasser, "I don’t recall that we were offering 
[New Perspectives] at the time as an alternative — as an Ecosystem 
Management. But clearly the Ecosystem concept was in our minds and maybe 
even in the writings if you pull up some of the old documents from that 
time. Even the charter, you may find Ecosystem in there."584 The New 
Perspectives program was in place, its principles and terminology almost 
worked out, and all that awaited the transition to "Ecosystem Management" 
was a policy decision by Chief Robertson and his superiors.
584 Salwasser, "Interview," 3.
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Chapter 8
ForestWorld, a Policy Spectacle
To live and let live is the public's motto,
And it's the public that I want to please.
The tent is up, the stage is set,
People are ready for a real treat.
They're sitting here already, open-eyed,
Placid, and waiting to be wonder-struck.
I've learned to give the public what it wants,
But never before have I been so embarrassed:
O f course, they're not accustomed to the best —
But just the same, they've read an awful lot!
What can we do to have things fresh and new, 
Significant and entertaining too?
— Goethe 
Manager speaking to the 
Poet, Prelude to Faust
Several people involved with the creation of ecosystem management — 
for instance, Jerry Franklin, George Leonard, Hal Salwasser, and Jack Ward 
Thomas — have suggested that the New Perspectives program served as a 
bureaucratic pilot project to ecosystem management.585 But, high profile as it 
was, its inception did not signal a major policy shift, but more of a policy 
experiment — a sort of political adaptive management. The actual policy shift 
required the kind of political pressure that soon came to bear upon the Forest 
Service and its Chief, Dale Robertson. This chapter will trace that shift in the 
context of politics internal to the agency, as well as the politics of national and 
international politics from the standpoint of the presidency.
585 por instance, Franklin, "Interview," Leonard, "Interview," Salwasser, "Interview," 
Thomas, "Interview."
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Robertson Bites the Bullet
In March, 1992, Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson "was still not ready to 
accept Ecosystem Management terminology," nor was he "comfortable with 
acknowledging Ecosystem Management as an operating philosophy."586 On 
the other hand, through the promotional efforts of Hal Salwasser and other 
New Perspectives staffers, the "Ecosystem Management" moniker was 
gaining support in  the Forest Service. Even Salwasser proclaimed, "people 
were talking about it more openly. ... There were rumblings from field units 
here and there. And obviously in the scientific held the concept had been 
around for at least a decade, because there were even books written about 
it. "587
Salwasser and the New Perspectives team soon convinced themselves that 
the time was right to adopt ecosystem management as official Forest Service 
Policy. In Roanoke, Virginia, where the Forest Service had organized a New 
Perspectives "workshop," Salwasser recalls, "after the show-and-tell, the 
message came back strongly to us: adopt Ecosystem Management as the 
Forest Service operating philosophy, and focus around a set of principles.588" 
Salwasser continued to lobby Robertson, and by the time of the FAO Regional 
Commission Meeting, the Chief had somewhat softened his position, perhaps 
influenced by favorable response horn the Canadian and Mexican delegation
586 Salwasser, "Interview," 8.
587 Salwasser, "Interview," 8. See for instance, Van Dyne's edited book, The Ecosystem 
Concept in Natural Resource Management, published in 1969, as an early linkage of the 
signifiers, "ecosystem" and "management"
588 Salwasser,, "Interview," 8.
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regarding the "New Perspectives" paper. According to Salwasser, the paper, 
which outlined the Forest Service New Perspectives program, "was really 
well received by the Canadians and the Mexicans, who complimented the 
Chief profusely over what the United States was doing with this ecosystem 
approach."589 The "ecosystem approach" was gaining enough political 
popularity and legitimacy for Salwasser to approach Robertson with the 
proposition of adopting ecosystem management as Forest Service Policy. 
Salwasser describes a brief meeting with Robertson on a resort beach in 
Mexico in which Robertson finally seemed somewhat amenable to shifting 
agency policy towards ecosystem management. Salwasser stated:
The afternoon after I gave this talk, I was walking along the 
beach there — Cancun is a phenomenal resort area — and Dale 
and his wife were lounging in some recliner chairs out along 
this beach. And I walked up to him and said "Dale, I would like 
to talk to you about something. The substance about what we 
talked about yesterday was really well received, and I used the 
term 'Ecosystem Management' frequently in explaining what we 
were doing. I think i t s time that the Forest Service adopt the 
Ecosystem Management terminology for what it is we're moving 
towards, and that we shape it, rather than let somebody else 
define what it is and then us having to live with that definition 
and not being able to make it mesh with our other legal 
mandates, we should embrace the terminology and at least play a 
part in shaping what it comes to mean." ... And my recollection 
was that he said, "Well, we'll think about it." It was the first 
time that he didn't say "No, we won’t do Ecosystem 
Management, and we aren't going to use those words."590
Salwasser had begun to sway Robertson by appealing to political 
pragmatism. In arguing that the Forest Service "should embrace the 
terminology and at least play a part in shaping what [ecosystem management] 
comes to mean," he had implied that confronting the signifier of ecosystem
589 Ibid., 6.
590 Ibid., 7.
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management was inevitable; ecosystem management would "come to mean" 
something, and the agency would be better off if it were to define that 
something. Robertson now had good practical reason for adopting the policy, 
and all he needed was permission from the presidential administration, itself 
feeling the nudge of national environmental politics.
Smoky and the President
Robertson would now have to reckon with administrative politics if he 
were to move the Forest Service management toward Ecosystem 
Management. He was aware that, before the Forest Service could ever address 
"a major policy issue like moving into Ecosystem Management," he would 
have "to get clearance through [his] political bosses — the Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture, and in this case, the White 
House."591 To Robertson, getting "clearance" involved a negotiation, 
depending upon the Forest Service's knowledge of what policy should be, as 
well as its ability to persuade his administrative superiors: "a big part of the 
Chiefs job is to figure out what the federal polity oughta be for the Forest 
Service and bring around his political bosses to support that."592 Whichever 
routes influence took, Robertson ultimately had to answer to "his political 
bosses," who in turn were subordinate to the president — politics as usual.
This chain of command was not new. The Forest Service is part of the 
executive branch, and it has been "after all, a federal bureaucracy, and
591591 Robertson, "Interview," 10.
592 Ibid., 10.
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accordingly, it was affected by the flow of power in the government."593 One 
source of this "power" is control over spending; all agencies have been 
subject to the powerful mechanism of executive budget review since the 1921 
Budget Act, "which changed the U.S. government from a series of quasi 
independent departments to a government under the control of the President 
and his chief financial officer, the Director on the Budget which presented a 
unified governmental position on financial and policy matters to 
Congress."594
Since then, presidential administrations have been able to exercise general 
powers over the federal bureaucracies through such mechanisms as 
reviewing, enhancing, or cutting budgets, eliminating programs within an 
agency, instituting (or ignoring regulations) and so forth. In the case of 
presidential administrations and the Forest Service, "[djespite increases in 
funding and personnel, the budget has been used to emphasize specific 
resource values and to de-emphasize others."595 Thus, a "review of changes 
between 1981 and 1983 shows the use of the budget system for policy 
purposes," the former reflecting President Carter's policy, the latter reflecting 
Ronald Reagan's policy, which increased budgeted timber activities, while 
decreasing recreation and wildlife management budgets.596
Further, laws written to govern the activities of federal bureaucracies 
almost always delegate authority to the Secretary of the Department in which
593 Clary, Timber, 193.
594 Wolf, "Letter," 1.
595 Frome, Forest Service, 46.
596 Ibid., 47.
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the agency is situated. For the Forest Service, this means Congress has 
delegated administration through the Secretary of Agriculture (who governs 
through an Assistant Deputy Secretary). For instance, in the Multiple 
Use/Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Congress states that "the Secretary of 
Agriculture is authorized and directed to develop and administer the 
renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use and 
sustained yield," while in the NFMA, Congress delegates authority to "the 
Secretary of Agriculture, under such rules and regulations as he may 
prescribe."597 In 1982 the Reagan administration used its powers of 
prescription in revising the Carter administration's 1979 NFMA rules, 
"because Reagan administration officials felt that the 1979 regulations did not 
insure that forest planners adequately considered economic impacts."598
In this context, the Department of Agriculture has long since occupied an 
important space in the U.S. Forest Service's Washington Office, as well as 
dictating to the agency through administrative orders.599 Speaking of the 
Reagan administration's oversight of the Forest Service, policy professor 
Steven Yaffee writes:
Congressional inquiries are always viewed as important items 
for agency response, but their impact on decisionmaking can be 
blunted. Inquiries from Executive-level political bosses are 
much more serious, and Reagan administration appointees were 
mobilized to pressure the FS on its owl direction. For example,
John Crowell, Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
Agriculture in charge of the Forest service , and former 
Louisiana-Pacific executive in Oregon, wrote a memo to FS Chief
597 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, and National Forest Management Act of 1976.
59® Yaffee, Wisdom, 68.
599 Mumma, "Interview,” 6.
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Max Peterson in July 1981 that can only be interpreted as political 
pressure."600
The memo claimed that early spotted owl set-asides, suggested by regional 
staffers, involved unacceptably high timber trade-offs and that "the guidelines 
need to be very carefully reviewed. Reduction in the number of pairs of 
spotted owls to be protected on each forest should be considered, and the 
number assigned to each forest be located in areas adjacent to similar areas in 
adjoining forests."601 Thus, the administration pursued a policy of 
"encouraging the resource management agencies to retrench toward their 
core technologies — commodity production for the USFS and BLM, and game 
animal management for the FWS."602
The Reagan administration, in exercising its influence upon the Forest 
Service further instituted this practice of political control, played upon by the 
following administration of president George Bush. Bush, having worked 
the language of environmentalism into his campaign platform, would 
eventually depend heavily upon this influence, not only in regard with the 
Forest Service, but with other bureaucracies as well.
The Environmental President
In 1988, presidential candidate, George Bush, had told the press that he 
would be America's premier "Environmental President." Bush pledged, 
for instance, that there would be "no net loss of wetlands," that he would
600 Yaffee, Wisdom, 65.
601 Crowley, John. Assistant Secretary of State. 1981. Memo to FS Chief Max Peterson. July.
In Yaffee, Wisdom, 65.
602 Yaffee, Wisdom, 158.
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work on a global wanning treaty, and that he would help to tighten clean 
air provisions.603 Upon being elected, he set to work assuring Americans 
that the anti-environmentalist "counterrevolution" was over. The Bush 
administration drafted legislation to strengthen the Clean Air Act and 
hosted an international meeting to begin drafting a global warming treaty.
In addition, Bush appointed William K. Reilly — who had recently 
directed the World Wildlife Fund — as administrator of the EPA, and he 
promised to give the agency cabinet status. He publicly supported a 
moratorium on offshore oil drilling, and he included in his budget the 
money for a major reforestation program.604
But, soon, President Bush's policy record began to appear less 
environmentally friendly, as he began publicly lamenting the costs of 
environmental regulations.605 Soon the Bush administration's policy of 
actively opposing environmental regulation inspired harsh criticism. The 
conflict took place on many levels — in the courts, in Congress, in the press, in 
the federal bureaucracies — with the administration focusing on 
administrative regulations as well as legislative and litigative strategies.
A major Bush strategy was to order constraints upon an agency's 
regulation proposal process, largely by overseeing and reviewing proposed 
regulations and by instituting (through executive order) rules for accepting or 
rejecting the administrative statute. For instance, Bush retained two 
significant executive orders from the Reagan presidency limiting new
603 Shabecoff, p. 251-56.
604 Ibid.
605 Shabecoff, p. 252.
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administrative laws proposals. One order required an agency to use "a formal 
cost benefit analysis... prior to formal proposal of major regulations, defined 
as having an annual impact on the economy of at least $100 million." The 
order required agency to determine whether or not "the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society/' and to 
choose whether or not to adopt them based upon the outcome of that 
calculus. The second order required agencies to "to develop an annual 
regulatory agenda for submission to OMB and to indicate how their programs 
were consistent with the president's own agenda." Critics condemned the 
orders because, first, the construction of cost/benefit analyses was a political 
process, and second, they gave the OMB a wide breadth of review, another 
political process.606
In addition to retaining the Reagan-era executive orders, the Bush 
administration used other working groups to oversee the introduction of 
new regulations or grant exceptions to old ones, with the explicit mission of 
encouraging "economic growth." Most notorious was the "Council on 
Competitiveness," headed by Vice-President Dan Quayle. In June, 1990, Bush 
chartered the Council to search for and eradicate regulations or grant 
exceptions when deemed reasonable from a business point of view. Through 
the "council," the administration was able to diminish the effect of 
amendments to the Clean Air Act that Bush supported and signed. The 
council also provided the context for the "wetlands dispute," wherein it 
attempted to broaden the EPA's definition of wetlands to open up to
606 Shabecoff, p. 219.
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commercial use "between 30 and 90 percent of currently protected 
wetlands."607
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In response, "tens of thousands" of environmentalists sent comments, 
opposing the policy, and scientific organizations entered the conflict. The 
National Academy of Sciences issued a report that recommended an end to 
loss of wetlands and a program for wetland restoration.608 Nevertheless, EPA 
director Reilly succumbed to political pressure and changed the definition. 
Eventually, the council's aggressive stance against environmental protection 
resulted in its members being summoned to extensive congressional hearings 
in 1991, which did not daunt the administration; in January 1992, Bush 
ordered a 90-day "regulatory moratorium," which he "continued in April for 
four additional months as the November election approached."609
Bush continued to pursue policy that ran counter to the environmental 
image he had attempted to construct. In 1991, Bush attempted to work 
through Congress to promote his "National Energy Strategy," which included 
provisions to develop oil extraction in the Artie National Wildlife Refuge.
He rejected proposed conservation measures on the advice of his economic 
advisors. "The nation's press portrayed the Bush plan as shortsighted and 
timid," and environmentalists successfully lobbied for defeat of the bill.610 
During the same year, Bush led the United States into w ar against Iraq, 
bombing dozens of oil production plants as well as public infrastructure,
607 Kraft, Environmental Policy, 145.
608 Ibid., 151.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid., 127.
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creating enormous toxic pollution in regional air and waters and further 
marring Bush's environmental legacy.
Bush and Trees
Towards the end of his presidency, Bush's position was clear regarding 
how much public old-growth forest would be open to logging: "It's time to 
put people ahead of owls."611 By this time, Bush presented the issue in terms 
of "jobs versus the environment," defining the problem as politics — or, 
"environmental extremists."612 Pursuing this policy stance, the 
administration refused to accept the findings of the court mandated 
Interagency Scientific Committee (and later, the Congressionally summoned 
"Scientific Panel") or the Fish and Wildlife Service produced 
"Recommendations for Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl." Instead, it 
opted to construct its own plan for BLM lands and national forests, which it 
introduced at a news conference in July 1990 as the "Five-point Plan to 
Preserve Owl (sic) and Protect Jobs." The News conference coincided with 
another — held directly before — announcing "the President's decision to 
curtail offshore oil drilling off California, Oregon, Washington, Florida, and 
New England's Georges Bank."613
According to one historical interpretation, the administration was 
responding to electoral politics: "Noone believed that the two decisions were 
unrelated. Rather, they appeared to give one to the environmentalists and
Ibid., 169.
612 Ibid., 169.
613 Yaffee, Wisdom, 128.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
one to the developers."614 Gubernatorial and Congressional elections were 
approaching, some of which would be sensitive to decisions regarding owl 
management or off-shore drilling. For instance, in Oregon, sensitive to the 
owl issue, Mark Hatfield was running for reelection, and in California and 
Florida, Pete Wilson and Robert Martinez, respectively, were running for 
governor's seats.615
The Bush administration appeared to be pursuing a "train-wreck strategy" 
concerning the owl issue, hoping to create a situation where either logging 
would virtually cease, and an agency head would convene the Endangered 
Species Committee (or "God Squad"), or ultimately Congress would be forced 
to revise the Endangered Species Act, which was up  for reauthorization in 
1992 (reelection year).616 A special reporter to The New York Times wrote a 
story regarding the White House rejection of the ISC owl plan alluded to this 
political strategy of sabotaging the ESA by dramatically raising its costs:
The reason, White House aides say, is that the Administration is 
intent on using the timber struggle to loosen the Endangered 
Species Act, which it says restricts economic development and 
intrudes on the lives of citizens. Saying that he wanted to bypass 
the law, Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan Jr. cast the struggle in 
the Northwest as one that pu t a few little owls in the path of 
thousands of jobs.617
The problem did not go away. In January 1992, the New York Times
reporting that, "politics reign at spotted owl hearing," wrote about a turn of
614 Yaffee's methodology of triangulating between newspaper reports and conjecture begs the 
question that much of history begs: what constitutes legitimate evidence?
615 Ibid., 129.
616 Ibid., 136-40.
617 Schneider, "Bush and Congress Facing a Showdown on Forests," New York Times., May 12, 
1992, A14.
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events wherein the EPA withdrew evidence, apparently due to political 
pressure:
[T]he hearings here by the panel, the Endangered Species 
Committee, concerning the northern spotted owl were only a 
few minutes old when it became dominated by internal conflicts 
of the Bush Administration over environmental policies.
Today, in a surprise move, the EPA, which has harshly criticized 
Government policies that favor logging in the Pacific Northwest, 
abruptly withdrew from the hearings... taking with it some of 
the most crucial evidence on behalf of saving the owl.618
During the same month, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service announced 
that its final designated spotted owl habitat would amount to 6.9 million acres 
~  down from its earlier proposal of 11.6 million acres. Interior Secretary 
Lujan, already involved with the ESA committee, responded by announcing 
that he was "delaying release of a comprehensive recovery plan for the owl 
and convening a new task force to develop recovery alternatives."619 In 
February, Lujan had announced formation of the team, proclaiming that he 
intended for it "to develop ways both to save the owl and to limit job losses in 
the Northwest timber industry," although implementation would involve 
legislative changes to exempt certain timber operations from environmental 
laws.620 According to the Washington Post, "[t]hose alternatives 
presumably would entail fewer job losses," while "jettisoning the goal of 
rebuilding the owl population in favor of merely stabilizing it."621
618 "Politics Reign at Spotted Owl Hearing," New York Times, Jan. 9,1992, A,14.
619 "Interior Secretary at Center of Storm Over Handling of Owl Controversy," Washington 
Post, March 22,1992, A8.
620 "Luhan to Name Third Panel on Northern Spotted Owl," Washington Post, Feb. 19,1992, 
A2.
621 "Interior Secretary at Center of Storm Over Handling of Owl Controversy," Washington 
Post, March 22,1992, A8.
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In May 1992, the "Cabinet-level" ESA committee, which Secretary Lujan 
had convened and was a member of, "voted 5 to 2 to waive the requirements 
of the endangered species law and allow logging on 13 federally owned tracts 
of timberland."622 Lujan finally announced an alternative owl plan calling 
for protection of 5.4 million acres — compared to the FWS's 6.9 million acres — 
as well as calling upon Congress to make changes in the Endangered Species 
Act, which was up for reauthorization. Without Congressional action within 
60 days, and barring court interference, the plan would become law and take 
effect. A Newsweek article called the policy "a vote against preservation" and 
"a sad parable of hypocrisy and hyperbole," characterizing it a political 
compromise of "complying with the ESA even as [the administration] moved 
to weaken it."623 Calling the "God Squad" decision "pure politics," 
environmentalists sued the Bush administration on procedural grounds 
including the neglect of more benign alternatives.624
Unpopularity Polls
Apparently the strategy did not reflect well upon Bush's popularity in this 
election year; the Bush administration's public image as the "environmental 
president" no longer appeared so "environmental." The New York Times 
published results of a May 1992 poll it had co-conducted with CBS News, 
remarking upon "Mr. Bush's low ratings on environmental issues, with 31 
percent [of respondents] saying they approved of the President's
622 "White House on Conflicting Paths as it Agrees to Protection for Owl," New York Times, 
May 15,1992, A l.
623 Hager, "A Vote Against Preservation," 83.
624 "Lawsuit asserts Interior D ept Acted Illegally on Spotted Owl," Washington Post, June 11, 
1992, A10.
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environmental policies and 55 percent saying they disapproved."625 Accurate 
or not, the survey portrayed Bush's public image as inadequate. According to 
the widely read New York newspaper:
A sizable majority of those surveyed said they felt that Mr. Bush 
talked more about protecting the environment than he had 
accomplished. Seventy percent said the President had been 
insincere in his expression of support for environmental issues, 
as against 19 percent who said they believed he had made 
progress.
This represents an erosion of Mr. Bush's already low standing on 
the environment from early in 1990, when 24 percent of those 
surveyed said they felt progress had been made, while 62 percent 
said he had just talked about the issue but had done little or 
nothing about i t 626
During the same month in 1992, "a Gallup poll indicated that the 
public disapproved of his handling of the environment by a two to one 
margin."627 In the midst of his re-election campaign, Bush was viewed as 
having failed to meet promises made in his prior campaign. According to 
one historical interpretation, the Bush administration was unable to 
depart from the strong political legacy left over from the Reagan 
presidency, resulting in "deep internal divisions over the direction of 
environmental policy" and his inability to keep campaign promises.628 
By the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, where Bush's footdragging on 
issues of biological diversity and global warming drew strong criticism — 
internationally as well as nationally — the "environmental community" 
considered the presidency a "great disappointment."629
625 "p0ii Finds Skepticism in U.S. about Earth Summit," New York Times: June, 11,1992,13.
626 Ibid.
627 Kraft, Environmental Polio/, 81.
628 Ibid., 81.
629 Ibid., 81.
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By June, 1992, President Bush was well into his re-election campaign and 
less than five months away from the November elections. Hoping to attract 
votes from white educated business types, the Bush re-election committee 
had to take account of environmentalist urbane political values that were 
popular even with many Republicans. But, by this time, Bush's policy record 
was widely interpreted as anti-environmentalist. The administration needed 
to take speedy action to signify a concern for "the environment" without 
compromising his opposition to the regulation of industry and economic 
growth. Bush needed to present himself as an environmental anti­
environmentalist, which he did not succeed in doing, at least from the 
perspective of environmentalists as well as some of the major newspapers. 
The Forest Service, however, offered him a timely opportunity for attempting 
this feat.
The President Goes to Rio
In 1992, the United Nations produced the Conference on Environmental 
Development (UNCED) — or, "the earth summit"630 — in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, to "discuss" "sustainable development," a "global forest convention," 
"technology cooperation," "protection of marine environment," "man-made 
pollution," "biological diversity" and "whatnot." Later, in his address to the 
conference, Bush would optimistically claim that "today, an unprecedented 
era of peace, freedom, and stability makes concerted action on the 
environment possible as never before."631
630 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S. News and World Report, June22,1992,20.
631 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
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But from the beginning, conflict, not harmony, characterized the 
conference and preparatory meetings called "PrepCom." According to U.S. 
News & World Report, "George Bush never wanted to go to Rio. He feared 
that his conservative approach to environmental issues would only spark 
hostility from Germany, Japan, and other nations."632 As early as February, a 
Bush appointee, Curtis Bohlen, "Assistant Secretary for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs," told the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that the president would not compromise regarding 
"economic growth" and "economic objectives." As Bush later stated at the 
conference, "we realize that growth is the engine of change and the friend of 
the environm ent."633 Early on, Bohlen established the administration's 
opposition to a proposed biodiversity treaty, telling Congress, "some countries 
are seeking to use the convention to regulate biotechnology, a position the 
United States cannot accept."634
In the same month, George Woodwell, director of the Woods Hole 
Research Center and Kilaparte Ramakrishna, the center's senior associate for 
environmental law, wrote in the New York Times that "discussions have not 
gone well. The world's poorer nations recognize that they are likely to be 
made the scapegoats of global warming." Concerning discussions on a forest 
convention, the researchers wrote, "[fjorest management is turning into one 
more issue over which industrialized and developing countries are fighting,"
632 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S. News and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
633 gush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
634 Bohlen, "US Prepares for UN Conference," 97.
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primarily because the more "developed" countries were arguing a double 
standard.635 Woodwell and Ramakrishna wrote:
True, [tropical] forests are diverse and fascinating but they are 
also almost entirely in underdeveloped countries. And it is on 
those forests that developed nations are working hardest to 
impose their wills. But the north seems unable to live by the 
rules it wants to impose on the south: government-subsidized 
greed is allowing wide swaths of Canada and the northwestern 
U.S. to be clear-cut, and lumber companies are now 
maneuvering to make profits from the Siberian taiga.
As a result, a "convention on forests" has become unacceptable 
to many nations preparing for the Brazil conference. Now the 
best that seems possible is a "non-legally binding authoritative 
statement of principles for a global consensus on the 
management, conservation and development of all types of 
forests." That promises little. 636
Soon, the administration made clear its policy of blocking proposed 
environmental treaties on "economic" grounds. In May, Bush threatened to 
boycott the upcoming conference "to win concessions from most of the 
world's nations on a global warming treaty, eliminating language that would 
have required the United States to cap its emissions of carbon dioxide by year 
2000 at 1990 levels."637 Bush refused to support fossil fuel use reductions, 
opting for a "'no regrets' policy where actions would be taken against the 
possibility of global warming only where they could be justified on some 
other grounds."638 The other nations compromised, replacing mandatory 
caps with voluntary "action plans" that governments would formulate to 
work with industry.
635 Woodwell and Ramakrishna, "Special: Forests, Scapegoats, and Global Warming," New  
York Times, February 11,1992, A25.
636 Ibid., A25..
637 "Bush, Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan toSave Earth's Forests," New York Times, 
June, 11, p. A,10.
638 Kraft, Environmental Polio/, 20.
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Similarly, by the time of the conference, Bush had made it known that he 
would not sign a "biodiversity treaty." Standing heroically in the way of 
progress, he stated obtusely:
We come to Rio prepared to continue America's unparalleled 
efforts to preserve species and habitat. Let me be clear. Our 
efforts to protect biodiversity itself will exceed the requirements 
of the treaty. But that proposed agreement threatens to retard 
biotechnology and undermine the protection of ideas. Unlike 
the climate agreement, its financing scheme will not work. It is 
never easy to stand alone on principle, but sometimes leadership 
requires that you do. Now is such a time.639
At issue was regulation of environmentally hazardous industries as well 
as "funding and mechanisms" of the specific "binding conventions" and the 
more general, non-binding resolutions. The U.S. News & World Report, 
after the conference, reported:
[Bush's] goal, he said, was to "protect taxpayers" and resist global 
pressure for mass U.S. spending on ecological concerns. The 
United States, he declared, will spend $1.2 trillion on 
environmental protection over the next decade. America is 
"way out front," he argued, "and we are going to stay out front, 
but we are not going to act like we have an open checkbook."
Bush was stepping into a "lions den" in Rio, a senior adviser 
said, but would stand up to extremists. "In the long run, that 
sells at home."640
Bush's intransigence formed the object for a barrage of media criticism, 
including a New York Times editorial, accusing the president of putting 
politics before environmental concerns. The Times  claimed:
The "Environmental President" now seems mainly interested in 
becoming the "Re-elected President." Twice in one week, on the 
issues of air pollution and forests, the Bush Administration has
639 Bush, p. 462.
640 "Bush Goes to Brazil," IT. S. Nezos and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
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handed down rulings that sacrifice long-term environmental 
concerns to short-term commercial and political interests.641
Another New York Times article wrote that the "United States has been
seen by much of the rest of the world as an obstructionist on the key issues of
global warming and biological diversity. The Bush Administration
successfully sought the adoption of commitments to reduce emissions of
heat-trapping gasses that is weaker than most other industrialized countries
wanted."642 According to another New York Times article, the
administration's stance on the treaties garnered itself international criticism.
"The United States received heavy international criticism over that decision
and for its refusal to sign the new biodiversity convention to preserve animal
and plant life, an agreement which won the European Community's support
today."643
As might be expected, Bush received criticism from the foreign press as 
well as the domestic press. "As delegates to the summit meeting began to 
gather in Rio de Janeiro today, the Brazilian press painted the Bush 
Administration as an environmental villain." By the second week of the 
conference, the administration was "under attack by poor nations and out of 
step with Europe," as well as being at odds with Japan.644
Bush responded by proposing to contribute money for a new program, 
proclaiming that the U.S. had "come to Rio with an extensive program of 
technology cooperation. We stand ready, government and private sector, to
641 "Mr. Bush's Political Environment," New York Times, May 19,1992, A22.
642 "U.S., Trying to Buff its Image, Defends the Forests," New York Times, June 7,1992,120.
643 « Delegates at Earth Summit Plan a Watchdog Agency," New York Times. June 7,1992,20.
644 "Logging Limits Sought over 7 Million Acres," New York Times, Jan. 10,1992, A12.
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help spread green technology and launch a new generation of clean 
growth."645 The author wrote:
Seeking to counter foreign and domestic criticism of his 
environmental record, President Bush presented a new program 
today to conserve the world's dwindling forests, a crucial issue at 
this month's Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Standing at a 
NASA research center before a huge blue photograph of the 
earth taken from space, Mr. Bush said the White House would 
increase its aid to other nations' forestry programs by $150 
million, to $270 million, starting in the fiscal year that begins in 
October.646
By the end of the conference, every one of the 165 heads of state involved 
in the conference, except for Bush, had signed the treaty. Bush told the 
conference, "Let's face it, there has been some criticism of the United States. 
But I must tell you, we come to Rio proud of what we have accomplished and 
committed to extending the record on American leadership on the 
environment," citing "the world's tightest air-quality standards on cars and 
factories, the most advanced laws for protecting lands and waters, the most 
open processes for public participation."647 In addition, Bush alluded to 
"concessions on a long-range plan to limit global warming."648 He also 
promised to "double global forest assistance," by doubling "US forest bilateral 
assistance next year" as a move toward working "together, respecting national 
sovereignty on new strategies for forests for the future."649 In terms of 
internal environmental policy, Bush congratulated the United States for its 
environmental legislation, added some ambiguous allusions to new policy 
regarding clearcut logging, telling the conference that the U.S. "will reform at
645 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
646 "Bush, Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan toSave Earth's Forests," New York Times, 
June, 11, A l.
647 "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 462.
648 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S, News and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
649 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development,"461.
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home, phasing out clear-cutting as a standard practice on US national forests 
and working to plant 1 billion trees a year."650
But, at home, people had become increasingly critical of Bush regarding 
his environmental record. According to a The New York Times and CBS 
News  poll, U.S. citizens were skeptical about "whether President Bush will 
accomplish much at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro this week." This 
skepticism "appeared to be linked to Mr. Bush's low ratings on 
environmental issues, with 31 percent saying they approved of the President 
policies and 55 percent saying they disapproved."651
Robertson Comes Through
A week before Bush's appearance at Rio, a U.S. delegation, headed by 
Environmental Protection Agency Director, Bill Reilly, was already in Brazil 
fielding sharp criticism from other delegations as well as from 
environmentalists shut out of the conference.652 Forest Service Chief, 
Robertson, in contact with Reilly, recalls that "the meeting down there... was 
kind of rough on the United States."653 The U.S. delegation faced 
international scorn regarding its policy on the major treaties in addition to its 
domestic policy, some of which — including clear cutting and endangered 
species — concerned the Forest Service directly. Only a week before, on May 
28, U.S. District Judge William Dwyer had ruled that the agency's proposed 
spotted owl plan was inadequate and violated environmental law and
650 Ibid., 461.
651 "Poll Finds Skepticism in U.S. about Earth Summit," New York Times: June, 11,1992,13.
652 Robertson, "Interview," 12.
653 Ibid., 11.
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ordered the agency to rewrite the plan.654 The following day the judge 
enjoined logging millions of acres of Forest Service land in the Pacific 
Northwest until the plan was finished.655 According to Robertson:
Bill was getting beat up pretty bad in Rio from other countries 
about the clear cutting, well, you know, that the United States 
was not as environmentally sensitive as we should be and that 
we talked a better game than we were. He was getting beat up 
over clear cutting and endangered species, pollution, clean air 
and ... global warming and reduction of gases that pollute and 
contribute to global warming. That was the big issue down 
there.656
Reilly and Robertson had established a relationship before Reilly's tenure 
as EPA director, during which they maintained contact. According to 
Robertson, Reilly "was very concerned about clear cutting, and he and I spent 
some time discussing that." Robertson recalls that, in the past, "Reilly and I 
had talked about the clear cutting issue and I think maybe Reilly [already in 
trouble in Rio] suggested to Clayton [Yeutter, the Secretary of Agriculture] 
'why don’t you talk to the Chief of the Forest Service, see if we can’t get some 
policy on the clear cutting?'"657 Apparently, Reilly, from Rio, called upon the 
help of Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson, through Clayton Yeutter. Before 
Bush's appearance at the Rio convention, Secretary Yeutter made a telephone 
call to Robertson. (Normally, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, in this 
case, John Beuter, who as acting Assistant Secretary in charge of the Forest 
Service, would have conducted business with the Forest Service Chief.) 
According to Robertson, Yeutter asked him to "come up with some kind of a
654 "Court Imposes New Logging Ban," Nero York Times, May 30,1998: A-12.
555 Ibid.
555 Robertson, "Interview," 11.
557 Ibid., 11. Yeutter was Secretary of Agriculture and superior to John Beutter, Deputy
Assistant over the Forest Service, who was temporarily serving as "acting" Assistant
Secretary. Ed Madigan became Secretary of Agriculture in October, 1992. Durbin, Tree Huggers,
120- 21.
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policy on clear cutting for the President for when he goes down in about a 
week to Rio." Though pressed to take a major policy position "rather 
quickly," Robertson felt he was in the position to collaborate, because, in 
Robertson's words, "fortunately, the Forest Service had been milling this 
around for quite a long time."658 In Robertson's words:
I said, "Yes, Clayton, I can give you a policy statement on clear 
cutting that basically says the Forest Service stopped using clear 
cutting as a standard silvicultural practice in the Forest Service 
and that it will only be used on an exceptional basis, but it won’t 
be due to economics." So, he says "Great, put that together; lef s 
see if we can't get this worked out in the next two or three days 
and the President can announce it at Rio and say we no longer 
will be doing clear cutting as a standard silvicultural practice on 
federal land in the United States."659
Robertson recalls using this request for presidential assistance as an 
opportunity to broach the idea of "Ecosystem Management" as an organizing 
principle for national forests. To Yeutter, he announced, "I’d like to 
announce Ecosystem Management as a policy of the Forest Service at the 
same time and make it clear cutting and Ecosystem Management, and I think 
that will go over well too."660 Yeutter was unfamiliar with the term, so 
Robertson explained to him, over the telephone, his conception of Ecosystem 
Management. Robertson recalled:
He says "what is that again?" And, I said "Ecosystem 
Management." He didn’t even know what that was. And he 
says "tell me more," and I kind of explained it: "it’s a more 
environmentally sensitive way to manage forest lands, deal with 
endangered species, in a much broader perspective.’’661
658 Robertson, "Interview," 12.
659 Ibid., 12.
660 Ibid., 13.
661 Ibid., 13.
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Robertson had alluded to an "environmentally sensitive way to manage 
forest lands" at a time when Bush's popularity regarding environmental 
policy was low. Secretary Yeutter apparently decided that the term was 
politically advantageous. According to Robertson:
He says "well all that sounds good; the President would like to 
say that." So he gave me a deadline; he said "by tomorrow 
morning, you have a draft over here on Ecosystem Management 
and clear cutting."662
The political discourse clearly had linked Forest Service clearcutting — or 
the relief from clearcutting — with Ecosystem Management. Robertson was 
now responsible for articulating this new policy direction in less than 24 
hours. Having worked out some of the concepts with Hal Salwasser had 
helped him to prepare, and he set out to work:
So I remember, I went home, and gosh, I thought about "here's 
the letter I gotta send to the White House tomorrow morning at 
8:00, fax it over and the President's going to look at it, Clayton's 
going to coordinate it with the President [and] Bill Reilly." So I 
thought about how to put this letter together, I actually wrote 
this letter, in fact I got up at 3:00 A.M. in the morning after 
thinking about it all night; I drafted this June 4,1992 letter 
starting at 3:00 A.M. in the morning. And I drafted it and called 
my secretary and said "You better be at the office at 7:00 in the 
morning because we gotta have this fax to Clayton Yeutter by 
8:00.” So she came in and she typed it up. I d id  a little more 
editing, and of course I was part of all the discussions in the 
Forest Service up to that point. But it got down too: I had the 
power of the pen and I didn’t have time to check with any body 
else. So I drafted this and then I sent it over to Clayton. He read 
it, and I don’t know if he checked with the President or not at 
that point, and he says "yeah, this sounds good."663
Robertson, exercising his "power of the pen," crafted this politically timed 
memorandum and presented it to the administration. Robertson had
662 Ibid., 13.
663 Ibid., 14.
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constructed this policy shift through unconventionally direct lines of 
communication, which briefly caused some dispute within the 
ad m in istration , but ultimately, Robertson and Yeutter's policy initiative 
prevailed. While Yeutter was not available at the Department of Agriculture 
(because he was at the White House) to read the final draft, according to 
Robertson, the Department of Agriculture staff accepted the policy statement:
He says "keep it under wraps, but I think this is the way we want 
to go." And by that time I hadn't even coordinated with my 
assistant secretary, so as soon as I got that OK from Clayton, I had 
to backtrack and sit down with John Beuter, who was my acting 
Assistant Secretary at that time, and go over it with him. John 
was very supportive. And i f  s such a major policy decision, we 
thought we better go down and talk to the Secretary about it.
Well, we couldn't get the Secretary, but we got the Chief of Staff; 
they didn't like the sound of it too well. Anyway, we finally got 
their approval... They finally said, "Well, we don't particularly 
care for this thing you're doing, but if that's what the President 
wants, what Clayton Yeutter wants, Bill Reilly wants for Rio, its 
okay with us." Again everybody did a little editing on it. So we 
finalized it.664
With the document written the administration had to decide how to 
announce the change to the public Ultimately, the president decided to have 
Robertson release the message domestically before he announced at the 
conference in Rio. According to Robertson:
In the mean time I kept talking with Clayton Yeutter [who was, 
at the time, over at the White House]; they were having a 
terrible time deciding if the President was going to announce 
this at Rio as part of his speech, or was he going to announce it 
here in the United States. They mulled that over for about a day. 
Finally Clayton called me back and he said, "Well the President 
has made a decision. He says that we decided you're the 
professional forester of the United States, Chief of the Forest 
Service, that you ought to announce this domestically, just 
ahead of the President making his speech, and he will announce
664 Ibid, 14.
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it in Rio in his speech at the Earth conference." So that’s what 
we did.665
Summarizing this fast moving series of events, Robertson recalls that he 
"wrote the letter... on June 4th, got it signed, communicated it, announced it 
in the United States." Mistakenly, Robertson recalls that Bush mentioned 
ecosystem management, stating that "if you'll read his speech in Rio, he 
included it as one of the things the United States is doing to deal with the 
clear cutting issue and endangered species and the concerns about old growth 
forest and all of that."666 Ultimately, Bush did not reference ecosystem 
management in his speech to the U.N. conference.667 He did vaguely 
mention "reform at home" and "phasing out clear-cutting as a standard 
practice on US national forests."668
True to his word, Robertson circulated the memorandum to "Regional 
Foresters and Station Directors," dated June 4,1992, announcing the agency's 
"marriage" to Ecosystem Management: 'Today, I am announcing that the 
Forest Service is committed to using an ecological approach in the future 
management of the national forests."669 The following day, linking the 
announcement on ecosystem management w ith a policy shift on clear 
cutting, the New York Times reported that "U.S. Forest Service field officers 
are being ordered today to start running the 126 national forests on an 
'ecosystem management' basis that could reduce by 70 percent the 
controversial practice of clear-cutting timber and result in more
665 Ibid., 15.
666 Ibid., 15.
667 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461-2.
668 Ibid., 461.
689 Robertson, "Memo to Regional Foresters and Station Directors," 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
environmentally sensitive stewardship of the nation's 191 million acres of 
federally owned forests."670 The paper also implied the relationship between 
the dual announcement by Robertson and Bush's uncomfortable position vis- 
a-vis the ongoing Rio conference: "Robertson's directive... comes as the 
United States has been sharply criticized for a lack of leadership in the 
adoption of two key environmental treaties at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro."671 The memorandum was clearly a political construction, and its 
contents were proportionately political.
The Memo
The memo, which announced "a new management philosophy" 
constructed "to deal with the clear cutting issue and endangered species and 
the concerns about old growth forest and all of that," made no mention of 
old-growth or ancient forests, and only briefly mentioned endangered species 
— not in the main text of the memo, but in "attachments." Regarding clear 
cutting, the agency would not really commit to discontinuing it, but rather, 
would "accelerate the reduction of clearcutting as a standard commercial 
timber harvest practice on the National Forests."672 Regarding "public 
involvement," Robertson proclaimed, "Like never before, the Forest Service 
must renew its commitment to public involvement and actively seek out and 
incorporate people's views in our decisions about the management of the 
National Forests and Grasslands."673 Meanwhile, the agency was attempting
670 '"Forest Service Chief Orders 'Ecological Approach' to Managing U.S. Woodlands," New  
York Times, June 4,1992: A -ll.
671 Ibid.
672 Robertson, "Memo to Regional Foresters and Station Directors," 2.
673 Ibid.
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to stifle participation in the form of administrative appeals. Robertson 
envisioned "a new higher level of dialogue or partnership with the 
American people" as "even more important now in view of the proposed 
changes in the administrative appeal process."674
Perhaps the most telling feature of the memo is its ambiguity, to which 
Robertson referred as "room and flexibility for the professionals on the 
ground in working with the public to work out the many details" of 
Ecosystem Management.675 Ecosystem Management as it applied to 
"endangered species and the concerns about old growth forest and all of that" 
would be worked out by "the professionals," who would use "ecological 
principles" to work out the on-the-ground details. In Robertson7s words, 
managers -- the professionals — would use "the best science and close the gap 
between the level of scientific knowledge and its application in our day-to-day 
m anagement."676
Reading the memo, an observer might get the idea that Ecosystem 
Management was a product of scientific deliberation. After all, as Robertson 
claimed in the first sentence, the agency had "made good progress over the 
past 3 years in experimenting with more environmentally sensitive ways to 
manage the National Forests."677 The agency had "learned a lot from our 
field demonstration projects, research effort, university symposia, and 
workshops," mainly that, as for as Robertson was concerned, "ecosystem
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid., 3.
676 Ibid., 2.
677 Ibid., 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
management works."678 Forest resource decisions were now to follow from 
the scientific processes imbedded in forest planning, it seemed, and, by 
implication, politics were now to be put aside. In the memo, Robertson made 
no reference to the politics governing the situation — the politics of 
Congressional appropriation, executive administration, judicial decision­
making, the politics of science making, nor the politics of citizen direct 
activism and media punditing.
In any case, by the June 25, when Robertson circulated a follow-up memo 
to regional foresters and station directors, the directorate had succumbed to 
national politics and fused the new clear-cutting policy with ecosystem 
management.679 According to Robertson, the directorate was "very pleased 
with the positive reaction to our new policy on ecosystem management, 
which includes increasing public involvement and reducing the use of 
clearcutting as a standard timber harvest practice."680 Clearly, Robertson and 
the directorate considered public participation in forest planning a significant 
issue.
The follow-up memo went on to outline the process by which the regions, 
forests, and ultimately, ranger districts, would work ecosystem management 
into planning and management. According to the memo, planners should 
not discontinue or undo ongoing projects. Rather, they should consider new 
projects using the principles and guidelines included in the June 4 memo.
678 Ibid.
679 The memo was in Robertson's name by signed by James Overbay, Associate Chief. 
Robertson, "Ecosystem Management, Public Involvement, and Clearcutting."
ibid., I .
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Ultimately, according to the memo, amendments in the NFMA regulations 
and planning guides would reflect these principles.681
Concluding Remarks
Politics was determining the course of Forest Service management of its 
forests, and its claims to scientific rationality. Though the "professionals" and 
"experts" would now use the scientific language and protocol of Ecosystem 
Management, this itself was a political maneuver. Perhaps in seeming to 
neglect the politics of national forest management, Robertson appeared to 
have ignored the main point of ecosystem management — which was to 
mediate, not eliminate, the political negotiation of forest output. Or, perhaps, 
he did not.
681 Ibid.
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Chapter 9
Plugging Up the Hole: Filling the Signifier of Ecosystem Management
Meet the new boss.
— The Who 
Who's Next (record album)
In partaking of the political dramaturgy around the shotgun "marriage" 
w ith ecosystem management, Robertson had situated the Forest Service in 
the position of filling the largely-vacant signifier of ecosystem management. 
The agency would set out to produce ecosystem management and meet the 
negotiable demands of the law and the whims (and implicit whims) of 
Congress — while reconciling with the agenda of the president. At the time 
of the memo, the question of who would be president remained unanswered, 
a question of importance. The answer to this question would have great 
bearing upon Forest Service policy, which would bear the name "ecosystem 
management." Thus, the shaping of ecosystem management — using parts 
constructed by the Interagency Science Committee, the Scientific Panel, and 
the New Perspectives program — remained politically negotiable.
In November, 1992, Bill Clinton defeated George Bush in the presidential 
election. Upon taking office, in 1993, Clinton inherited the injunction on 
timber harvesting on BLM and Forest Service in owl territory (imposed by 
Judge Dwyer, in May 1992) and faced political crisis in the forest politics of the 
Pacific Northwest.682 He also inherited the July 16 (1993) deadline imposed by 
Judge Dwyer for completing a plan for "Management for the Northern
682 Seattle Audubon Society o. Mosely, et. al., 798 F.Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992)..
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Spotted Owl in the National Forests/' including a complete environmental 
impact statement with viability assessments of northern spotted owls and 32 
other "old-growth associated species," projecting the effects of the preferred 
alternative.688
Immediately the presidential administration confronted this political 
problem of reestablishing the Forest Service's ability to manage the national 
forests in the Pacific Northwest. The administration divided Judge Dywer's 
demands into two tasks — completing the viability assessment and 
constructing a forest plan. Forest Service Chief Robertson assembled a team, 
the Scientific Assessment Team (SAT), again led by Dr. Jack Ward Thomas, to 
conducting the assessments. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration began 
preparing a "timber summit" — a well-publicized public hearing held by 
Clinton and others picked by the administration — meant to produce a set 
goals for the upcoming planning project.684
The administration would take a direct and high profile approach to 
accomplish its goals of convincing the court to lift the injunction on the 
Forest Service's timber program in the Pacific Northwest and resurrecting the 
Forest Service's credibility. This chapter will discuss the work of the SAT, the 
construction of the "Northwest Timber Summit," and the work of the 
Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. It will conclude by 
pointing out the significance of the FEMAT effort in light of the Forest 
Service's ecosystem management.
688 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, Viability Assessments and 
Management Considerations , 8.
684 Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT."
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Wildlife Accounting: The Scientific Assessment Team
Judge Dwyer's decision required the agency to answer three questions:685 
Did the Endangered Species Committee's May 15 decision to allow the logging 
of the 13 BLM timber sales change the viability assessment the Forest Service 
prepared for its 1992 Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management 
for the Northern Spotted Owl in the National Forests? Did new information 
found since the 1992 EIS require revision of the selected alternative or change 
the viability of the owl? Would implementation of the plan lead to 
"extirpation" in agency planning areas of any of 32 listed species "associated 
with old growth"? Chief Dale Robertson had assembled "a technical 
"Scientific Assessment Team" (SAT) to provide the assessments/' assigning 
Jack Ward Thomas as team leader.686
Thomas and others in the Forest Service were aware that hundreds and 
perhaps thousands of species were associated with old-growth forests and that 
the agency would be better off assessing them immediately. Thomas 
remembers pleading his case to Jim Overbay, Deputy Chief for the National 
Forest System, "who assigned the team," and Overbay cooperated.687 Thomas 
recalled:
I ... said, "Look, why don't we quit evading the real issue and 
answer the appropriate question. The question is: "There aren't 
39 species associated with old growth, there are maybe 900 or 
1,400 of them. Let's look at the whole spectrum of species."
685 Ibid., 8.
686 Thomas and Marcot, Of Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10; SAT, 9-10.
687 Thomas, "Interview," 3.
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Overbay said "OK, let's go." So I wrote the instructions that he 
would then give to us to follow.688
Thomas then wrote the letter of instruction to himself and the Team, as he
had for the ISC committee, incorporating the mandate for this expanded
assessment within the "Guidelines for the Scientific Analysis Team for the
Northern Spotted Owl."689
On March 19, 1993, the new Clinton administration presented the SAT 
report to Judge William Dwyer. According to Thomas, the most 
distinguishing feature of the report was that the team had expanded the 
mission to include a nearly complete "catalogue" of species "closely associated 
with old growth," species ranging from fungi to fish.690 Though the report 
did not get much press attention, it was an important document because, in 
Thomas' view, assessing this expanded list required a process that was 
tantamount to an ecosystem assessment. Thomas recalls:
Now the Administration was not ready to talk ecosystems just yet.
But when you consider 900 to 1,400 species and their interactions and 
interdependence, you are talking about ecosystems. The SAT report 
never made the headlines like ISC and FEMAT, but the SAT report 
was a truly crucial turning point. That's when we looked at all 
associated species. At that point everything bogged down in political 
controversy.691
In all, the report included assessments of 667 species "listed as closely 
associated" — a dramatic increase over the original number of species Judge 
Dwyer had ordered the agency to assess. According to the Team, this
688 ibid.
689 Thomas, "Interview," 1,3; Overbay, James, Instructions for the Scientific Analysis Team, in 
U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, Viability Assessments and Management 
Considerations , Appendix 2B.
690 Thomas and Marcot, Of Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10.
691 Thomas, "Interview," 3.
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expansion was partially due to changing the definition of "associated with old 
growth"692:
The environmental Impact Statement [on Management for the 
Northern Spotted Owl in the National Forests] identified 32 
species of terrestrial vertebrate wildlife (amphibians, reptiles, 
birds, and mammals) that are closely associated with late- 
successional or old-growth forests or components of old-growth 
forest. ... Our analysis refined the basis for evaluating the degree 
of association of these species with late-successional and old- 
growth forests, and expanded the evaluation to include fungi, 
lichens, plants, invertebrates, and fish, in addition to all 
terrestrial vertebrates.693
The mandate of the Team was to provide a qualitative assessment and a 
framework for assessing the viability of old-growth species in context of 
various management scenarios. This assessment would not be quantitative 
and would rely on the judgment of Team members:
In estimating habitat associations and risks of extirpation, the 
Scientific Analysis Team was not expected to conduct a formal 
viability assessment for each forest species associated with old- 
growth forests. Rather, we were directed to use common sense 
and expert judgment and to explicitly display and discuss the 
process used for establishing viability ratings.694
In the report, the Team argued that such "full disclosure and knowledge" 
of the effects on all old growth species resulting from implementation of the 
Spotted owl plan would be important for the plan's "selection and 
im plem entation."695 In addition, a broad assessment would better meet the 
agency's mandate to manage for biodiversity. Importantly for the future of 
Forest Service management, the structure of the report would provide a 
framework from which to produce ecosystem management: "Such a
692 Thomas and Marcot, Of Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10.
693 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, 259.
694 Ibid., 258.
695 Ibid., 259.
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comprehensive approach lays the groundwork for a more complete approach 
to ecosystem management."696 Nine months after Chief Dale Robertson had 
committed the Forest Service to an expedient "marriage" with "ecosystem 
management," the agency was beginning to articulate what the term would 
mean.
The "Forest Conference" and FEMAT
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration was developing its political 
solution to the crisis in the Pacific Northwest. After replacing the retiring 
Chief Robertson with the new Chief Jack Ward Thomas, the administration 
began producing a "Northwest Forest Conference" slated for the following 
April 2, in Portland, Oregon, at which Clinton and Vice-president A1 Gore 
would sit face-to-face and discuss concerns regarding the west side forests. 
Yaffee points to the Clinton administration's media presentation of the event, 
writing that "the forest conference was remarkable in several ways. It 
showcased the President and Vice-President of the United States, along with 
three cabinet secretaries, sitting around a conference table for a full day, 
talking domestic policy with those who ostensibly would be most directly 
affected by any course of action, while the rest of the nation had the 
opportunity to watch the proceedings on national television."697 Yaffee also 
refers to the political and symbolic nature of the conference, to which the 
Forest Service and Congress — "some of the more major historic players in 
the dispute" — noticeably were not invited. He writes, "the symbolism was 
unmistakable: Here was a conference focused largely on the future of
696 ibid. Also see Thomas, "Interview," 1; Durbin, Tree Hungers, 197.
697 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 141-42.
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national forest management in the Pacific Northwest, and the chief of the FS 
and the elected representatives of the regions population were not at the 
table."698
The Clinton and Gore campaign had relied upon the promise of avoiding 
the "false choices" between environmental and economic issues — 
particularly in regard to the political conflict associated with the Pacific 
Northwest "forest ecosystems."699 At the conference, Clinton revisited the 
political issue of "balance" -  a key signifier during this struggle — implying 
that he and the people of the Pacific Northwest could devise a policy that 
would preserve significant wildlife and allow for logging at the same time. 
But, balancing continued to mean the consideration of both sides of the 
"loggers versus owls" issue. Clinton addressed the issue of such balance in  a 
question to conferencees:
How can we achieve a balanced and comprehensive policy that 
recognizes the importance of the forest and timber to the 
economy and jobs in this region, and how can we preserve our 
precious old-growth forest, which are part of our national 
heritage and that, once destroyed, can never be replaced?700
In the language of this rhetoric, the "owls versus jobs" dichotomy
persisted, yet Clinton, in the same tone as the New Perspectives rhetoric,
claimed that the end to the political turmoil would require substituting the
choice between these uses with some sort of reconciliation. The President
claimed:
The most important thing we can do is to admit... that there are 
no simple or easy answers. This is not about choosing between
698 Ibid., 141-42.
899 Morganthau, "A Lighter Shade of Green," 24.
700 Clinton, in Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT," 6.
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jobs and the environment, but about recognizing the 
importance of both.701
A reconciliation would deliver a perpetual supply of commodities 
without sacrificing "forest health," a term that was beginning to find coinage 
in the political struggle around the national forests. In his advocacy for forest 
health, Clinton even went so far as to evoke its religious value (with implicit 
references to Christian deism): "We need to protect the long-term health of 
our forests, our wildlife, and our waterways. They are a gift from God, and we 
hold them in trust for future generations."702 A policy would have to, in 
Clinton's words, "produce a predictable and sustainable level of timber sales 
and nontimber resources that will not degrade or destroy the 
environm ent."703
Furthermore, establishing this balance would require a change in the 
terms of struggle — the interdepartmental (and intradepartmental) struggle 
within the federal government, explicitly, and the struggle between 
government and public implicitly. The shift would be tantamount to an 
institutional change in natural resource politics — from an adversarial 
approach to a consensual approach: "We will do our best... to make the 
federal government work together and work for you. We may make 
mistakes, but we will try to end the gridlock within the federal government 
and we will insist on collaboration, not confrontation."704
701 Ibid., 6.
702 Ibid., 6.
703 Ibid., 6.
704 Ibid., 6.
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Before the Forest Conference, the administration had begun setting up the 
"Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team" (FEMAT) — recruiting 
members, renting space, and buying equipment — which Thomas was to 
lead.705 The team would include representatives from six agencies, among 
them the Forest Service, to construct a set of alternatives for managing the 
Northwest forests. Among them were Jerry Franklin, Eric Forsman, and 
Charles Meslow, all well known for their roles in the forest policy dialogue. 
The president ordered the team to synthesize the political demands voiced at 
the forest conference, demands which amounted to reiterations of the same 
values underlying the conflict over forest planning all along. The new plan 
would address the demands of the timber industry and its cohort of loggers 
and "timber communities," while speaking to the issue of species 
preservation and "forest health." Further, the project would muster scientific 
credibility, establish a direct line of decision-making, and conform to federal 
administrative and environmental law.706
The Clinton administration imposed five constraints — or "criteria" — to 
guide the process. The first criterion limited alternatives to those that could 
be analyzed within sixty days, effectively limiting the options to plans already 
developed, for instance, those developed by the Scientific Panel. The second, 
third, and fourth criteria, which included risk analysis language, had to do 
with ensuring that the team's solutions would "provide a medium to very 
high probability of ensuring species viability" in the face of timber 
harvesting.707 The second criterion stipulated that "the majority of the
705 Thomas, "Interview," 7.
7°6 ForestEcosystemManagement Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, ii-iv, II-4.
707 Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
options should have a relatively high probability of successfully meeting the 
objectives for each of the five biological criteria" developed by the team. 
These sub-criteria stipulated the maintenance of viable populations of the 
northern spotted owl, marbled murrelets, "at-risk fish species and stocks," 
"other species associated w ith old-growth forests," and finally, "maintaining 
an interacting late-successional/old-growth forest ecosystem."708 The third 
and fourth criteria stipulated that, respectively, "at least one of the options 
must have a medium probability rating" (for the biological criteria) and one 
must have a "very high rating."709 Clearly, the construction of a viability 
assessment would be central to the report, and given the short time period 
allowed the team, it would rely upon further developing the assessments 
from the SAT report.710 The fifth criterion also determined that the team 
would construct a statement of tradeoffs, requiring that "options selected 
should include at least one developed from an approach focusing on species 
and at least one developed from an approach focusing on old-growth forest 
stands."711
When the team went about assembling the report, much of its work 
comprised of constructing options from 29 previously written plans (ranging 
from the 1984 regional guide to the National Forest Products Association's 
"multi-resource strategy," to the modifications of the ISC strategy).712 
According to Thomas, the team merely refined the earlier ISC, Scientific 
Panel, and SAT reports to develop FEMAT: "So it started off as an owl plan,
708 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, HI-1.
709 Ibid., m-3.
710 Thomas, "Interview," 3.
711 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, III-3.
712 Ibid., El-2.
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but basically, when you look at FEMAT, if  s just ISC with bells and whistles 
hung on it."713
To construct the options, the team used a zoning procedure, first dividing 
all federal lands in the three state owl region (a total of 24,261,000 acres) into 
two categories — "congressionally withdrawn" for wilderness, national parks, 
and wild and scenic rivers (6,983,100 acres) and acres to be allocated (17,278,000 
acres).714 For the present, "the pie" would consist of these 17-million acres. 
For each option, the team would divide the contestable acreage differently 
according to a classification scheme using four zones, each corresponding 
with a general management goal (or set of goals). "Administratively 
withdrawn areas" would be managed for recreation, "visual protection," 
"certain other administrative objectives/' or lands unsuitable for timber. 
"Late-successional reserves" — would be "protected from most management 
activities... though some level of silviculture might be permitted to enhance 
the development of old-growth characteristics." On "managed late 
successional areas" (only featured in options 1 and 3) agencies would allow 
commercial logging, but with the objective of creating "late-successional" 
characteristics which would allow more logging than the late successional 
reserves. All options allocated some lands to "Riparian reserves," which 
were, in general, protected from logging. (All these categories of "reserves," 
as well as the team's would correspond with the "patches" from the 
landscape ecology model.) "Matrix" would constitute "all federal lands
Thomas, "Interview," 1.
714 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table III- 
5.
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outside the above six categories."715 FEMAT'S use of the term "matrix" to 
designate lands "outside the above" reflected landscape ecology's coupling of 
"matrix" with the term (and idea of) "background." But, given the 
contestability of these land uses, from a political point of view, they were not 
necessarily "background."
For each of the various options, the team altered the proportion of the 
total land allocated to the zones, as well as altering specific management rules 
governing each zone. For instance, in option 1, the group designated the 
highest amount of land to late successional reserves — 11,495,500 acres (two- 
thirds of the contested acreage) — and the lowest amount to matrix — 2,830,600 
acres (roughly 15%). By contrast, option 7 designated the lowest amount to 
late successional reserves — 5,912,600 acres (one-third the contested acreage) — 
and the most to matrix — 8,459,800 acres (a little under half the contested 
acreage). Acreage assigned to late successional reserves in the various options 
ranged 5,582,000 acres — roughly one-third the total contestable acreage, and 
acreage assigned to matrix ranged 5,629,000 — also about one-third the total 
contestable acreage.716
The team assessed the results of the options in terms of a limited set of 
concerns: expected population viabilities for the various species protected 
under the Endangered Species Act, and timber; aside from the Clinton 
administrations criteria concerning species viability, the team judged that
715 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 145. Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest 
Ecosystem Management, EQ-3-13.
716 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table III- 
5.
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"the economic and social implications of the options should be 
considered."717 Of the "implications," only economics was assessed in 
quantitative, comparative terms, and this assessment primarily concerned 
tim ber harvest — in terms of board feet and jobs. (The team did not offer 
comparisons for expected range and mining uses under the different options.) 
The report also mentioned "Non-commodity production," which amounted 
to various categories within a "Recreation Opportunity Spectrum setting," 
with little comparative value. The report was concerned primarily with 
timber harvesting.718
In addition to evaluating "the likelihood of maintaining sufficient 
habitat, well distributed on federal lands, to provide for the continued 
existence of viable populations of northern spotted owls and marbled 
murrelets," the team "performed similar assessments for more than 1,000 
plant and animal species closely associated with old-growth forests."719 To 
choose which species to assess, the team used criteria that Thomas had 
devised for associating with "late-successional forest conditions."720 The 
assessment project depended upon the personal judgments of "more than 70 
experts" serving on "14 separate assessment panels." The team set up a 
process (called "judgment probabilities") that allowed specialists to translate 
the certainty or uncertainty of their knowledge pertaining to individual 
species into numerical values. In addition, the team set up a process for 
appropriating knowledge (based upon interpretations of literature and
717 Ibid., m-3.
718 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table VI- 
1-36.
^  Mesiow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 24.
720 Ibid, 24.
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research) pertaining to a species into an evaluation of the effects of each 
option upon that species. According to Charles Meslow, Richard Holthausen, 
and David Cleaves, who were part of the FEMAT:
Each panel was asked to estimate the likelihood of four possible 
outcomes [on species viability] for habitat conditions on federal 
lands. The panel process was designed to elicit expert opinion 
and professional judgment. We used advice from the panel, 
other information, and our own expertise to make the final 
assessment.721
The team constructed the "outcomes" along a continuum from habitat "of 
sufficient quality, distribution, and abundance to allow the species population 
to stabilize, well distributed across federal lands" to habitat conditions that 
would "result in species extirpation from federal land."722 Eighty percent 
likelihood of achieving the strictest outcome (most likely for viability) 
constituted the operational definition of viability.723
Since the criteria instructed by the Clinton administration required a 
diversity of effects, from requiring a majority of options to meet the biological 
criteria with high ratings to requiring one option to have a medium level, the 
team was able to establish discernible contrasts between options; in this way 
the team was able to make clear the trade-offs inherent — through an agency 
perspective — between the timber and wildlife associated with ancient forests. 
The construction also expressed choices between options in terms that would 
allow Forest Service and administration officials to be aware of the legal 
effects of agency management, at least in terms of the Endangered Species Act.
721 Ibid.,24.
722 Ibid., 26.
723 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, 11-28; 
Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26.
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When May, 1993, the FEMAT working groups presented their work to the 
full team, culminating the previous weeks' work, they discovered that two of 
the eight options developed to date were unacceptable according to the 
biological criteria (7, and 8).724 Of the remaining six, option 5 offered the 
highest annual harvest off the "owl forests," at 915 million board feet (118,000 
jobs), and option 6, the second highest, offered 774 million board feet (117,500 
jobs).725 One billion board feet, politically, was the industry's minimal 
acceptable offering, and the team had failed to deliver this am oun t726 
According to Thomas, many of the FEMAT team members were surprised at 
the results: "Some, including me, were stunned by the low numbers" — 
particularly those concerning the timber yield.727
George Frampton, Assistant Secretary of Interior for the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Park System (and former president of the 
Wilderness Society), sensed that the timber supply numbers would not be 
politically acceptable, commenting "If that was to be the timber cut in the final 
alternatives, it wouldn't be acceptable." Regarding the team's scientists, 
Frampton commented that the scientists, too, sensed that the timber harvest 
quantities were politically unacceptable: "They knew what the margins 
were."728 Thomas recollects that the team had failed to find an alternative 
with the correct balance promised by the administration. He noted:
724 Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26-27.
725 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, VI-5, 28.
725 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 203.
727 Thomas, "Interview," 5.
728 George Frampton, in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 203.
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We tried to create an array of options all the way from very 
strong environmental protection to high levels of timber 
production- And then, when we wanted some intermediate 
ones that cut close to the line, we could not come up w ith any 
that did not go "off the edge" on the two sides (protection and 
production," yet maybe it would not stand up to legal muster.
The option with absolute protection of the environment 
probably would not be politically and economically acceptable.
We needed a full array of options. But when we got through, we 
simply did not have any that were feasible that included 
production of more than 600 to 800 million board feet.729
The team members perceived that none of their alternatives would be 
politically acceptable, but some of them believed that they could find a 
solution if given a little more time. Jerry Franklin convinced the team to 
attempt to produce another option that would be politically acceptable. 
Thomas recalls:
Jerry Franklin... rather passionately declared that we had not yet 
done the job. We were all tired and completely exhausted.
Franklin made a plea "lef s try one more option." He took the 
lead in the development of Option 9. The team was pooped, but 
he got up and said, "Come on guys, one more time." Thus Jerry 
Franklin "fathered" Option 9.730
Ultimately, Franklin, whose background in silviculture established his
perspective as a forester, led the effort to craft another option.
By June, they had developed "Option Nine," and in July, the team 
published its report, which "yielded the groundwork for the administration 
to chart a course through the political negotiation and maneuvering that was 
sure to come."731 Of all the options that would satisfy the legal conditions, 
particularly in context of the ninth circuit court, Option 9 would produce the
729 Thomas, "Interview," 4. Thomas heavily edited this transcript, softening much of the 
lanuage from the actual interview.
730 Ibid., 4.
731 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 145.
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most timber — 1.2 billion board feet — and jobs at — 119,800 jobs. Thomas 
sensed that Clinton would choose this alternative.722
With the option, the team delegated 7,053,600 acres to late-successional 
reserves and 4,853,300 acres to matrix. The team made this new option 
possible by redefining the zoning categories that it had established, 
particularly the idea of reserves.733 For instance, "Late-Successional 
Reserves" would not be limited to old-growth, but would, in addition, 
include areas with stands less than 80 years old to be "managed" (through 
silviculture) for old-growth characteristics.734 Furthermore, forestry 
management, including salvage logging and commercial and precommercial 
thinning, would be allowed. In FEMAT's words, referring to the west side, 
'Thinnings (precommercial and commercial) may occur in any stand up to 80 
years of age regardless of the origin of the stand," though it would be subject 
to "review by an interagency oversight team to ensure that they are beneficial 
to the creation of late-successional forest conditions."735
The reserves were neither pristine nor inviolate, thus challenging a 
preservationist interpretation of biological reserves. According to Jerry 
Franklin, progenitor of new forestry, old-growth might not be necessary for 
meeting wildlife and ecological objectives, if manipulation of younger stands 
heeded certain structural objectives: T  don't think old-growth is that much
more important or better than later stages of a mature forest in providing
722 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 205.
722 StCIair, "Cutting it Down the Middle."
734 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-21
725 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-21
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services to the environment. ... [I]f we are good with our forest management, 
we can perpetuate some of the characteristics of old growth without actually 
perpetuating the old-growth forest."736 (This was the promise of new 
forestry.)
In the "matrix" areas, between reserves, the Team included over 4 million 
acres that would be open to some form of logging. According to the report, 
Option 9 zoned over 30 percent of the remaining 8.5 million acres of "late- 
successional and old-growth forest" (c. 2.8 million acres) into the matrix.737 
In addition, it designated over 30 percent of the remaining 4.5 million acres of 
"old-growth only" lands (c. 1.3 million acres) to matrix lands. The team also 
abandoned the Scientific Committee's use of the "50-11-40 rule" for matrix 
lands, which was designed to accommodate wildlife movement, effectively 
loosening constraints upon logging.738 In lieu of this 50-11-40 coverage, the 
team used riparian zones to meet wildlife viability objectives.739 Much of the 
promised timber would come from the matrix old-growth.
For Option Nine, the team invented "adaptive management areas." In 
these ten management areas, which ranged from 84,000 to 400,000 acres, "well 
distributed in the physiographic provinces," agencies would conduct 
silvicultural experiments and allow commercial logging.740 These areas each
7^6 Franklin in StClair, "Cutting it Down the Middle," 13.
^ 7 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Tearn, "Objectives, Process, and Options," 
(diagram, p. 15). (Hereafter, FEMAT, "Objectives.")
738 In the words of FEMAT, "The 50-11-40 rule ... calls for at least 50 percent of the federal 
forested land within each quarter township to be forested with trees averaging at least 11 
inches in diameter at breast height and with a canopy dosure of at least 40 percent" FEMAT, 
"Objectives," 15.
FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, Ch. 3; FEMAT, "Objectives," 15.
740 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-24.
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contained diverse age and class structures and composition, including a 
significant amount of old growth — additional land upon which the agencies 
could practice New Forestry.741 The adaptive management areas seemed to 
offer a context for applying administrative promises to manage for "balance," 
and the team placed them in politically controversial areas — areas with old- 
growth near timber dependent communities. According to the report, "Most 
are associated with subregions impacted socially and economically by reduced 
timber harvest from the federal lands. The areas provide a diversity of 
biological challenges, intermixed land ownerships, natural resource 
objectives, and social contexts."742
Soon after Clinton unveiled the plan in July, activists began to study the 
maps. Many groups responded in protest to some of the allocations, some 
that would allow clearcut logging in prized roadless areas and others that they 
felt would jeopardize other ecological values. For example, they objected to 
designations that would allow logging in the "steepsided watershed of Still 
Creek east of Portland, in Mount Hood National Forest, forested with natural 
stands of Douglas-fir, cedar, and hemlock 80 to 100 years old."743 "In the 
Siskiyous, Option 9 placed more than 30,000 acres of burned over, heavily 
roaded BLM plantations in a reserve while leaving several pristine roadless 
areas open to logging." Deputy Interior Secretary George Frampton 
commented that "We all knew going in that an ecologically credible plan 
would not produce more than 1 billion board feet," but nevertheless, he
741 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, III-24r25; S t Clair, "Cutting it Down the Middle"; 
According to Yaffee, this was "the magic of adaptive management," Spotted Owl, 146.
742 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-24.
743 Ibid, 205.
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assented to the plan.744 The Wilderness Society proclaimed that Option 9 
was merely a political substitution for the FEMAT process — a political 
construction that failed to fulfill the mission of solving ecological problems: 
"Unfortunately, administration officials — who were mostly interested in 
producing a politically correct "balanced solution" -- did not heed the 
FEMAT's advice."745
In any case, Clinton would move ahead with the plan, but first he had to 
grapple with the court imposed timber injunction. The following November, 
the administration formed a deal with plaintiffs in the Portland Audubon 
Society v. Lujan case that had resulted in an injunction from logging on 
spotted owl land. Tom Collier, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's chief of staff, 
had requested the plaintiffs to release of 200 million board feet of timber (on 
BLM lands) from the injunction continued by Judge Dwyer of the Ninth 
Circuit Court in early 1992.746 The release apparently would demonstrate 
good faith on the part of the environmental groups as well as allowing 
Babbitt to meet his commitment to sell 2 billion board feet of timber in the 
first year of the Clinton administration.747
Collier also used intimidation, warning the plaintiffs that without a 
"good-faith effort," on their part, Interior Secretary Babbit would urge the 
administration to immunize his plan from legal challenge through 
legislation.748 Environmentalists and strategists influencing the plaintiffs,
744 Frampton in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 205.
745 Anderson, "Prescription," 39.
746 "Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992)."
747 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 209.
748 Ibid., 209.
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including Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund lawyer, Kevin Kirchner, took 
seriously the threat of the rider. Other lawyers followed the same track, and 
"at one point [according to Larry Tuttle, executive director of the Oregon 
Natural Resources Council, plaintiffs] SCLDF attorneys Vic Sher and Todd 
True threatened to fire ONRC as a client if Tuttle refused to go along with the 
deal." Malanie Rowland, a Wilderness Society attorney, advocated the deal, 
believing a friendly relationship with the Clinton administration was critical: 
"We had to have their support. If we didn't, I d idn 't see any ways we could 
hold on to our victories."749 In addition, Montana Senator Conrad Bums (R) 
and others were attempting to split the 9th Circuit, which had long had the 
reputation of being environmentally friendly. The plaintiffs went for the 
deal, and in April 1994, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior issued 
records of decision, (slightly modifying the plan) and issued guidelines for 
conducting necessary assessments and studies of management effects.750
Meanwhile, the timber industry objected to the plan for reductions in 
timber levels. Attacking its claim to "balance" and calling it a "problem, not a 
solution," John Hampton, chief executive officer of the Willamina Lumber 
Company of Portland, Oregon, lambasted FEMAT for usurping presidential 
power to assert its environmentalist biases into policy751:
Following the forest summit, President Clinton called for a plan 
that recognized the "human and economic dimensions of these 
problems"; that was "scientifically sound, ecologically credible, 
and legally responsible"; and that produced "a predictable and 
sustainable level of timber sales." Instead, the FEMAT produced 
a major policymaking effort to "revolutionize land management
749 Rowland in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 211.
750 Marcot and Thomas, O f Spotted Owls, 11.
751 Hampton, "A Problem, Not a Solution," 25.
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in the Pacific Northwest/' This outcome was not anticipated 
when the president asked the "best scientists" to find ways to 
protect the forest environment while minimizing the human 
impact. The new policy developed by the FEMAT is not a 
balanced solution to the forest debate.752
Other industry representatives criticized the process as a product of 
"scientific opinion, not process," pointing to its political nature and arguing 
that the process was too exclusive. James Newberry, a manager for Potlach 
Corporation, wrote in the Journal o f Forestry:
The FEMAT report, in large part, is the opinion of a group of 
scientists and not the result of a rigorous application of the 
scientific method. Therefore, a group composition is critical to 
an objective evaluation and implementable plan. I believe the 
FEMAT team lacked the broad perspective that would have been 
achieved by selecting scientists representing a variety of 
organizations and specialties as well as on-the-ground managers. 
Silvicultural expertise does not appear to be as well represented 
as wildlife and fisheries.753
Another critic voiced a more extreme version of the complaint that the 
FEMAT process had been too closed, alluding to its secrecy and evasion and 
accusing the team of reinstituting the environment versus timber dichotomy:
The FEMAT approach to this charge displayed all of the 
characteristics of technocratic self-protection: controlled access, 
invisible agenda, obscure language, unaccountable 
proceduralization [sic], and most importantly, fallback to the 
understood comforts of environment versus industry.754
Soon the timber industry translated this critique into a court case 
against the Forest Service, using the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
"intended to ensure that Federal agencies treat equally all non-Federal and 
nongovernment interests, and not establish advisory committees consisting
752 Ibid., 25.
752 Newberry, "Scientific Opinion, Not Process," 44.
754 Romm, "Professional Springtime," 47.
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of preferential membership."755 By 1997, the case had not been resolved; 
though the government lost the case in Washington, D.C, the judge has 
refused to order an injunction halting implementation of the plan.756
Concluding Remarks
Constructing the FEMAT process required a serious political effort and, 
ultimately, muscle from the Clinton administration. But, the politicians did 
what they needed to do, and the FEMAT process went on. Presumably, the 
benefits would include a reinstatement of some Forest Service (and hence, 
administrative) authority in land management in the owl forests.
Through the FEMAT process, the Forest Service (and other 
participants) used the logical frameworks developed by the ISC, Scientific 
Panel, and SAT to institute a planning structure for what it would call 
ecosystem management. Through the planning process, the Forest Service 
was be able to designate and distribute resources on the national forests. With 
this framework in place, the individual national forests would be able to 
construct or revise their own plans and presumably remain within the law. 
Presumably, they would be able to incorporate this process of ecosystem 
management into the regular Forest Service planning cycle.
755 Marcot and Thomas, Of Spotted Owls, 12
756 Ibid., 12
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion
The lordly right o f giving names extends so far that one 
should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language 
itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: 
they say "this is this and this ,"  they seal every thing and 
event roith a sound and, as it were, take possession o f it.
— Frederich Nietzsche 
Geneaology o f Morals
What this history demonstrates is that, insofar as Ecosystem Management 
pertains to policy, political choices have produced forest policy and its related 
science (in the inclusive sense — the historical process and the scientific texts). 
Scientists have been involved, but their role has been to construct a technical 
process — including the rules, terminology, and information — through which 
politicians will struggle for and negotiate over the actual distribution of 
resources.757 In the words of FEMAT:
We believe the assessments of the current situation, the 
previous assessment of the situation, and the options presented 
herein are adequate to support an informed decision as to a 
course of action. Our work as scientists, economists, analysts, 
and technicians is complete. Whatever decisions that may 
emerge from this work are now, most appropriately, in the 
hands of elected leaders.758
Thus, the FEMAT team was responsible for defining the parameters of a 
political discourse, not for choosing which course the agencies would follow.
757 Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT." Loosely speaking FEMAT, Ecosystem 
Management was a "user's guide" to ecosystem management 
75® FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, 1-3.
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The FEMAT did not make the distinction — directly or indirectly — 
between which of its options would be Ecosystem Management and which 
would not, because all options were Ecosystem Management options. The 
planning process — judging and constructing the viability assessments of 
several species across large landscapes, designating certain areas to 'large-scale 
management experiments," others to "reserves," and such activities outlined 
by FEMAT and the earlier reports are the characteristics that distinguished it 
from other management styles.
The process and the language used in articulating and actualizing any of 
the options constitute Ecosystem Management, not any particular set of 
consequences, or prescriptions. The best the agency can do is make available 
to politicians the language and designations of resources for their 
negotiations — aside from its ability to lobby, which varies. In producing 
ecosystem management, the Forest Service was constructing a planning 
framework — a decision-making process with a management language 
(including terminology, imagery, cartography). Through ecosystem 
management, the Forest Service would continue to be executor of the whims 
of presidential and congressional politics, but it would again define the terms 
of the negotiation. Ecosystem management performs a mediating role; it 
provides a framework for classifying, mapping, and inventorying space, 
conceptually linking desire to prescription to activities over that space, and 
assessing trade-offs between activities, particularly, logging and preservation.
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An important question that remains concerns w hat distinguishes this 
process and language, this paradigm, as different from the preceding NFMA 
model. (Recall that Ecosystem Management is itself governed by the NFMA.) 
Jack Ward Thomas has argued that use of tiered spatial "scales" for assessing 
consequences marks the difference.759 Perhaps more important is its use of 
the process of risk assessment for a wider variety of old-growth "associated" 
species viability."760
Another important question that remains concerns "What marks this 
paradigm as being the same as the preceding model?" To me, the most 
obvious answer also links Ecosystem Management with MUSY: promises of 
a little for everyone. Multiple use promised that, through intensive 
management, the national forests could provide game, recreation, and 
timber. Ecosystem Management still promises a little bit for everyone — 
although now with a wider variety — an expanded range of values, in situ as 
well as output-oriented, for instance, ancient trees, habitat for rare species, lod 
of spiritual and aesthetic value, structural complexity, biological, diversity, 
and so on.
In the years since the agency's "marriage" to Ecosystem Management, the 
discourse has moved in the direction of "forest health." Jack Ward Thomas, 
as Chief of the Forest Service in 1995, told the 60th North American Wildlife 
and Natural Resources Conference (NAW), in Minneapolis, Minnesota, that 
"By sustaining healthy ecosystems, present and future generations may reap
759 Thomas, "Forest Health," 4.
760 Yaffee attributes great significance to this technology, first used in the Interagency 
Scientific Committee report. Spotted Owl, 83.
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the benefits that healthy, diverse and productive ecosystems provide." Forest 
"health" is key here, but its definition is somewhat vague and even circular. 
In the NAW paper, Thomas defines a "healthy forest" as one "that is a fully 
functioning community of plants and animals and their physical 
environment." This would seem straightforward, but "fully functioning" 
turns out to be defined relative to objectives: "In this concept, fire, insects, 
and disease — at appropriate levels - are components of healthy forests." But, 
the idea of "appropriate" follows from the political designation of "objectives 
of management and by the economics of management actions."761
Health, the latest pursuit of Ecosystem Management, has to do with the 
productive capacities of the material conditions — the "extant biotic and 
abiotic influences" ~  available for pursuit of objectives, themselves products 
of political desire. In the words of Jack Ward Thomas, speaking as Forest 
Service Chief in 1995, "I propose that a desired state of forest health exists 
where extant biotic and abiotic influences do not threaten resource 
management objectives now or in the future — including ecosystem 
function."762 Even Bryan Norton, who longs for science-based management, 
admits that ecosystem health is "a highly normative concept."763 In language 
"appropriate" to the context, Thomas closes the signification circle, writing 
"the desired state of forest health exists where extant biotic and abiotic 
influences do not threaten resource management objectives now or in the
761 Thomas, "Forest Health," 3.
762 Ibid., 3.
763 Norton, Toward a Unity , 193,239.
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fu tu re." ?6 4  Presumably, even the timber industry would agree to this 
definition.
764 Thomas, "Forest Health," 2.
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